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Abstract 
 
 
How do we think the photographer as a creator? This question often provokes a debate regarding 
the limits of the photographic medium: In particular, the potential for freedom of creative 
expression.  The concern that photography is unable to afford the artist sufficient creative control 
over her work follows from the observation that photographs are causally related to the object 
photographed. Consequentially, the viewer is unable to take an interest towards the photograph 
as an aesthetic representation; since it is the object photographed that holds the attention of the 
viewer, rather than the photograph itself. 
 
However, I contend that in reaching this conclusion we overlook the decisive impact of 
photography on the creative practice of picture making. Rather than illustrate the artist as 
restricted in her use of the photographic medium, I aim to show how photography has 
transformed the relationship between artist, subject and medium. The access to and engagement 
with her subject requires a different kind of approach.  
 
Instead of following the usual route that attempts to mark out a description of creative practice 
which has as its centre the intentions of the artist, I claim that a more insightful approach may 
surface from rethinking the role of the artist: A role in which the quality of intention does not 
follow – solely – from the imaginative or interpretive intentions of the artist, but emerges from a 
multitude of perspectives.
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Photography: Intention, transparency and the role of the artist 
 
Introduction 
 
A discussion of the role of the artist in relation to the creative practice of photography often falls 
prey to misrepresentation. This distortion, I claim centres on the notion of intention; and is based 
on the idea that due to the mechanical process of photography we are unable to take an interest 
towards the photograph as representative of the artist’s intention. In this investigation I aim to 
reconsider the notion of intention in relation to the photographic. It is my claim that the creative 
practice of photography requires a different attitude towards the parameters of expressivity. 
 
Very quickly after the formal recognition of its technical principles, the debate regarding the 
artistic potential of photography formed many contradictory perspectives. From the Pictorialists 
belief that photography afforded the artist a new way of picture making to Baudelaire’s rejection 
of photography as a creative art-form, the landscape of this discussion is extremely familiar in 
debates regarding the aesthetic potential of the medium. There is nothing new about asking the 
question; is photography art? However, I contend that agreeing one way or another does not help 
us understand better anything peculiar to the creative potential of photography. 
 
So then why discuss the role of the artist in relation to photography? If we have – whether 
grudgingly or not – accepted photography as a valid artform what need is there probe any 
further, characteristics peculiar to the medium? I agree that there would be no need to do so were 
it that a discussion of the creative practice of photography followed from a clear understanding 
of the parameters of the intentional. Yet the problem of locating the photographer’s intention 
remains. 
 
The problems remains, I claim, because in discussing the creative potential of photography, we 
have yet to confront what I consider to be a transformation of the role of the artist – in relation to 
pictorial representation. I am not suggesting that the creative practice of picture making has been 
irrevocably altered – wholesale – due to the impact of photography. Simply that in discussing 
photography, we must consider the possibility that the role of the creator and therefore, her 
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intentions, take on a new direction. In this introduction I intend to establish what I consider to be 
the source of the misinterpretation of the creative practice of photography.  
 
Photographic neutrality 
 
The view that I will be opposing in this investigation concerns the description of photography 
and photographing as a process which debars human intervention; in the act of photographing the 
photographer is for Andre Bazin rendered neutral.
1
 The manner by which photographic realism 
removes the intentional from the creative act has for Bazin enabled us to think of the 
photographic ‘image [as]… formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man.’2  
 
I will begin with what I regard to be the consequence of Bazin’s argument – concerning our 
understanding of the parameters of creative practice. Bazin’s discussion regarding the function 
and creative limits of photography has set in stone much of our modern criticism regarding 
creative photography:
3
 In particular, concerning the presence of the photographer’s intention – 
and from it our understanding of the photograph as expressive of a creative intent. Bazin thought 
that due to its mechanical process, photographs disallowed human intervention. Therefore, 
beyond the documentation of the object before the lens, we need not think of the medium as 
offering the artist a unique approach towards the creative practice of picture making. Bazin’s 
essay introduces us to the debate regarding photography and intention. However, it does not 
                                                          
1
 In Bazin’s influential essay the Ontology of the Photographic Image (1967) he discusses the impact of 
photography on the creative practice of picture making. For Bazin, the consequence of photographic realism enables 
the painter to give up what he refers to as the Renaissance project of realism; a striving towards realistic depiction. 
The mechanical objectivity of photography has, he claims, redirected the artistic practice of picture making towards 
pure expression and imaginative interpretation. This investigation focuses on what significance this has for our 
consideration of the creative practice of photography. 
 
2
 Bazin, A. (1967), p.13 
 
3
 Perhaps we might trace Bazin’s concerns regarding the creative potential of photography back to Baudelaire or 
more usefully Elisabeth Eastlake. However, Bazin’s argument regarding the impact of photography on the creative 
practice of picture making offers us a useful starting point with regards to how we are able to disseminate our 
understanding of the creative potential of the photographer. 
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examine the parameters of intentionality in representational art. Therefore, whilst it is necessary 
to trace the lineage of this discussion back to Bazin, I do not consider his argument beyond this 
introduction. 
 
My aim regarding the interpretation of the creative practice of photography concerns the role of 
the artist. The view that the mechanical debars creative intention, as introduced by Bazin, has 
taken on a more sophisticated form; in particular it has fostered a predilection towards 
underlining the limits and idiosyncrasies of human intervention – in relation to the creative 
practice of picture making.  
 
This perhaps, is due to the temptation to look for the painter – when measuring creative potential 
– in the practice of the photographer. However, by comparing a description of the photographer 
against the painter I claim we have a tendency to overlook the complexities of photographic 
practice. We often think that because the photographer is unable to control each and every aspect 
of the object before the lens theirs is a medium which is aesthetically less valuable.
4
   
 
In the first section of this investigation I will criticise what I regard to be a traditionalist 
understanding of creative practice; in particular concerning our understanding of the artist’s 
intent. In doing so my aim is to underline what I consider to be a misguided approach towards 
evaluating the photographer’s intent.  
 
Transparency 
 
I begin by tackling the notion that due to the status of causal dependency, photographs are 
transparent images. If we are to afford the photograph pictorial status – argues the transparency 
theorist – they are to be considered as the kind of pictures that enable us to see the object 
                                                          
4
 Certainly, in post-production the photographer is able to alter each and every aspect of the pixel or grain and to be 
sure there are some strong views concerning photography and manipulation. However, I think that due to 
multifarious uses of the medium, discussing one way of doing as more valid than another is often unhelpful. Within 
this discussion I make no value distinction between the digital and the analogue. If the image began with the 
depressing of a shutter release – as willed or otherwise – I regard that image as a photograph. 
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photographed and so we may think of the photograph as giving us perceptual access to that 
object. The concept of transparency is I claim a consequence of Bazin’s estimation that 
photographs do not involve human intervention. I do not reject the claim that claim that we may 
describe a photograph as a transparent picture; insofar as we see through a photograph to the 
object photographed. Nonetheless, I will argue that because a photography is causally related to 
an event, transparency does not entail likeness; the term event in this thesis refers to the 1/60
th
, 
1/30
th
, 1/15
th
, etc., of a second exposure.  
 
I do not aim to deny that photographers are – in some respects – in service to a machine, nor do I 
deny that the photograph – at the time of exposure – is not causally related to the object before 
the lens. However, I also claim that it is due to these factors that we find ourselves compelled to 
rethink the role of the artist. 
 
Presence of the artist 
 
To think about how we point towards the presence of the artist – her intention – in a 
photographic work, I claim, underlines our misunderstanding of its artistic appropriation. Some 
thinkers, as I will illustrate point out the composition as illustrative of the artist’ intention. 
Others, perhaps more naturally direct our attention towards the object photographed as the cause 
of our aesthetic interest whilst others still look to amalgamate these two possibilities.  
 
Perhaps the most common argument in support of the notion that the photographer has 
intentional control over her subject matter incorporates a historical perspective of the 
development of medium. The techniques of picture making in photography, so the argument 
follows have given the artist a different kind of freedom; normally related to developments in the 
craft of picture making, intentionality refers to the possibilities connected by the chemical and 
mechanical progression of photography. Whilst I acknowledge and occasionally reference the 
arguments in this area, I find that it not only sidetracks but actively distorts our main concern: To 
locate the manner by which the camera has added to the creative practice of picture making, I 
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contend that we need to consider how the mechanically dependent causal process has compelled 
the artist to rethink her role in relation to the interpretive and intentional.
5
    
 
Therefore, I claim that all other concerns – have the potential to – bypass what is most striking 
about the artistic appropriation of the photographic medium: That a photograph is related not 
primarily to the object before the lens but the duration of the exposure. A photograph, therefore, 
is – due to the causal process that involves a time-based exposure – a document of a moment. It 
is in an exploration of the moment or event, rather than the creation of an appearance that I claim 
we will find the photographer’s intent. 
 
By accepting that the photographer is unable to control every last detail within the frame, I will 
argue that the photographic work is not solely an expression of the artist’s voice. Nonetheless, 
this absence or silence – of an all pervasive authorial presence – does not reflect negatively on 
the creative appropriation of the photography; moreover I claim that it enables us to consider the 
photograph as not only an expression of the artist’s voice but how that voice relates to and is a 
reflection of the environment within which it is expressed.  
 
I contend that the identity of the artist, in this sense, should not be understood as defining the 
content of her work. Moreover, the intentions of the artist who chooses to photograph form, I 
claim, in dialogue with her subject matter. Michael Kenna perhaps best underlines this point in 
describing his role in the making of his beautifully crafted landscapes: 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 See Scharf, A. (1965). Aaron Scharf’s intelligent discussion of Creative Photography traces the history of artistic 
appropriation of the medium. Scharf’s expert understanding of the history of artistic photography clearly defines the 
arguments concerning an aesthetic understanding of photographic techniques. However, Scharf’s aims are quite 
different from those relating to this investigation. Whilst Scharf outlines a historical trajectory of the developments 
of artistic practice in photography, I aim to outline what is peculiar to the creative practice of photography. Not by 
pinpointing technical differences but by provoking a discussion of the impact of photography on our understanding 
of the intentional, the interpretive and the imaginative: In short, a discussion of the impact of photography on the 
role of the artist.  
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In my photographic work I’m generally attracted to places 
that contain memories, history, atmospheres and stories. I’m 
interested in the places where people have lived, worked and 
played. I look for traces of the past, visual fingerprints, 
evidence of activities - they fire my imagination and connect 
into my own personal experiences. Using the analogy of the 
theater, I would say that I like to photograph the empty stage, 
before or after the performance, even in between acts. I love 
the atmosphere of anticipation, the feeling in the air that 
events have happened, or will happen soon…6 
 
 
Therefore, the relationship between the artist, subject and her tool kit takes on a unique 
prominence in the creative practice of photography. It is a relationship in which the role of the 
artist is not only defined merely by reference to her intentions but how the work reflects the 
environment in which that intention is born.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Kenna, M. in interview with Telford, A. in Wraparound, Vol. 1, No.1, 2003. 
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Chapter 1 
The artistic aims of the photographer Intentionality and Appearance 
 
1.1: Finding the photographer 
 
In the Analytic Tradition, the argument regarding the aesthetic value of a photograph often 
revolves around a debate concerning representational value. Furthermore, within the parameters 
of an aesthetic discourse this involves an evaluation of the potential for the viewer to take an 
interest towards the photograph for its own sake. The challenge, according to the view that I will 
explore in this chapter is to prove that photographs are interesting as photographs; and not 
merely pictures that are transparent to the object photographed.  
 
In order to consider the potential that we may appreciate photography as a representational 
artform, it is first necessary to establish a criterion of correctness. This requires that I tackle two 
basic questions: What is the conceptual model of a photograph that I will be using and what are 
the conditions that need to be satisfied in order to call a picture representational art? The working 
model of a photograph that I use in this chapter is also a component integral to the argument 
concerning the value of the medium as a representational artform. I begin my discussion of 
photography and representational art with a critical exploration of Roger Scruton’s argument in 
his essay Photography and Representation.
7
 My abstract notion of a photograph is informed by 
his argument that we may describe the photograph as a picture that stands in causal relation to 
the object that is photographed; ‘The ideal photograph... stands in a certain relation to a subject. 
[A] photograph is a photograph of something… the relation is causal… In other words, if a 
photograph is a photograph of a subject, it follows that the subject exists.’8   
                                                          
7
 Scruton, R. (1998), pp. 119-148 
8
 Scruton, R. (1998), p. 121 
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For Roger Scruton, this description of a photograph is also used as evidence against the claim 
that we may appreciate an ideal photograph as representational art. Before I consider the second 
question; that addresses the conditions that need to be satisfied in order for us call a photograph 
representational art it is first important to add a corollary about the abstract understanding of 
photography that will be employed in this discussion. The conception of a photograph is in this 
thesis premised on a logical ideal rather than a normative substantiation, as it is for Scruton: ‘By 
an ‘ideal’ I mean a logical ideal. The ideal of photography is not an ideal at which photography 
aims or ought to aim.’9  
 
The potential for a medium to allow the artist to produce a work of art that is an embodiment of a 
thought about its subject is often taken to outline the parameters of representational art. This 
notion of representational art is the framework that I will explore and eventually aim to challenge 
as unsuitable to our aesthetic understanding of the photographic representation. My examination 
of representational art will focus on the notion of intentionality: In Scruton’s argument he 
establishes the lack of intentionality – due to the mechanically derived causal process – as central 
to our inability to take an interest towards the photograph as an aesthetic representation: ‘The 
photograph lacks that quality of ‘intentional inexistence’ which is characteristic of painting. The 
ideal photograph, therefore, is incapable of representing anything unreal…’10  
 
Scruton’s notion of intentional inexistence is, I contend, central to an understanding of the 
aesthetic representation that I will challenge as explicative of the artistic limits of the ideal 
photograph; for Scruton, I claim, intentionality is a quality that is central to the cause of aesthetic 
interest towards the pictorial representation. In order to say that our interest is held by the 
representation and not merely the object photographed it is necessary to recognise an intention at 
work in the creation of an appearance.  
 
                                                          
9
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.120 
10
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.131 
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Therefore, in order to appreciate the ideal photograph as representational art, it is necessary, for 
Scruton, that our interest may be recognised as dependent on the intentions of the photographer. 
Because of the mechanically derived causal process, Scruton argues that our interest towards the 
photograph cannot be determined by the photographer’s intentions but by the object 
photographed: ‘… when we say that x is a photograph of y we are referring to this causal 
relation, and it is in terms of the causal relation that the subject of a photograph is normally 
understood.’11  
 
In the absence of intentional inexistence, argues Scruton, we are unable to say that our aesthetic 
interest is held by the photograph. Because a photograph is a photograph of its subject, it is the 
subject photographed that is the cause of our aesthetic interest – rather than the photographer’s 
intentions. Consequently, Scruton refers to the photograph as a transparent image and in doing 
so outlines the parameters of a discussion of the aesthetic character of photography: ‘The 
photograph is transparent to its subject, and if it holds our interest it does so because it acts as a 
surrogate for the thing which it shows. Thus if one finds a photograph beautiful, it is because one 
finds something beautiful in its subject.’12 
 
Yet, in his description of intentionality, I will argue that Scruton reveals a gap in our 
understanding of representational art – where photography is concerned. In particular, I think this 
regards our understanding of intentionality as central to the cause of our aesthetic interest 
towards the representation. For Scruton, intentionality, as it is understood in representational art 
is recognised in one sense to be the embodiment of a thought – about the way something looks in 
representational art: ‘…to understand a painting involves understanding thoughts. These 
thoughts are, in a sense, communicated by the painting. They underlie the painter’s intention, and 
at the same time they inform our way of seeing the canvas.’13 
 
                                                          
11
 Scruton, R. (1998), p. 131 
12
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.134 
13
 Scruton, R. (1998), p. 123 
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In the case of the ideal photograph, it is clear that the photographer’s thought does not underlie 
an intention to see the subject the way it appears in the photograph; at least not in the same way 
that it does in painting. The painting example that Scruton offers, I contend, is useful as a way of 
demarcating what I claim is most prominent about his conception of representational art – that I 
outline and challenge in this chapter; that intentionality is a quality that is central to our 
understanding of a picture as representational art.  
 
In my challenge I do not intend to undermine the notion of intentionality as central to our 
appreciation of the painting, neither will I attempt to contest the conception of intentionality as, 
in one sense, the embodiment of a thought about the subject. Nonetheless, I will argue that it is 
possible to appreciate the ideal photograph as representational art; and in turn, for the artist’s 
intention – in the creation of a photograph. Recognising intentionality in photography, I claim, 
requires a different approach towards our understanding of the configuration of intentionality. 
The mechanically derived causal relationship, I contend, disrupts the centralised place of 
intentionality in representational art, as we recognise it in painting.  
 
However, the mechanical process that demarcates the conception of the ideal photograph does 
not completely dissolve the possibility of intentional control, rather, we find that it is displaced; 
central to acknowledging the different configuration of the intentional in photography is our 
understanding of relationship between the appearance generated in the photograph and the object 
that is causally related to the appearance. As Dawn Phillips claims in her counter to Scruton’s 
notion of the ideal photograph argument, a photograph is not merely a record of an appearance 
but the recording of a moment in time: ‘A photographic event occurs when a photosensitive 
surface is exposed to the light and a recording of the light image takes place. The photographic 
event is the recording of the light image. It is important to recognize that in this description ‘a 
recording’ is not the same as ‘a record’.’14 The photographic process involves the recording of 
the objects before the lens. Nevertheless, it does not follow that a photograph will be a record of 
the objects before the lens. 
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Of central importance to this discussion of artistic photography is the notion of the photographic 
event. In re-constructing the cause of our interest towards the photograph, I contend that it is the 
photographic event and not the object photographed that holds our aesthetic interest; the task in 
this chapter will be to underline this approach as illuminative of a need to reconsider our 
understanding of the intentional in relation to the photographic artform. Whilst I do not disagree 
with Scruton’s claim that an ideal photograph stands in causal relation to the object 
photographed, I do not agree with his claim that this relationship extends to resemblance. My 
understanding of the photographer’s intention is informed by Phillips’s claims that a photograph 
is not causally related to the appearance of the object before the lens but the photographic event. 
A photographic event, argues Phillips does not generate the appearance that we appreciate in the 
photograph but is the element to which that appearance is causally related:   
 
Information recorded during the photographic event can be 
processed in different ways to result in any number of images 
– even ones with very different properties. These photographs 
are not unified by sharing visual resemblances with and a 
causal relation to a ‘pro-filmic event’… Rather they share in 
common a causal relation to one and the same photographic 
event.’15 
 
Broadly speaking, however, I agree with Scruton’s claim that the photographer’s intention is not 
central to the cause of our aesthetic interest towards the photograph. The photographer’s 
intention, I claim, does not necessarily circumscribe our appreciation of the way the subject 
photographed appears but emerges through our interest towards the appearance as set in the 
context of the photographic event; whereas in painting we attribute the appearance of the object 
represented to the artist’s intentions, in photography, we are unable to do so – as it will become 
clear throughout this chapter. Nonetheless, I contend, it is not merely the appearance that holds 
our interest but what the appearance can tell us about the photographic event. Rather than 
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understanding intentionality as central to our appreciation of representational art I will argue that 
in the ideal photograph it becomes de-centred. 
 
Before I describe the de-centred notion of intentionality in photography – as key to our 
understanding of photography as representational art – it is first important to discuss in depth, the 
notion of intentionality that I claim offers us an inadequate interpretation of the photographic 
artform. I will begin by considering Scruton’s notion of intentionality in representational art. In 
particular, I am concerned with his understanding of the intention in representational art as 
synonymous with the expression of a thought:  
 
…properties of the medium influence not only what is seen in 
the picture but also the way it is seen. Moreover, they present 
to us a vision that we attribute not to ourselves but to another 
person; we think of ourselves as sharing in the vision of the 
artist, and the omnipresence of intention changes our 
experience from something private into something shared. 
The picture presents us not merely with the perception of a 
man but with a thought about him, a thought embodied in 
perceptual form.
16
 
 
1.2: Technological interference 
 
For Scruton, artworks are a way for humans to both interpret and comment on our experience of 
the world. Indispensible to this process is that the practice of creativity enables the artist to make 
a work that allows her to freely interpret her subject; without the medium that she chooses to 
represent her intentions encroaching on this process. In this sense our interest is not merely held 
by the subject represented but the representation of that subject matter. In representational art, 
argues Scruton, the appearance of the subject matter is able to tell the viewer something not only 
about the subject but also about the artist’s thoughts about that subject:  
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…painting being fully articulate, can attract attention as the 
principal expression of a process of thought. It can be 
understood in isolation from the special circumstances of its 
creation, because each and every feature of a painting can be 
both the upshot of an intentional act and at the same time the 
creation of an intentional object. The interest in the 
intentional object becomes an interest in the thought which it 
conveys.
17
 
 
Characteristic of our experience of the representational work of art, for Scruton is that it be 
uninterrupted by any concerns which are external to the intention to see the subject in a way that 
is expressive of a thought about that subject; for this reason I claim that his notion of 
intentionality – in terms of representational art – must be understood as central to the cause of 
our aesthetic interest. By engaging with the work of art as an artist’s interpretation, we 
understand our aesthetic interest to be in one sense different from our interest in the subject 
represented: For example, if I take an aesthetic interest towards a painting of Churchill my 
aesthetic interest towards the picture is held by the depiction of Churchill. My interest towards 
the depiction is not merely held by the subject but also – and significant in the process of 
determining my aesthetic interest – the depiction.  
 
We need not treat the depiction and the subject as wholly separable, but there is, as Scruton 
points out a difference. An interest towards the depiction can also be characterised by the 
intention to see the subject in a certain way: ‘We are interested in the visual relationship between 
the painting and subject because it is by means of this relation that the painting represents. The 
artist presents us with a way of seeing his subject.’18 Therefore, it is to the intention of the artist 
that we accredit as the cause of our aesthetic interest towards the depiction: 
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Moreover…[the artwork] present[s] to us a vision that we 
attribute not to ourselves but to another person; we think of 
ourselves as sharing in the vision of the artist, and the 
omnipresence of intention changes our experience from 
something private into something shared. The picture 
presents us not merely with the perception of a man but with 
a thought about him, a thought embodied in perceptual 
form.
19
  
 
An aesthetic interest towards the pictorial representation, contends Scruton, is an interest towards 
an appearance. An appearance, that we appreciate as the embodiment of a thought about the 
subject is not merely caused by our seeing the subject depicted. Moreover, it is by recognising 
that the appearance of the subject in the picture is dependent on the intentions of the artist that 
we are able to take an aesthetic interest towards the representation: 
 
…the painting stands in this intentional relation to its subject 
because of a representational act, the artist’s act, and in 
characterizing the relation between a painting and its subject 
we are also describing the artist’s intention. The successful 
realization of that intention lies in the creation of an 
appearance…20  
 
Contrarily, when we take an interest towards the ideal photograph, claims Scruton, it is an 
interest directed towards the object photographed, not towards the artist’s thought about the 
object. Whilst our interest towards the painting recognises that the appearance of the subject 
depicted acknowledges the artist’s intention, in photography we are unable to characterise the 
appearance of the subject in such a way. In place of intentionality, in photography, we regard the 
appearance of the subject as causally related to the mechanically derived causal process: 
 
In characterizing the relation between the ideal photograph 
and its subject, one is characterizing not an intention but a 
                                                          
19
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.123 
20
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.120 
15 
 
 
 
causal process, and while there is, as a rule, an intentional act 
involved, this is not an essential part of the photographic 
relation.
21
 
  
 
1.3: Intentionality and appearance 
 
Central to our understanding of the aesthetic experience as caused by the creative act for Scruton 
is characterised by a lack of interest – on the part of the viewer – towards the object depicted; 
lacking in the sense that we appreciate not the appearance of the subject – itself – but an 
appearance that is caused by a process that originates in the artist’s intentions. To be able to 
create representational art, we might infer from Scruton’s characterisation of intentionality that 
the artist must be bound, only by the limits of her imagination. If the artist’s creative process is 
limited by the constraints of a medium – such as in photography – the viewer is unable to take an 
interest towards the work as expressive of a thought about the objects depicted.
22
  
 
By claiming that the aesthetic representation is not dependent on our acknowledging its fidelity 
to the object depicted Scruton defines our aesthetic interest towards the pictorial representation 
to be determined by the notion of disinterestedness: Not to be confused with uninterest, to be 
disinterested towards something is to take an interest in it for its own sake rather than its 
functional or instrumental value: ‘It is commonly said that an aesthetic interest in something is 
an interest in it for its own sake: the object is not treated as a surrogate for another; it is itself the 
principal object of attention.’23 Scruton points out that when we take a disinterested interest 
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towards an object we do not desire to take possession over it but adopt a contemplative attitude 
in our appreciation of a pictorial representation.
24
  
 
For example when I take an aesthetic interest towards Klimt’s portrait of Margarete 
Stonborough-Wittgenstein (1905), I am not only concerned by the merit of likeness – and 
perhaps not at all when called upon to describe the aesthetic character of my experience of the 
painting. Moreover, I appreciate the painting as the artist’s interpretation of the appearance of his 
subject: the formal qualities, unified in the picture are those elements that hold my aesthetic 
interest. It does not matter if, for example I notice that Klimt has misrepresented the nose of his 
sitter. In matters concerning my aesthetic interest I do not compare the nose of the sitter with the 
nose of the subject in the painting, as my interest is directed towards the detail of the 
representation.
25
  
 
When we understand the contents to be constructed in accordance with the intentions of the 
picture maker we are able to appreciate the picture as representational art. Following the 
argument outlined in Scruton’s account of the parameters of the aesthetic character of 
representational art, it could be concluded that the ideal mechanically reproduced image could 
only disrupt the potential for intentional input: ‘Our ability to see intention depends on our 
ability to interpret an activity as characteristically human.’26 Because the camera and 
photographic process interrupts the link between the intention and the thought, for Scruton, we 
are unable to take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph qua photograph.  
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Phillips argues in response to Scruton’s claims about causality and appearance that a photograph 
does not merely enable the viewer to take an interest towards the subject photographed.
27
 Long 
exposures of a moving object, for example, may make some if not all of the features of that 
object indiscernible when seen as photographed.
28
 Phillips argues that Scruton is wrong to talk 
about the photograph as having a subject: The photographic image is the end stage in a process 
that begins with the recording of a duration – the exposure – rather than the tracing of an 
appearance; an notion of the ideal photograph that we may infer from Scruton’s interpretation: 
‘The ideal photograph… stands in causal relation to its subject and ‘represents’ its subject by 
reproducing its appearance.’29 Yet, as Phillips contends, because the photographic process is 
causally related to the duration of the exposure, our interest towards the image is not necessarily 
observant of the object photographed:  
 
[Nonetheless]…the appearance of the photograph does not 
lead the viewer to learn about the appearance of the 
photographic event. The photographic event does not have 
relevant visual properties – it is not a visual event. This 
contrasts significantly with any version of the original causal 
story which is concerned to establish that the photograph 
shares an appearance with the pro-filmic event.
30
    
 
I agree with Phillips, that our interest towards the photograph does not necessarily involve the 
identification of the object photographed. The causal process does not necessarily produce 
images in which the appearance of the object photographed determines is preserved. Because a 
photograph is an image that records, for example either, 1/60
th
, 1/30
th
, 1/15
th
, etc., of a second, 
our interest is not merely caused by seeing the subject but an appearance generated by the 
duration of the exposure. 
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Phillips’s criticisms of Scruton’s contention that our interest towards the photograph corresponds 
with an interest towards the appearance of the object photographed offers a fresh approach: 
Although the photograph does generate an appearance that is causally related to the object in 
front of the lens, it is not merely the appearance of that object that holds our interest. Moreover, 
it is an appearance that invites us to contemplate the photographic event. Although the image that 
holds our interest may not necessarily bear any resemblance to that photographic event: ‘the 
appearance of the photograph leads the viewer to learn about the photographic event.’31  
 
Phillips’s conception of the photographic event poses a particular challenge to Scruton’s 
conception of the parameters that demarcate our aesthetic interest towards the photograph; 
regarding our appreciation of the photograph as an appreciation of the appearance of the object 
photographed. Scruton contends that our interest towards the photograph corresponds to an 
interest in the appearance of the object photographed: ‘It follows, first, that the subject of the 
ideal photograph must exist; secondly, that it must appear roughly as it appears in the 
photograph…’32 For Phillips, because a photograph does not necessarily generate an appearance 
that relates to the appearance of the object photographed it is not inevitable that our interest will 
be held by the appearance of the object photographed: ‘The photographic image stands in a 
merely causal relation to those objects [photographed], but this does not entail that they must be 
the subject of our interest when we view a photograph.’33  
 
Phillips’s conception of our interest towards the photograph as causally related to an event rather 
than the appearance of the object photographed, I contend enables us to reconsider our approach 
towards the photographer’s intentionality. If it is not merely the appearance of the object that 
holds our interest, but an appearance that is related to the duration of the exposure I claim that 
we may learn something about the photographer’s intentions as forming in the event. However, 
in this sense, the intentions of the photographer, I claim do not form in the same way as Scruton 
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describes. For Scruton, intentionality is recognised in representational art as the creation of an 
appearance. As a photographer is not able to control all aspects of the photographic event insofar 
as its appearance in the final image is concerned, the intention cannot be understood as central to 
the cause of an aesthetic interest.  
 
However, I claim that the photographer’s intention does in some way cause our interest towards 
the photographic representation. Yet, it is an intention that may be described as de-centred; we 
do not appreciate the appearance of the object photographed as causally related to the 
photographer’s intentions but we may take an interest towards the appearance as communicative 
of a thought about the photographic event. When we take an interest towards the photograph, I 
claim that we do not necessarily take an interest towards the way something looks in the 
photograph but what the appearance can tell us about the photographic event. As the 
photographer Joel Meyerowitz contends, our interest towards the photograph does not merely 
relate to the way something appears but what can be said about the possibilities that we relate to 
the appearance: ‘I find it strangely beautiful that the camera with its inherent clarity of object and 
detail can produce images that in spite of themselves offer possibilities to be more than they 
are.’34 Our interest in the ideal photograph, for Meyerowitz often enables the viewer to engage 
with the photograph as representative of a number of possible descriptions of the photographic 
event. In appreciating that our interest is not necessarily guided by a unified intention we are, I 
claim, recognising the configuration of the photographer’s intention; to appreciate the 
photograph as an open description or narrative that is causally related to the photographic 
event.
35
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1. Joel Meyerowitz, Fallen Man, 1967 
 
An understanding of the notion of intentionality – that I intend to introduce in this thesis – may 
be described as de-centred in terms of its configuration in the ideal photograph. To explore the 
possibility that photography does enable intentionality it is necessary to make a criticism of the 
possibility that the media employed in creating the technologically reproduced image can offer 
us a different approach towards describing intentionality in representational art. 
 
1.4: Technology and the role of the artist 
 
To criticise the view inferred in Scruton’s argument that technological advance is harmful to 
creative practice of making representational art I appeal to a point raised in Walter Benjamin’s 
essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.
36
 For Benjamin, the new forms 
of mass production that emerged during the nineteenth century quite simply transformed creative 
practice. As Noël Carroll notes, technological advance, for Benjamin irrevocably alters our 
conception of the artwork. Not only has it changed the way in which we are able to access 
artworks but also how they are used to engage with the world:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the camera that we appreciate the photograph as real. The event itself that Meyerowitz has photographed is for 
the viewer real only as a possibility. Whilst I think that an exploration of Freud’s notion of the uncanny may prove 
useful I do not take up such a study in this thesis. 
36
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Mass reproducibility changes the structure of art. Each age 
evolves a different sort of art relative to its productive forces, 
since changes in the productive forces inevitably bring about 
changes in its historical relation to the ideological 
superstructure of society and to the existing social relations of 
the productive forces of the relevant epoch.
37
 
 
For Benjamin, the new forms of production also enable us to revisit a conception of creative 
practice of making representational art: Not only in relation to the artist’s toolkit but also as a 
reassessment of the relationship between the artist and intentionality; recognising that 
appearance is causally related to a mechanically derived causal process, the photographer does 
not seek to create an image in which the appearance is an embodiment of an intention. By 
choosing to photograph, I contend, the attitude towards the expression of a thought is different; 
rather than, as Scruton contends, simply absent: ‘The result is that, from studying a photograph 
[the viewer] may come to know how something looked in the way that he might know it if he 
had actually seen it.’38  
 
Since photography stands in causal relation to the objects photographed, there is as a 
consequence in its creative appropriation a transformation of the role of the artist; in relation to 
how the artist is able to use that medium to express a thought about the subject.  For Benjamin, 
the potential for creativity in the representational arts progresses through the emergence of new 
technical means of production: ‘The history of every art form shows critical epochs in which a 
certain art form aspires to effects which could be fully obtained only with a changed technical 
standard…’39 
 
For Benjamin, artworks before photography maintained their value due in part to the elevation of 
the status of the artist. The act of creating artworks and our conception of human involvement, 
for Benjamin is challenged in the creative appropriation of the photographic medium: A culture 
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of the artist genius, he claims, grew from an appreciation of the work of art that due in part for its 
propensity to compel contemplation developed a value that had its base it ritualistic tradition: 
 
The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being 
imbedded in the fabric of tradition… Originally the 
contextual integration of art in tradition found its expression 
in the cult… We know that the earliest art works originated in 
the service of ritual – first the magical, then the religious 
kind.
40
 
 
Photography requires the artist to take a different approach towards her creative practice. Not 
least because the photographer can, due to the causal relationship, only make a picture of her 
subject if it was present when the picture is taken. For Benjamin, this has the propensity to 
disrupt what he perceives as the false ritualistic basis upon which we appreciate representational 
art: ‘for the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art 
from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced 
becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.’41   
 
The photographer argues Benjamin, in comparison with the painter is unable to create an ideal 
photograph that removes the subject from the environment in which they were photographed; in 
a painting our appreciation of the subject corresponds to the artist’s thought – communicated in 
the generation of an appearance – rather than the subject before the lens. For Benjamin, because 
ideal photographs are images that represent – for example – 1/60th of a second of a particular 
scene they are able to give new insight into the subject they depict. In discussing the 
photographer’s intention, therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the parameters of expression.  
Benjamin illustrates this point by comparing the differences between the painter and the 
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photographer to that of the differences between the magician and the surgeon. The painter in his 
analogy is regarded to be synonymous with the magician, insofar as he remains at a remove from 
the world which he represents in his work. The photographer is described to be analogous to the 
surgeon – due to the mechanisation of her tool-kit – must engage directly with her subject: ‘The 
magician maintains the natural distance between the patient and himself... [and] he greatly 
increases it by virtue of his authority. The surgeon does exactly the reverse; he greatly 
diminishes the distance between himself and the patient by penetrating into the patient’s 
body…’42  
 
Benjamin’s analogy, I contend, underlines a difference in kind in the creative appropriation of 
the two media used in the creation of representational art. Whilst I do not agree with his view 
that photography has transformed pictorial representation I do think it offers a viable alternative 
to Scruton’s conception of representational art. In comparison with Scruton’s view, I think that 
Benjamin recognises a difference in kind and more importantly offers a way of approaching this 
difference – that does not seek to demand a likeness in the two artform. In order to explore the 
photographer’s intention further, recognising the relationship between the photographer and 
environment in which she is working as influential may be useful in garnering an understanding 
of the photographer’s intention. Scruton’s view by contrast, I claim, is too narrow insofar as he 
does not offer an exploration of the possibility that intentionality available to the painter is 
rejected by the photographer. Whilst this may not undermine his claims relating to – what I refer 
to as – a centralised notion of intentionality it does, I contend, illuminate the need for a fresh 
approach towards an understanding of intentionality involved in the photographic artform. 
 
 
1.5: The fantasy of technology 
 
Central to Scruton’s description of representational art is that the depiction not only tells us how 
something looked but how it looked to the artist: ‘This is what makes painting and literature into 
representational arts: they are arts which can be appreciated as they are in themselves and at the 
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same time understood in terms of a descriptive thought which they articulate.’43 When the 
outcome of creative process is dependent on a machine, the potential for imaginative expression 
is by implication, for Scruton, disrupted. 
 
As a consequence the contents of the work are not wholly attributable to the intentions and 
imaginative intellect of the artist: Instead of taking an interest towards the artwork as a product 
of the artist’s skill and imagination, for Scruton, the imaginary quality is replaced by a fantasy. 
In the case of photography, this is because the object of our interest is not mediated by a thought 
but is present to our visual experience. Therefore, according to Scruton, we are unable to take an 
interest towards a thought about that object: 
 
And surely it is this too which makes photography incapable 
of being an erotic art, in that it presents us with the object of 
lust rather than a symbol of it: it gratifies the fantasy of desire 
long before it has succeeded in understanding or expressing 
the fact of it.
44
 
 
For example we may marvel at the intricate construction of the imaginary landscapes in Caspar 
David Friedrich’s paintings; however, in keeping with Scruton’s terms, we are unable to afford 
the same kind of interest towards a Joel Peter-Witkin photograph. This is because – in the case of 
Peter-Witkin – our interest, argues Scruton, is still determined by those objects depicted rather 
than the depiction itself. The intention of the photographer does not guide or generate an 
aesthetic interest: ‘Even in the case of a docile fantasy, it must be remembered that the desire 
which underlies it is real… The subject of fantasy really does want something… but he wants it 
in the form of a substitute.’45  
 
Pictures that are produced by technologically advanced media, for Scruton it would seem are 
unable to engage our imaginative interest as aesthetic representations, but provoke a fascination 
towards the object depicted. Therefore, the idea mechanically reproduced image, for Scruton, 
may only disrupt the relationship between the artist and the creation of representational art.  
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1.6: The fictive in representational art 
 
Ideal photographs, insofar as they are causally related to the object before the lens allow us to 
contemplate and criticise the object photographed in some way. In this sense our aesthetic 
appreciation of the photograph does not relate the appearance of its contents as causally related 
to the artist’s intentions. The appearance that we appreciate in the photograph is, for Scruton, a 
duplicate of the object that it depicts and therefore to see its appearance as pointing to a gesture 
by the artist is to appreciate not an intention but makes a fetish of its appearance: ‘…a fantasy 
desire will characteristically seek, not a highly mannered or literary description, not a painterly 
portrayal, of its chosen subject, but a perfect simulacrum – such as a waxwork, or a 
photograph.’46  
 
For Scruton, in order to call a picture representational art our interest towards it must recognise 
that the appearance generated in the creation of an image is communicative of a thought about 
the object represented: ‘[representational works of art]… present to us a vision that we attribute 
not to ourselves but to another person; we think of ourselves as sharing in the vision of the artist, 
and the omnipresence of the intention changes our experience from something private into 
something shared.’47 Primarily, this concerns the value of intention: if we are to take an aesthetic 
interest towards the picture then the intention must be regarded as the aspect that is central to the 
cause of that interest.  
 
For Scruton, the impact of mechanical media on artistic creativity is potentially negative because 
in the process of making a picture, it is the reproduction of an appearance rather the intention to 
create an appearance that holds our interest. Because the photographer is unable to use her 
medium to interpret the appearance of her subject – in a manner which does not involve a 
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mechanically derived causal process – the viewer is unable to appreciate the outcome as 
expressive of an intention to see the subject in a certain way: 
 
You cannot paint modern life, merely by producing 
recognizable images of it – for after all, there are images of 
modern life in photographs, and photographs are a thousand 
miles from paintings, even when (to the unthinking person) 
they look the same. You can paint modern life only if you 
produce your image of it as painters do – which means using 
brush and pigments with same broad intention as they were 
used by Titian, Rembrandt or Gainsborough.
48
  
 
I agree with Scruton that the photographer is unable to exact the same intentional control over 
her subject as is the painter. However, I contend that if we are to use a notion of intentionality as 
central to the measure of representational art – as I claim that Scruton does – then we disallow a 
fulfilling investigation of artistic photography. For Scruton, acknowledging intent is central to 
our recognising creative practice and this is evidenced in our understanding that the artistic 
representation as in one sense a fictionalisation of the subject; insofar as our interest towards the 
subject represented in the picture is attributed to the artist’s interpretation of that subjects 
appearance: ‘We see not only a man on a horse but a man of certain character and bearing. And 
what we see is determined not by independent properties of the subject not by our understanding 
the painting.’49  
 
Because the viewer appreciates the depiction as also determined by the artist’s intention, interest 
may also be caused by contemplating the subject in a manner which the artist is inviting us to 
appreciate its appearance; as Scruton contends in his essay, In Search of the Aesthetic: 
‘Representation is a form of presentation, and it is not the thing itself, but the way that thing is 
presented, that captures our attention. A fictional world is being presented to us, and it is in and 
through the presentation that this fictional world enters our thoughts.’50 
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Once again, I agree that this is characteristic of our interest towards paintings; that we take an 
interest towards the representation as, in one sense, an embodiment of the artist’s intention. Yet I 
do not think that we need look for this quality in representational photography. The artist – in 
taking a photograph – is unable to sublimate the subject within her intention subject due to the 
causal process. The photographer, as Elliott Erwitt notes is interested in exploring the narratives 
found in the event. Rather than attempting to convey a thought about the objects they 
photograph, photographers often describe their intentions as a kind of response to a narrative 
that they encounter in an event: 
 
I rarely stage pictures. I wait for them… let them take their 
own time. Sometimes, you think something’s going to 
happen, so you wait. It may pan out; it may not. That’s a 
wonderful thing about pictures – things can happen. It’s not 
that I’m against staging, or anything else, when you’re not 
cheating or working with false purposes. Even as you wait, 
you are, in a way, arranging and manipulating. You’re getting 
ready to frame the event…51 
 
The photographer’s intention, I contend, does not circumscribe our interest towards the 
representational meaning. In this thesis I will describe the photographer’s intention as present, 
yet de-centred. In taking this approach, however, it is first necessary to examine an 
understanding of the parameters of intentionality in representational art and consider this in 
relation to photographic art. 
 
We have so far considered what I perceive to be an important aspect of Scruton’s complaint 
regarding the potential for a photograph to be considered as representational art: That being a 
criticism of the impact of technologically advanced media on creative practice and in particular 
human intention. My next task is to underline those characteristics that Scruton claims to 
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describe the boundaries of artistic photography. In doing so, I will also present my own 
interpretation of the aims of artistic photography as a counter weight to Scruton’s position. 
 
 
1.7: Photography as a means to an end 
 
Critical to Scruton’s sceptical view of the potential to appreciate a photograph as representation 
art concerns the disruption of human intentionality due to the mechanically derived causal 
process; which causes the viewer to engage with the ideal photograph as an image that is 
transparent to its subject. He regards to notion of intentionality as axiomatic in terms of its ability 
to enable the viewer to take an aesthetic interest towards the work as representational art – as 
expressive of the artist’s thought:  
 
Our ability to see the intention depends on our ability to 
interpret an activity as characteristically human, and here, in 
the case of representational art, it involves our understanding 
the dimensions and conventions of the medium... to 
understand art is to be familiar with the constraints imposed 
by the medium and to be able to separate that which is due to 
the medium from that which is due to man.
52
 
 
Due to the mechanically generated causal process, the aspect that we may attribute to human 
activity – the intentional – is for Scruton, removed in the ideal photograph. This is countenanced 
by the causal relationship between the subject and photographic representation. So our interest 
towards the photograph is premised not on the potential to interpret the appearance of the picture 
as evidence of human activity but a causally derived mechanical relationship: ‘if x is a 
photograph of a man, there is a particular man of whom x is a photograph.’53  
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However, it is difficult to think of a tool that could not be reasonably understood to potentially 
disrupt by happenstance or design, the intentional content – that we may take to be an 
embodiment of a thought about the subject photographed. A painter may choose a certain brush 
for its particular affect, just as the sculptor may use a chainsaw effectively on a block of wood 
but not marble. The material tools of a particular medium both guide and shape the artist’s 
interpretation and to this end guides our understanding of the parameters of intention; thus 
allowing us to appreciate both the artist’s mastery over and use of the tools of her chosen 
medium.  
 
To think of the structure of representational meaning as defined by the artist’s intention, I claim, 
potentially eliminates any further discussion of photographer’s intentionality. In terms of the 
photographic representation, I think that Scruton’s argument reveals an interesting gap in our 
understanding of creativity and intentionality. Accepting that a photographer, by photographing 
is unable to create an image that may be appreciated as causally related to a thought about that 
object is problematic to a positive discussion of photographic art. This view is consistent with an 
understanding of the aesthetic representation that relies on a centralised notion of intention. I 
contend that such a configuration disallows a fulfilling discussion of photographic artform.  
 
Re-considering the constitution of intentionality in photographic representation enables us to 
take an alternate approach towards our understanding of the formation of the photographer’s 
intention. If we conclude, as I claim Scruton does, that our interest towards the photograph is co-
existent with an interest towards the object photographed some exploration of photographer’s 
attitude towards taking an aesthetically pleasing picture of her subject may offer some useful 
insight. In Scruton’s examination of the ideal photograph, our aesthetic interest, he argues, is 
bound up in the subject rather than the depiction of the subject: ‘The photograph is a means to 
the end of seeing its subject; in painting, on the other hand, the subject is the means to the end of 
its own representation.’54 However, in seeing the subject photographed, I claim that our interest 
may also be affected by the photographer’s intentions. Whilst, I agree with Scruton, that a 
photographer may not exact the same kind of intentional control as the painter, we may 
appreciate a different kind of relationship between the photographer and her intention; and 
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consequently, as I will argue, the notion of intentionality has a different kind of configuration in 
the photographic artform. 
 
Consider for example the artistry of the portrait photographer, Yousuf Karsh. Karsh is perhaps 
most noted for his wartime portrait of Winston Churchill. Karsh maintained that his expressive 
portraits were achieved by engaging in a most uncommon manner with his subject. This is 
perhaps supported by the now mythical claim that Churchill’s stoic expression – in the iconic 
photograph – was caused by Karsh physically removing the trademark cigar from the lips of the 
British Prime Minister; this fact is of course not apparent in the photograph itself. Nonetheless, I 
claim that whilst Karsh’s interaction with his subject is not central to the cause of our aesthetic 
interest towards the image it does indeed contribute.  
 
In conversation with Karsh, George Bernard Shaw underlined a quality lacking in photography 
that the painting has in abundance, which paradoxically, is perhaps also central to its creative 
potential. Shaw observed that the painter due to the necessity of presenting her subject matter 
through imaginative interpretation is often unable to produce an image which allows the subject 
to speak for himself: ‘The trouble with painters is that they put far too much of themselves into 
their work. That is the reason portraits of me make me look as if I took spirits.’55  
 
The photographer, whilst unable to put her own identity into the work – in the same manner as 
available to the painter – I claim found an alternate way of making aesthetically pleasing 
representation of her subject. What is most powerful about Karsh’s portraiture, I contend, is the 
way in which he regards his expressive potential as emergent through the his interaction with the 
subject; creating an image that holds our interest not merely because of the way the subject 
appears but also due our acknowledging that the appearance is causally related to the 
photographic event. The photographer’s intention, for Karsh, does not emerge in the appearance 
of the subject but by contemplating the appearance as situated to the photographic event.  
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2. Yousuf Karsh, Winston Churchill, 1941 
 
It is Scruton’s assessment that the aesthetic representation holds our interest as not only a 
representation of the depicted subject but also as a thought about that subject. Mechanical 
causality, following Scruton’s argument, disrupts the human intention, insofar as we are unable 
to perceive the depiction as an expression of the artist’s intention: ‘In characterizing the relation 
between ideal photograph and its subject, one is characterizing not an intention but a causal 
process...’56 We therefore, are unable to take an interest towards the photograph as expressive of 
a thought about that subject.  
 
Whilst Scruton’s thesis is helpful as an explication of the creative difference between the 
photograph and painting it leaves us with a gap in our understanding; insofar as a description of 
creative potential of the photograph is concerned. I aim to show that our appreciation of a picture 
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as an aesthetic representation need not be dependent on our seeing a depiction as expressive of 
the artist’s intention; that the aesthetic representation is an interpretation of the subject. 
Moreover, I think there is a need to present a positive thesis of the photographic that does not 
seek to ignore the two features that emerge from Scruton’s argument; the lack of intentional and 
interpretational control. 
 
1.8: The photographer’s intention? 
 
For Scruton, the first problem we encounter when attempting to carve out a semblance of the 
intention in the photographic artform concerns its configuration in the creation of an appearance: 
‘Of course I may take a photograph of a draped nude and call it Venus, but insofar as this can be 
understood as an exercise in fiction, it should not be thought of as a photographic representation 
of Venus but rather as the photograph of a representation of Venus.’57 Any sense of the 
intentional that we may appreciate is not a property of the photograph but the object 
photographed. This is because, as Scruton’s asserts causal provenance dictates that 
‘…representation is not a property of the [photograph].’58 For him, the representation takes place 
not in the photograph but in the subject. Therefore, our appreciation of the representation of 
Venus, he argues, is directed towards the subject rather than the photograph – as having the 
quality of being an aesthetic representation. 
 
An important characteristic of this understanding of the aesthetic representation is that it enables 
the viewer to take an imaginative interest towards the depiction. Whilst we do not necessarily 
need say that the depicted subject is imaginary we may take an interest towards its depiction as 
imaginative. In this sense we treat the depiction as an expression of a thought about the subject; 
‘… it is characteristic of aesthetic interest that most of its objects in representation are 
imaginary… It is important because it enables the presentation of scenes and characters toward 
which we have only contemplative attitudes.’59  
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Since, for Scruton, an ideal photograph does not enable the artist – in photographing – to 
interpret the appearance of their subject we are unable to see the contents of the photograph as 
communicative of a thought that is imagined by the photographer. We can, of course look at a 
photograph of Andy dressed up as Venus and take an aesthetic interest in Andy’s representation 
of Venus but for Scruton, ‘…the representational act, the act which embodies the thought, is 
completed before the photograph is ever taken.’60 
 
Scruton’s argument that photographs do not engage our imaginative interest hinges on our 
accepting that the creation of representational art is dependent on a notion of intentionality that is 
central to the cause of our interest. For the photographer, I think that it is not necessarily 
important to be able to interpret the subject in a manner which is available to the painter; and 
although Scruton does not claim that photographers assume that a camera enables them to 
interpret their subject matter he does claim that such a use would misinterpret the logical ideal of 
her medium; he illustrates this limitation of the medium as evidence to his claim that we are 
unable to appreciate photographs as aesthetic representations. ‘…when the photographer strives 
towards representational art, he inevitably seems to move away from that ideal of photography 
which I have been describing toward the ideal of painting.’61 I claim that by discussing what is 
peculiar to the photographer’s approach towards her creative practice will enable us to see why 
photographs can be valuable as aesthetic representations. 
 
Scruton’s discussion of the aesthetic potential of photographic representation, I claim, is lacking 
in its exploration of the medium as used by photographers with the aims of making an artistic 
representation. I think acknowledging this lacking is important in terms of our understanding 
how the medium of photography enables the artist to interact imaginatively with her subject. By 
exploring how photographers engage with their subject, I aim to underline an approach towards 
representational art that is peculiarly photographic.  
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1.9: possibility and representation 
 
I claim that it is by exploiting the causally derived mechanical process that a photographer can 
provoke our imaginative and contemplative engagement. Scruton contends our aesthetic interest 
towards a photograph is caused by attending to the appearance of the object photographed rather 
than the intention to see the object as it appears in the depiction. We may infer from this, 
therefore, that the aesthetically meaningful content of the photograph is provided by attending to 
the object before the lens: the causal process disallows us to appreciate the photograph as an 
expression of the photographer’s intention – to see the subject in a certain way. The way the 
subject appears in the photograph, therefore, we do not attribute to the photographer. 
‘[Photography] can present us with what we see, but it cannot tell us how to see it.’62  
 
We may, for example find a photograph sad because of the way that the subject appears to us in 
the photograph. For Scruton, sadness is represented by the subject, not the photograph. In 
reiterating this claim, I contend that we also find a positive view that discovers a manner by 
which photographs engage our imaginative interest as representational art. Central to this 
positive view is developing an aesthetic understanding of the photographer’s approach.  
 
Meyerowitz in a documentary on street photography illustrates neatly the creative impetus to 
photograph. His comments may also, I claim, show us more generally why it is possible to 
appreciate photographs as aesthetic representations: ‘… the camera puts a frame around life. 
What happens in the frame is the content. [The photographer] can put together things that do not 
necessarily fit together. [The photographer] is just framing what’s possible.’ 63  
 
What I take Meyerowitz to mean by this in more general terms is that photographs do not merely 
show us how something looked. A photograph may provoke contemplative interest because the 
photographic frame presents the viewer with a number of possibilities – ways of taking an 
interest towards the subject as photographed. I claim that it is not necessary to attribute these 
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possibilities to our seeing the subject but, more importantly, our seeing the subject as 
photographed.  
 
Attributing a possibility to a photographer’s intention requires us to satisfy two queries; firstly, 
we need to know how a possibility may be causally related to an intention. Secondly – and 
perhaps more importantly – we should understand what is meant by our use of the term intention. 
Answering the second query is a more involving task than the former and is the broad aim of this 
thesis. In order to demonstrate the parameters of the photographer’s intention it is important to 
illuminate a difference in the notion of intentionality: In particular, concerning the difference of 
its configuration in painting and photography. 
 
In painting, I have argued that – as Scruton claims – intentionality is central to the cause of our 
aesthetic interest towards the pictorial representation. In photography, however, the intention is 
not central to the cause of our aesthetic interest; due to the mechanically derived causal process 
that is involved in the creation of a photograph. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the 
human intention is absent in photography. Informed by Phillips’s conception of the photographic 
process, I contend that an aesthetic study of photography has more to learn from exploring the 
photographic image as causally related to the photographic event rather than merely the object 
photographed. This conception of the photograph enables us to counter Scruton’s claim that an 
interest towards the photograph may be defined as an interest towards the object photographed.  
 
Because our interest is causally related to the photographic event and not merely the object 
photographed, an interest towards the appearance is, I claim, situated in the photographic event. 
Whilst we may be familiar with the appearance generated by the mechanically derived causal 
process we are estranged from the photographic event, to which the appearance is causally 
related. A possibility, as I claim it is understood in Meyerowitz’s conception is descriptive of an 
aesthetic interest towards the photographic event: In taking an aesthetic interest towards the 
photographic event, I contend, we recognise that the meanings we attribute to the appearance 
generated by the photographic process not concretised in the image; but emerges as possibilities, 
nascent in the photographic event. The photographer’s intention, likewise, may be described as 
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emergent in the photographic event as a possibility. Therefore, we find that the photographer’s 
intention is de-centred in our understanding of it as causative of our aesthetic interest. 
 
Scruton does consider the possibility that by the measure of framing that we are able to 
appreciate the photograph as representing an idea or thought about the object photographed. Yet 
he contends that the ‘representational act, the act which embodies the representational thought, is 
completed before the photograph is ever taken.’64 Whilst I am inclined to agree with Scruton that 
the appearance of the object in the ideal photograph is causally related to the object rather than 
the photographer’s thought about that object, this does not necessarily extend to the 
representational act. In considering the photograph as a document of the photographic event, the 
meaning that we attribute to the object as it appears in the ideal photograph need not correspond 
to the appearance of that object.  
 
To consider this further I contend that we must explore what is characteristic about Meyerowitz’s 
claim that photography enables us to take an interest not merely towards the subject 
photographed but also the possibilities that are nascent in the photographic depiction of that 
subject. By taking an interest towards the subject as meaningful in a number of possible 
expressions, I contend that we do not merely relate these possibilities to the subject but the 
representation.  
 
I am, in this instance using the word possibility to illustrate a difference between the subject and 
its appearance in the photograph; insofar as our seeing the subject in a photograph may cause us 
to afford it certain qualities that are not necessarily caused by seeing the subject but by 
responding to our seeing that subject as photographed; which I claim may provoke our 
imaginative interest. Edward Weston’s Pepper No.30 (1930) is a striking example insofar as 
lighting and composition seem to underline its shape in such a way that the vegetable is 
anthropomorphised and we also see it as a strong man flexing his muscles. Weston found in 
photography an ability to create images in which the meaning did not merely form in the object 
photographed but possible meanings that are nascent in the objects photographed: 
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…I have on occasion use the expression, ‘to make a pepper 
more than a pepper.’ I now realize it is a misleading phrase. I 
did not mean ‘different’ from a pepper, but a pepper, plus, - 
an intensification of its own important form and texture, - a 
revelation… Photograph as a creative expression – or what 
you will – must be seeing plus. Seeing alone means factual 
recording. Photography is not at all seeing in the sense that 
the eyes see…65 
 
I do not mean to suggest that in lieu of this that our interest towards the object photographed is 
separable from an interest caused by that object – as photographed. Indeed I agree with Scruton 
insofar as he claims that an ideal photograph directs our interest towards the object 
photographed: ‘The camera, then, is being used not to represent something but to point to it.’66 
Yet in pointing out the subject, and by virtue of our noticing not simply the subject but the 
subject as it appears in the photograph, the camera also enables the viewer to appreciate not 
merely the object photographed but its emergence in the photographic event. The appearance of 
the object photographed, although related to that object is not by extension determined by its 
appearance – before the lens; the photographic event, that has been described as the duration of 
the recording process is the quality that determines the parameters of the causal relationship.  
 
1.10: The Aesthetic possibility in the event 
   
As the photographer Duane Michals observes, the subject photographed is not necessarily of 
primary importance in the photographic representation. For the photographer it is not merely the 
appearance that generates representational meaning but the possibilities that we find in the 
appearance that are representative of the photographic event. For Michals, photography enables 
him to create appearances that embody not necessarily a thought but a narrative like structure 
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and therefore, do not merely direct our interest towards the subject photographed: ‘Photography 
deals exquisitely with appearances, but nothing is what it appears to be.’67  
 
Charlie White is one such photographer whose work explores the photographic appearance as a 
representation of a thought about the photographic event. His often surreal images and elaborate 
arrangements frequently incorporate weird looking puppets – merging studio portraiture with 
digital manipulation techniques.
68
 Photography allows White’s suggestive narratives to flourish, 
I contend, due to their being rooted in the mechanically derived causal process; insofar as we are 
unable to see meaning as unified by a solitary intention, meaning emerges as a suggestive and 
complex narrative.  
 
For White, the thought that he seeks to communicate is not intended to be a unifying element. 
White is interested in exploring the psychology of human relationships, in particular in social 
and institutional settings. Therefore, it is important that the representational meaning in his work 
remains nascent: White wants to acknowledge that in the complex rituals of our social relations 
the way things appear to us can sometimes deny or even mask meaningful experience. The ideal 
photograph for White enables the creation of representational art in a way that is different from 
painting: in painting, the representational meaning relates to a thought about the subject, but in 
the ideal photograph the source of the meaning relationship is not limited to a single unifying 
source: ‘A picture is just a million questions now… Did it really happen? Do I believe it? The 
picture doesn't lie. It is a lie.’69 
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3. Charlie White, from the series Understanding Joshua, 2001 
 
In the series Understanding Joshua (2001) White creates a number of scenes which to a varying 
degree we might call familiar – a party scene, a lovers’ quarrel, for example. Yet the inclusion of 
a grotesque puppet – whom we may or may not take to be Joshua – seems to disrupt a sense of 
familiarity that we attribute to the event. The puppet acts as a foil and challenge to the meaning 
relationship that we ordinarily attribute to a social gathering. This coupled with an overt colour 
palette, his tableaus seem to draw our attention to complex tensions present in the 
meaningfulness of appearance; an element which is unified by the documentary quality of his 
images.  
 
For White the camera offers the artist the ability to explore the tension that exists between 
appearance and meaning. The representational meaning of his work is not embodied by a 
centralised intention, as Scruton argues is important to our appreciation of representational art. In 
White’s work, the intentional becomes – purposefully – de-centred; the meanings that we 
attribute to the representation emerge not as unified by the intentions but as fragments or 
possibilities that relate to the photographic event; a gesture, colour scheme or expression strikes 
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our interest not merely towards the subject photographed but as representative of the 
photographic event. Yet for White, we are unable to access the meaning relationships that form 
in the event. The meaning relationships are nascent in the recognisable gestures – as possibilities 
– that we attribute not merely to the object photographed but our understanding of the 
photographic event. 
 
In another example of White’s work – US Gymnastics Team (2005) from the series Everything is 
American (2005) – we see an injured young gymnast – apparently in pain – in the arms of her 
concerned instructor. Two young gymnasts behind the central characters look at the scene in the 
foreground with a distinct lack of interest. Their apparently false and potentially hostile postures 
create a surreal sense of tension. White’s series often embodies a strange or defamiliarised 
narrative: In one sense the arrangement seems to reflect a decisive or intentional input, but this is 
negated or at least challenged by the causal derivation of the photographic capture: the viewer is 
unable to say with certainty that this is what White is intending to express. Yet, this sense of 
uncertainty, in the meaning of an appearance is the foundation upon which the parameters of his 
intentions are built.  
 
For White appearances can be both alienating and distancing insofar as the connections formed 
between their meanings are concerned: Photographs document the subject before the lens but the 
meaning we afford the subject photographed may be different to the meaning we afford the 
subject itself. Nonetheless, we do attach certain meanings to the subject – by virtue of appealing 
to the appearance of the subject photographed. For White, the camera is able to show a tension in 
this relationship; his images explore the way that appearances communicate meanings and are 
representations of how this effects our interaction with the world: White’s use of the camera 
underlines the role of the photographer as different in kind to that of the painter: His intentions 
emerge not through the creation of an appearance but the narrative structure of his images, 
causally related to the photographic event. Yet intentionality is not a unifying element like we 
understand it in painting. In order to consider how intention differs from its place in painting, it 
is necessary to explore the relationship between meaning and appearance in the photographic 
representation. 
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4. Charlie White, US Gymnastics Team, 2005 
 
1.10: The art of mirrors 
 
For Scruton, to reiterate, the mechanically derived causal process interrupts, and is a quality that 
is counter-intuitive to the creative practice of representational art. If an ideal photograph 
engenders an interesting appearance it is the subject photographed that we find interesting rather 
than the photograph: ‘The ideal photograph also yields an appearance, but the appearance is not 
interesting as a realization of an intention but rather as a record of how an actual object 
looked.’70 
 
In this chapter I have begun to explore the idea that contra-Scruton we are able to appreciate the 
photograph as representational art. In order to obtain a correct approach to an understanding of 
the photographic representation I claim that we must reconsider our configuration of 
intentionality: I have introduced the notion of a de-centred intentionality as peculiar to our 
                                                          
70
 Scruton, R. (1998) p.121 
42 
 
 
 
appreciation of the photographer’s representation. My aim in offering a different approach 
towards describing the representational meaning in photography is to produce an understanding 
that enables a more fulfilling exploration of the creative parameters of the photographic medium.  
 
Scruton does accept the possibility that we are able to appreciate the ideal photograph as 
different from an appreciation of the object in the photograph. He agrees that we are able to take 
an interest towards the photograph that is to some extent removed from how we would ordinarily 
view the subject photographed: ‘A photograph will be designed to show its subject in a particular 
light and from a particular point of view, and by doing so it may reveal things about it that we do 
not normally observe and, perhaps, that we might not have observed but for the photograph.’71 
 
Yet, for Scruton, this does not provoke us to think of the photograph as an aesthetic 
representation. A photographer, for Scruton, cannot make a picture that is representational of a 
thought about its subject. Nevertheless they are able to show us the subject in interesting new 
ways. Although photographs allow us to see the object photographed in new and interesting 
ways it is the object photographed and not the representation that is the cause of our interest:  
‘The art of mirrors may, like the art of photography, sometimes involve representation... But 
representation will not be a property of the mirror.’72 For Scruton then, aesthetic representation 
is bound up in the intention of the artist; by taking an interest towards something as an aesthetic 
representation we take an interest towards something insofar as it is caused by a human 
intention:  
 
The image becomes articulate [as an aesthetic representation] 
when (a) the maker of the image can seriously address 
himself to the task of communicating thought through the 
image alone, and (b) when the spectator can see and 
understand the image in terms of the process of thought 
which it expresses.
73
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Therefore, crucial to our conception of the aesthetic representation is that our attention is held 
not by the object photographed but the artist’s intention to see the object the way it appears in the 
photograph. Scruton’s claims about what I refer to as a centralised notion of intentionality in our 
conception of representational art enable us to reflect on the work as in one sense embodying the 
identity of the artist; insofar as we acknowledge that the content of the representation leads us to 
consider a thought about the subject depicted; by acknowledging the image as the 
communication of a thought we are given access to the way in which the artist sees the world and 
its subject matter, and thus we find in the work an imprint of the artist’s identity. The identity of 
the artist is important to our recognition of the work as an embodiment of an intention, insofar as 
it is important to our understanding of an image as representational art. Photography, according 
to Scruton does not provoke this kind of interest precisely because the mechanical element of the 
medium disrupts the transmission of the photographers thought. Because of the mechanically 
derived causal relationship, the photographic representation does not tell us what the 
photographer thinks about the subject, only that: ‘…from studying a photograph … [we] may 
come to know how something looking in the way that … [we] might know it if … [we] had 
actually seen it.’74  
 
In this sense, for Scruton, appearance emerges not as a communication of a thought but where a 
thought is communicated it is attributed to a thought about the subject as it appears in the 
photograph. What is communicated – in terms of the artist’s intent – is not an interpretation but 
as Scruton argues, an appearance which we relate to the subject as it appears in the photograph. 
This appearance in turn conveys to us a certain meaning which we may relate to the subject.  
 
I agree with Scruton, insofar as he contends that the artist is unable to use the camera to create an 
ideal photograph in which an appearance is representative of a thought about the object 
photographed. Yet, I also think that to take this as concluding our discussion of the creative 
potential of photography is a mistake and is illustrative of a gap in our exploration of 
representational art. Rather than assess the potential for the camera to enable the artist to make a 
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picture in which the appearance of the subject is intentionally created I think it may be more 
interesting to see how mechanical causality has impacted positively on artistic intention.  
 
1.11: Challenging the role of the artist 
 
We may find a useful example of this in the work of Gillian Wearing. In her Album (2003) 
series, she creates a body of work both using and re-creating her family portraits. In each image 
from the series Wearing recreates a photograph of one family member, using herself as the 
model. The work examines the notion of identity and roles within the family structure. For 
Wearing, photography allows the artist to challenge the notion of representational art as 
dependent on a centralised conception of intentionality; in her work the expression of a thought 
is ambiguous in its formation, insofar as it does not circumscribe our aesthetic interest. 
Wearing’s work does not merely share a thought about her subjects but demonstrates the 
complexity of this task; it is not just the thought that we engage with but its context, and this 
aspect, for Wearing can become overwhelming or make an expression fragmented. 
 
Her appropriation of the photographic media is also important to our understanding of her 
intentions. Had she used painting to explore the same ideas, our interest towards the appearance 
generated in the representation would have been unified by Wearing’s intentions. In 
photography, the same kind of interest is not possible; we recognise that by creating an ideal 
photograph Wearing is not able to intentionally control the ideas about appearance; as in White’s 
work, her intentions are nascent rather than unifying. 
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5. Gillian Wearing, Self Portrait as My Father, 2003 
 
Wearing often uses photography to confront familiar and conventional conceptions of identity. In 
Wearing’s work, the camera often emerges as an unsurpassable authoritative element; 
disallowing or interrupting her from completing the intentional act of interpretation. For 
example, In Signs that say what you want them to say and not Signs that say what someone else 
wants you to say (1992–93) Wearing approached – seemingly at random – people in the street, 
asking them to write down on a piece of a paper a spontaneous thought or feeling. She would 
then make a portrait of the individual holding the piece of paper. Images in this body of work 
illustrate a disjunctive relationship between the subject and the slogans that adorn the paper they 
hold.  
 
Wearing’s work provokes an imaginative interest insofar as it allows us to engage with the often 
tension filled relationship between meaning and appearance. Since the camera records that which 
is before the lens, Wearing’s photographs often enable us to ask questions about the way we 
relate meaning to an appearance: ‘It leaves a lot to the imagination, that's what art should do. It 
leaves you something to go away with, something to think about. It doesn't say: this is a story, 
completely, and this is my take on it.’75  
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For Scruton, whilst a painting also deals with appearance our interest towards the appearance is 
guided by the interpretive: ‘The aim of painting is to give insight, and the creation of an 
appearance is important mainly as the expression of a thought.’76 Our interest in appearances 
when looking at the photograph, he argues, is guided not by the interpretive but causally related 
to the subject photographed: ‘A person studying an ideal photograph is given a very good idea of 
how something looked.’77  
 
I do not think that Wearing’s work enables us to disregard Scruton’s claim that photographs 
disallow the artist to present the subject as an imaginative interpretation. The representational 
meaning in her work relies on the viewer acknowledging a causal relationship between the image 
and the photographic event. Nonetheless, I contend that it is the causal element that enables the 
viewer to take an aesthetic disinterest towards the subject: As Wearing claims, photographs do 
not give us the full story precisely because we are not able to attribute their content to a unified 
thought about the subject; what can be said about the photographic image – in terms of the 
communication of a thought – may emerge only as a possibility. 
 
I claim that the disjunction, between meaning and appearance is enough to enable the viewer to 
take an interest towards the photograph qua photograph; insofar as the camera, by pointing 
towards the subject enables the photographer to engage creatively with the relationship between 
subject and appearance. Yet, for Scruton, key to our understanding of a picture as 
representational art, is the description of its detail: if our interest towards the detail is causally 
related to the representation and not the object represented then we are able to say that the image 
is a work of representational art. Because the detail of the photograph relates to the way the 
subject appears we are unable to say that what we are looking at relates to something that the 
artist wants to express about her understanding of the subject:  
 
                                                          
76
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.129 
77
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.130 
47 
 
 
 
An interest in an object for its own sake, in the object as a 
whole, must encompass an interest in detail. For if there is 
nothing for which one contemplates an object an object, as 
has frequently been argued, there is no way of determining in 
advance of looking at it which features are, and are not, 
relevant to one’s interest. It is for this reason that we cannot 
rest satisfied with nature but must have works of art as the 
objects of aesthetic judgement.
78
 
 
 1.12: Detail 
 
The search for meaning in a photograph is therefore curtailed 
or thwarted: there is no point in an interest in detail since 
there is nothing that detail can show. Detail, like the 
photograph itself is transparent to its subject. If the 
photograph is interesting, it is only because what it portrays is 
interesting, and not because of the manner in which the 
portrayal is effected.
79
 
 
To call an image representational, for Scruton, we must also be able to say that it holds some 
meaning that is autonomous from the object depicted. Scruton argues that the photograph like the 
mirror image, is causally related to the object it depicts. Therefore, in a sense we must think of 
the photograph as an image that does not have any content of its own; that is to say, we do not 
appreciate the mirror image separately from the object reflected in the mirror. 
80
 
 
He does consider the potential for a photographer to control the detail of her composition. Yet he 
argues that if a photographer intends to make a representation that engages our aesthetic interest 
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she must create an image in which the detail engages our interest irrespective of the object it 
represents; detail, therefore, when it is aesthetically engaging is a property of the image rather 
than the subject. Causal derivation, argues Scruton, denies the possibility for the artist to take a 
photograph that allows us to see its detail as – wholly – attributable to her intent:  
 
Even if he does, say, intentionally arrange each fold of his 
subject’s dress and meticulously construct, as studio 
photographers once used to do, the appropriate scenario, that 
would still hardly be relevant, since there seem to be few 
ways in which such intentions can be revealed in a 
photograph.
81
 
 
Conversely, he argues that we do not merely attribute the content of a painting to the object it 
depicts: whilst we may acknowledge a relationship between the two, the depiction due to its 
status as an interpretation is separable – in terms of how we direct our interest – from the object 
depicted. By taking an interest in something as an aesthetic representation, therefore, we take an 
interest in its content as peculiar to the representation itself. For Scruton, due to causal derivation 
we are unable to attribute the contents of the photograph to the image: ‘Detail, like the 
photograph itself, is transparent to its subject.’82  
 
According to this view of the aesthetic parameters of the ideal photograph, in order to create a 
picture that may be appreciated as an aesthetic representation, the photographer, must create an 
image that is essentially ideally unphotographic; insofar as by making an image in which we are 
able to appreciate the detail as attributable to the image rather than the subject she must do away 
with the causal element which as Scruton argues is elemental to the ideal photograph: ‘… when 
the photographer strives towards representational art, he inevitably seems to move away from 
that ideal of photography which I have been describing toward the ideal of painting.’83  
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By manipulating the negative or image, contends Scruton, the artist is moving away from the 
ideal of photography. The photomontage, digital manipulation or scratched negative all, for him, 
serve as examples in which our interest towards the image is not concerned with its 
photographicity. In these instances, claims Scruton, the causal link is disrupted and we do not 
take an interest towards the image as an ideal photograph. In order to create an image – using 
photography – in which we attribute the detail to the image and therefore the artist’s intention 
‘… one must then so interfere with the relation between the photograph and its subject… [and by 
doing so the image] ceases to be a photograph of its subject.’84  
 
If we are to take an aesthetic interest towards the pictorial representation that is not merely 
caused by the subject of the depiction then the detail must also refer to the artist’s intentions. 
Detail, in its aesthetic context refers to the artist’s interpretation, imagination and intention. His 
conclusion insofar as we conceive of detail in the photograph reveals the converse: photography 
‘can present us with what we see, but it cannot tell us how to see it.’85  
 
1.13: Detail and the de-centred intent 
 
Scruton’s conception of representational art as an intentionally created object is, I contend is too 
narrow: in particular his description of the content of the aesthetic representation understood as 
an expression of a thought about the subject, that we attribute to the artist. Photographic detail, as 
Scruton rightly points out does not refer to a thought about the subject – due to causal 
dependency: The mechanical causal process, we may infer from his argument, disrupts the 
potential for the artist to create a representation that may be appreciated for its expression of a 
thought about the subject. So if we are unable to take an interest towards the detail in a 
photograph as – wholly – attributable to the image, how is the artist able to use the camera to 
express a thought about the subject? 
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In Michals work, his arrangements do not rely on the viewer realising the intentional as a 
unifying element; we do not take the image to embody a thought about its subject matter: since 
the appearance generated in the image is not causally determined by Michals’s intentions. 
Moreover, what holds our attention, I contend, is reliant on – in comparison to the painter – a 
sense of authorial absence. As Michals argues photographs enable us to ask questions about what 
we are looking at and what can be said about the relationship between meaning and appearances: 
 ‘My photographs are about questions. They are not about answers. I think photographs should 
provoke, should set up the question, the premise, and shouldn’t give the answer.’86  
 
Michals’s work often documents an exchange, or some kind of interaction; for example in his 
work Chance Meeting (1969): In this series we see six images, each of which records the 
inconspicuous instance of two people passing each other in the street. As the event unfolds we 
notice that one of the individuals gives a passing – yet what appears in the photograph to be a 
decisive – look as he walks by the other individual. This seems to go unnoticed as they both pass 
each other. In the image in final image in the series, the man who threw the initial glance is 
disappeared and the look is returned.  
 
What Michals intends for us to see emerges not by our taking an interest in the way things appear 
but rather what certain appearances suggest: We do not see, yet we are able to imagine that in the 
passing glance, something meaningful is taking place. In sensing – but not seeing literally – a 
tension emergent in the passing glance we begin to see the subjects and their appearance in a 
different way: the back alley setting, the impersonal attire which the two individuals wear, the 
way in which the brick wall seems to make the passing feel more claustrophobic. For Michals’s 
it is not just the appearance from which we derive meaningful engagement but what the 
appearance is able to tell us about the photographic event. 
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6. Duane Michals, Chance Meeting , 1969 
 
For Michals, lack of intentional control enables him to engender a greater sense of complexity in 
the subject that he explores in his photographs. In particular, causal dependency plays a vital role 
in Michals’s approach towards expressivity. Whilst a photograph may enable the viewer to take 
an interest towards the subject photographed it is not necessary that in doing so they will learn 
anything certain about that subject. It is in this sense that Michals’ work is interesting as 
representational art: Appearance generates interest insofar as it emerges as a vehicle that both 
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conveys and yet also cancels meaning; whilst a photograph enables us to attend to the way that 
the object appears in the photograph, it is not merely the appearance that holds our interest but its 
context within the photographic event: ‘I am interested in the nature of things. The nature of 
something is quite different from the way it looks.’87 The difference or inaccessibility, I claim, is 
expressed by Michals’ work because whilst the viewer may see the 1/60th of a second 
photographed by Michals the viewer does not have access to the photographic event – the 
duration of the exposure.  
 
An aesthetic interest is not necessarily guided by the way the subject appears but also the 
photographic event to which that appearance is causally related. For Michals photography allows 
him to create work in which the expressive emerges not as the unifying quality but as a 
possibility: Photography, therefore, enables Michals to create representational art in which his 
intention is not in harmony with the appearance that he invites us to contemplate but emerges as 
fragmented; insofar as that intention becomes de-centred in photography. 
 
Scruton may contend that he has addressed and successfully challenged the possibility that 
photographs can be expressive of an intention to see the subject in a certain way. Scruton 
considers an example in which he points to a passing drunk and exclaims Silenus.
88
 He discusses 
the possibility that by describing the subject in this way; ‘I am inviting you to think of him in 
that way [and in doing so] I have expressed a representational thought…’89 Yet he concludes that 
it is not the photograph or his pointing finger that we see as the representation. The camera or 
Scruton’s finger may indeed point towards the drunk but it is the latter and not either of the 
former that we see as a representation of Silenus. ‘The subject, once located, plays its own 
special part in an independent process of representation. The camera is not essential to that 
process.’90 
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Yet, I do not think that Scruton’s claim poses a problem for a de-centred conception of the place 
of intention in creative photography. As he contends, the photographer is unable to use the 
camera to enable the viewer to see something photographed as something else – as an expression 
of her thought. If we see the drunk as Silenus it is because it is in our seeing the drunk – and not 
the photographer’s thoughts about that drunk, although we may also share them. Nonetheless, as 
I expressed in the example of Michals’ work, the photographer does not seek to engage our 
attention in the way in which Scruton is addressing. Michals does not require the viewer to see 
the subject in a certain way: moreover, he points to the subject and poses the question; “what do 
you think that means?” As we have underlined in Michals’s work, intentionality emerges as a 
subtle mechanic in photography; it does not unify the representational meaning of the work. 
 
As Michals’ work illustrates, we are not necessarily able to say anything conclusive about what 
the photograph is expressive of – in terms of our acknowledging that the representational 
meaning is unified by the photographer’s intention. However, I contend that the artist is able to 
use this quality, peculiar to photography, to create images that hold our interest as artistic 
representations. In Michals’s work he is not pointing to the drunk and saying, ‘look Silenus’. His 
aim is more complex; he wants the viewer to think about what they are looking at and consider 
how and why certain meanings emerge. Creating meaningful photographs, for Michals is like 
seeing the whole picture in the pieces of a puzzle without fitting together the pieces; this is the 
photographer’s problem – to show how this embodies a thought, yet does not seek to reconcile 
that thought as a whole or unifying thought in the image. For Michals, photography does not 
seek to unify this puzzle but only to show that it can enable us to engage contemplatively with 
our experience of the world: 
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That alone is a problem… you have to organize your mind in 
such a way as to know how to express this. The nuances, the 
chance meetings with people, the sexual interests…the 
decisive moments in everyday life that heighten awareness. 
How can I express these things? It’s very subtle; more like 
haiku than hardcore rock music.
91
 
 
1.14: The photographer’s problem  
 
‘The photographer’s problem, therefore, is to see clearly the limitations and at the same time the 
potential qualities of his medium... This means a real respect for the things in front of him.’92 It is 
likely that Scruton would agree with this view. Paul Strand, the protégé of Alfred Stieglitz and 
mentor to Henri Cartier-Bresson, used photography to document the everyday goings on in city 
life. He also saw, contra Scruton, that the camera could tell us not only about the way something 
looks but also convey a thought about our experience of the world.  
 
Strand was interested in the complexities of appearance, identity and self expression. Everything 
that occurs before the lens could be ‘organized to express the causes of which they are effect, or 
they may be used as abstract forms, to create an emotion unrelated to the objectivity as such.’93 
The creative process of the photographer – as understood by Strand – is not to present the subject 
as a representation that is unified by an intention; moreover, photographer’s set themselves 
challenges to create images that enable the viewer to contemplate and re-think meaningful 
relationships. I have introduced the notion of a de-centred intention that finds the photographer’s 
thought in the photographic event. In this configuration we may acknowledge the intention not 
merely by attending to an appearance but by finding that appearance in the context of the 
photographic event. 
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1.15: Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have outlined a critical exposition of Scruton’s claim regarding the creative 
practice of picture making. The ideal mechanically reproduced picture disallows the production 
of a representation in which the appearance of the object depicted is unified by the artist’s 
intention. This method of producing an appearance is lacking in the ideal photograph, argues 
Scruton, and therefore the viewer is unable to appreciate the photograph as representational art. 
His aim is to identify a difference between photographic and painterly representation and in 
doing so show why the painter but not the photographer is able to use her medium to create an 
image that we may appreciate as representational art. 
 
Whilst I agree that underlining the distinction between representation in painting and 
representation in photography is important, I think it also illuminates a gap in our thinking about 
the creative potential of photography. As will become apparent throughout this thesis, there is a 
good deal of literature that seeks to take the causal process seriously and it is my intention to do 
the same. I think that in following this route it will become clear that mapping out the creative 
potential of photography requires a reassessment of the relationship between the artist and her 
intention. 
 
In this chapter, I have sought out to show that Scruton’s assessment of the relationship between 
artist and camera, whilst accurate in recognising the provenance of causality perhaps suffers 
from association with the painterly – a charge which he also acknowledges.94 The painter’s 
relationship with her subject, for Scruton leads to a negative assessment of photography’s 
potential to be appreciated as an aesthetic representation. However, I claim that whilst we need 
to acknowledge the difference between the media – in terms of how they afford the artist 
intentional control over her subject – it is important that we separate from our discussion of 
causal derivation a measure that takes its nodal points from the medium of painting. In doing so I 
claim that we may come to see the mechanically derived causal process as a quality that requires 
the artist to find a different approach towards the expression of a thought about the appearance of 
                                                          
94
 See Scruton, R. (1998), p.139 
56 
 
 
 
her subject. At the centre of this alternate approach will be a positive appraisal of the loss of a 
centralised notion of the intentional.  
 
In chapter 2 I will explore the historicity of the qualities that Scruton denies as capable of 
constituting an aesthetic representation – the loss of the intentional. In doing so, my aim is to 
show that photography has had a positive effect on how the artist understands her work as an 
expression of a thought about her subject. The very qualities which Scruton denies, I contend, 
emerge as aesthetically engaging insofar as they enable the artist to form a different kind of 
purpose in expression – that is no less valuable as representational art. 
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Chapter 2: The modern eye 
 
2.1: The modern eye 
 
Alfred Stieglitz in conversation with some painters, whilst he was a student in Germany: “Of 
course this is not Art, but we would like to paint the way you photograph.” His [Stieglitz’s] reply 
was, “I don’t know anything about Art, but for some reason or other I have never wanted to 
photograph the way you paint.”95 
 
 
Scruton’s essay on aesthetic representation sets out to examine ‘… whether there is some feature, 
suitably called representation, common to painting and photography. And we wish to know 
whether that feature has in each case a comparable aesthetic value.’96 We know that due to the 
mechanically derived causal process Scruton claims that we are unable to take an interest 
towards the photograph as an aesthetic representation. In order to appreciate a picture as 
representational art it is necessary that our interest is held by the artist’s intention. I contend that 
due to its reliance on a notion of intentionality that is found in our understanding of painting, this 
argument only clouds our exploration of the creative potential and aesthetic understanding of 
photography. As Stieglitz and his interlocutors neatly underline, we may see the photograph as 
expressive of something we attribute to the artist’s understanding. However, it is when we begin 
to look for values that originate in the relationship between the painter and her intentions that 
doubt over the creative and aesthetic potential emerges.  
 
Rather than making an attempt to isolate photography from painting – as a way of addressing its 
creative and aesthetic potential – I think perhaps a different approach is required. We have been 
discussing Scruton’s assessment of the representational value of photography; key to his claim 
that a photograph cannot be appreciated as an aesthetic representation regards the photographer’s 
inability to make a photograph that works as an expression of her intentions. In one sense – 
concerning the relationship between medium and artist – Scruton’s assessment of the creative 
                                                          
95
 Goldberg, V. (1988), p. 285 
96
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.120 
58 
 
 
 
potential of the photographer is measured against values that originate in painting: In particular 
regarding the aesthetic representation as the expression of a thought. Scruton argues that the 
photographic causal process, when compared to the painter’s relationship with her media 
underlines the absence of intentional and interpretive control which he describes as characteristic 
of the aesthetic representation: ‘The photograph is a means to the end of seeing its subject; in 
painting, on the other hand, the subject is the means to the end of its own representation.’97 
However, I contend that this comparison is problematic because it can lead us to look for the 
painter in photography. In taking this approach, it would seem that we place demands on 
photography – in terms of its creative potential – that are bound to raise scepticism or a negative 
assessment of its creative and aesthetic potential. 
 
Rather than searching for the painter in photography, therefore, I contend that an opposite 
approach may be helpful. By looking for the photographic in painting my aim is to consider how 
characteristics of the former have enabled the artist to take a different approach towards 
expressivity and intentionality: Central to this, will be a discussion of what I perceive to be the 
positive impact of the photographic causal process on the creative practice of pictorial 
representation. My aim in taking this approach is to question Scruton’s assertion that interpretive 
and intentional control, are characteristics central to our appreciation of the image as 
representational art. 
 
I accept Scruton’s logical ideal that a photograph is causally related to the object before the lens 
and therefore our interest is held by that object rather than a representation causally related to the 
artist’s intention. Nonetheless, I do not accept that this disallows us to take an aesthetic interest 
towards the photographic representation. My claim is that we do not appreciate the 
photographer’s intentions as central to our interest towards the representational meaning. 
However, we do recognise that our interest is guided by an intention. In this sense, we 
acknowledge the photographer’s intentions as present yet de-centred: The appearance of the 
object depicted is not causally related to the photographer’s intentions but our interest towards 
the photographic event is also causally related to the photographer’s intentions.  
                                                          
97
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.133-134 
59 
 
 
 
 
For Scruton, we relate the appearance generated in the painting to the painter’s thought about the 
object depicted: We know that it is, to a greater or lesser degree her intention for the object to 
appear as it does in the painting. When we look at a photograph, however, we are not always 
able to say with confidence that the appearance of the object in the photograph can tells us 
anything about the photographer’s intention. This is for Scruton the reason why we are not able 
to appreciate the photograph as an aesthetic representation. I described the absence of intentional 
control in a different way.  
 
I recognise that intentionality relates not merely to the appearance of the object photographed but 
the relationship between appearance and the photographic event: Interest towards appearance is 
not merely caused by attending to the way something looks but how we relate that appearance to 
the photographic event. However, a difficulty remains; that being the propensity to describe our 
interest towards the photograph as causally related to an intention. Nonetheless, by 
acknowledging that a photograph points towards a photographic event rather than merely the 
way something looks when it was photographed we are able to challenge the notion that 
intentionality relates merely to the construction of appearance. In this sense, as Phillips 
recognises the subject of the photograph is not necessarily recognisable as the object 
photographed but the event: ‘In general, the duration of the photographic event corresponds to 
the period of time the photosensitive surface is exposed to light… Different lengths of exposure 
time will produce significantly different records.’98 In one sense we may think that our interest 
towards the photograph is caused by our seeing the subject, rather than the artist’s intention to 
see the subject in a certain way – due to causal dependency. In another sense we may also 
recognise that our interest towards the subject as we see it in the photograph is different – not 
merely caused by seeing the subject: Our appreciation of a gesture, look, shadow, etc, that see in 
the photograph may hold our interest because of a sense of unity that it appears to give the 
image.  
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Yet, as Meyerowitz contends the meaning that we attribute to the photographic event emerges as 
a possibility – rather than a representation unified by an intention. Whilst this does not offer a 
counter to Scruton’s claim that photographer’s are unable to create images that are causally 
related to their intentions it opens up a gap in the debate about representational art and 
photography; it enables us to consider the potential that the photographer’s intention is present 
but not central to our interest towards the image. If we are to better understand how the 
photographer’s intention emerges I contend that we must focus not on appearance but the 
photographic event. As the noted photography critic John Swarkowski argues, in understanding 
the photographic artform we are moved not to consider appearance but event: ‘It isn’t what a 
picture is of, it is what a picture is about.’99 
 
Our discussion of intentionality and photography has, so far, revealed a subtle mechanic; we are 
not, in appreciating the ideal photograph, compelled to acknowledge the photographer’s 
intentions as constructive. Nonetheless our interest towards the frame is guided by certain 
decisions, to include or exclude certain subjects. How we relate the ideal photograph to a thought 
about the object(s) photographed, however, remains a problem. 
 
The causal relationship, I claim does not disallow the expression of a thought, it enables the artist 
to take a different approach towards how we are able to think about the artwork as an expression 
of a thought. Photographs can be interesting as pictures that challenge the traditional notion of 
expressivity that is available to the painter. The photographer is able to create images that hold 
our attention because we are compelled to contemplate the possibility of what is expressed; for 
many artists photography is an approach that allows them to challenge the relationship between 
object and meaning. 
 
I aim to present the view that the mechanically derived causal process creates a relationship in 
which the artist finds her expression by – to a certain degree – relinquishing her interpretive 
powers; in this sense the artist is not only interested in conveying her intention to create a unique 
appearance. Moreover, the artist is interested in showing the relationship between appearance 
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and meanings as they form in the photographic event. That we are unable to say that the 
photograph expresses a thought about the subject in the same way that we find by looking at a 
painting seems to be illustrative of the medium’s creative appropriation.  
 
Photographers often use the camera to make images that challenge the way we think about 
engaging our interest with the subject captured before the lens. For Gregory Crewdson 
photography enables him to express his interest in the tension between the familiar and the 
strange. The cinematic influence in his images is striking and this is also evidenced by his use of 
film studio lights and large production teams. The result of his carefully crafted tableaus, are 
scenes that invite us to contemplate the possibility of a narrative that the camera records. Yet, 
because of the photographic causal process we are unable to attribute these scenes to the 
photographer’s intention – in the same way that we may do in a painting.  
 
The inability to regard the photograph as an expression of a thought about the subject, I claim 
enables Crewdson to create images that are rich in mystery. Because the photographic image is a 
recording of a moment in time we appreciate the representational meaning as causally related to 
the photographic event. Yet as we do not have access to the photographic event, the meaning that 
we form in relation to his images is not wholly realised; but emerge as possibilities, rich in 
narrative. It is not Crewdson’s intention for the viewer to see the subject in a particular way but it 
is his intention to create pictures which provoke us to ask questions about the possibility of a 
narrative. We are drawn towards the photograph not merely because of the subject photographed 
but because of the possibilities that we attribute to the photographic event; as though the image 
also contains a narrative that due to the mechanically derived causal process we do not have 
access to. 
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7. Gregory Crewdson, Untitled, 2001-2 
 
Scruton underlines causality as a quality of photography that disrupts the relationship between 
the artist and her thought process – to the extent that we are unable to attribute the resulting 
image to the artist’s interpretive understanding of the subject; consequentially, our aesthetic 
interest is not held by the image but the subject. Nonetheless, by measuring the creative potential 
of the photographic medium against the painterly, I claim that Scruton closes the door shut on a 
serious discussion of the impact of causality on creative practice. If, on the other hand, we take 
seriously the loss of intentional and interpretive control in Scruton’s logical ideal I contend that 
we may unfold an alternate yet no less profound understanding of the artistic expression based 
on a reassessment of the relationship between artist and her intentionality.  
 
To introduce this view, I will first consider how the ideal photograph impacts positively on the 
artist’s attitude towards expression in representational art; presenting its invention/discovery as 
historically important in terms of how the medium enables the artist an alternate approach 
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towards exploring the relationship between meaning and appearance. Photography, I will show 
has enabled the artist to rethink her approach towards expressing a thought about her subject.  
 
2.2: The remarkable appearance 
 
In his address to the Chamber of Deputies in 1839 Dominique Arago outlined the reasons why 
Daguerre should be awarded a pension for his innovations in photography. One of the reasons 
given by Arago notes that the ‘…[r]emarkable invention of M. Daguerre is a great service 
rendered to the Arts.’100  
 
Indeed, Arago was not alone in the instigation of photography as a useful artist’s aid. William 
Henry Fox Talbot invented the fixed negative as an aid to improve his sketch work and even 
Baudelaire thought that photography performed a service to the arts, even if it was as ‘a very 
humble handmaid’101. Yet this does not give us a rounded understanding of photography’s true 
impact on pictorial representation. A more profound understanding of photography’s effect on 
pictorial representation may be discerned from what I recognise as its first important collision 
with painting; in the infamous Palais des Champs-Elyses Salon show of 1865 in Paris. The event 
that caused such an explosion of moral furore was a work by the French painter Edouard Manet.  
 
Manet’s Olympia (1863) was roundly lynched by both critics and the public; excoriated as a 
moral abomination, the crowd of those who came to visit the exhibition simply to jeer at Manet’s 
work became so vast that the salon ‘… needed to deploy guards to protect Olympia from the 
malicious designs of the indignant spectators.’102 Rather than comment on the artist’s brushwork 
or interpretation of the subject critics attacked the painting from an altogether different 
perspective. It was not the depiction that the critics deplored but the subject matter itself; a 
subject matter that according to Manet’s dissenters had no place in art. Manet was criticised, not 
for his ability to express a thought his subject, but for his decision to depict a nude in a realistic 
style.  
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Both critics and the public were repelled by the idea that an artist would consider such a realistic 
depiction of a prostitute as beautiful, although painters in Western Europe had over the last 
twenty years begun to celebrate in their advocacy of naturalism a sense of the contemporary 
realism.
103
 The criticism that Olympia received seems to reflect an attitude towards picture 
making that is enthused by a rejection of a realism that I contend is influenced by a photographic 
way of looking. The unavoidable realism that arrived through the photographic picture, I 
contend, gave the painter a new way of thinking about appearance. The realism that was 
available – unavoidably to the photographer – underlined for the painter a reduction of the 
distance between the sitter and the artist that had not before been expressed. For Manet and the 
Post-Impressionists it was not only the intention that could provoke contemplative interest but 
the momentary.  
 
2.3: Lighting the subject 
 
Yet it is not only a different approach towards re-imaging the subject that photography enabled; 
stylistic tropes in photography also influenced the painter’s interpretation of colour, tone and 
lighting. In the The Judgement of Paris Robert King discusses the influence of photography on 
Manet’s masterpiece. Manet’s Olympia, as King notes is visibly influenced by photographic 
techniques. Bright and contrasting colours flatten Manet’s tonal range washing out shadow thus 
creating harsh lines. These qualities, insists King mimicked techniques that marked the 
photographic process of the mid-nineteenth century. Such techniques included strong artificial 
lighting and long exposures that caused the image to lack in detail and as King argues, visibly 
inspired Manet’s approach to depicting his Olympia:  
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If Victorine had indeed been photographed by Nadar (who 
sometimes used battery-powered arc lamps to cast light on 
his subjects), the result would not have been dissimilar to the 
stark image Manet produced on his canvas, whose lack of 
detail, moreover, resembled the hazy images produced by 
photographers as a result of long exposures required by 
paper-negative prints.
104
 
 
 
8. Edouard Manet, Olympia, 1863 
 
In his lecture on Manet’s paintings, Manet and the Object of Painting the philosopher Michel 
Foucault dedicated a section to the painter’s innovative use of lighting. In particular, Foucault 
addresses Manet’s of artificial lighting. He notes that in his Luncheon on the Grass (1863) not 
only does there seem to be natural light which bathes the female character in the background, but 
also of an artificial light which strikes brutally the characters in the foreground. Again in his 
description of Olympia Foucault addresses the light as a force that pierces so as to reveal every 
aspect of its model:
105
 ‘the light is certainly not a soft and discreet lateral light, it is a very violent 
light which strikes her here, full shot.’106  In underlining the stylistic influence – of photography 
– on the painter’s depiction of his subject, I claim that we may observe a difference in attitude 
                                                          
104
 King, R. (2006) p.108-9 
105
 Foucault, M. (2009), p.62 
106
 Foucault, M. (2009) p.67 
66 
 
 
 
towards thinking about the creation of an appearance. This also extends to how the artist begins 
to think about framing, light and even the way in which they look at the subject. 
 
2.4: Contemporary beauty 
 
In the work of the Impressionists, the attitude towards depicting and representing the subject 
began to reveal more of the influence of photographic documentation in painting.  For example, 
the French painter Gustave Courbet claimed that the artist should, principally, be an observer 
rather than interpreter of his subject matter. Expression, for Courbet reveals itself not only in the 
artist’s interpretation but unfolds the context within which that interpretation is held: ‘Beauty, 
like truth, is relative to the time in which one lives and to the individual capable of 
comprehending it. The expression of the beautiful is in direct proportion to the perceptive powers 
acquired by the artist.’107  
 
As the creative attitudes of Manet and Courbet attest, a stark realism began to unfold in the 
interpretation of aesthetic representation during the mid to late nineteenth century. This realism 
was based on observation and an interest towards the artist’s contemporary environment. Claude 
Monet, as Paul Smith notes, wanted to make paintings that were not beholden to a unified 
narrative. For Monet the painting was not simply a product of the imagination but could describe 
our sensuous experience of the temporal.
108
  
 
Scruton does acknowledge the quality of resemblance as an aspect of our interest in 
representational art. In taking an aesthetic interest towards the representation, the subject is not 
removed from that kind of interest. Rather, his point – regarding the difference between 
photographic and painterly representation – concerns the cause of the aesthetic in our interest; 
which he argues is not merely found in our seeing the subject but in our seeing it in a certain 
way, according to the artist’s intention. In order to say that our interest is held by the depiction 
and not the subject depicted, even though we make reference to the subject, it is the intent to look 
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at the subject in this way – rather than the subject’s appearance – that signifies the image as an 
aesthetic representation:  
 
…there is the case where the reasons for the interest are 
reasons for interest in the picture (in the way in looks) even 
though they make essential reference to the subject and can 
be understood as reasons only by someone who understands 
the reference to the subject. For example, the observer may 
refer to a particular gesture of a certain figure… Clearly, that 
is a reason not only for an interest in the subject but also (and 
primarily) for an interest in the picture, since it gives a reason 
for an interest in something which can be understood only by 
looking at the picture.
109
 
 
In discussing Manet’s Bar Aux Foiles-Bergere (1882) Scruton underlines in his logical ideal the 
difference between photographic and painterly representation; in which the former is dependent 
on acknowledging that our interest is held by seeing the subject and in the latter recognising that 
our interest is caused by the representation: ‘Here it could not be said that the painting is being 
treated as a surrogate for the subject: it is itself the object of interest and irreplaceable by the 
thing depicted.’110  
 
For Scruton, in order for the viewer to say that his aesthetic interest is directed towards the 
representation – and not the subject represented – his interest must be provoked by a thought 
about the subject. This is, for Scruton, an essential quality of the aesthetic representation; whilst 
the viewer may recognise the subject represented and even be able to say that the representation 
presents that subject in a good likeness, it is not the subject that presents itself but the artist 
whose communication with which the viewer is taken: ‘…to understand a painting involves 
understanding thoughts. These thoughts are, in a sense, communicated by the painting. They 
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underlie the painter’s intention, and at the same time they inform our way of seeing the 
canvas.’111  
 
It is the causal relationship between the subject and mechanical instrument, that for Scruton, I 
claim, denies the possibility of creating an aesthetic representation. Yet I think that this view of 
causal derivation is perhaps too hasty and we yet may see a way by which photography allows 
the artist to rethink her understanding of the artwork as an expression of a thought.  
 
In Manet’s bar scene, for example, it is not only his masterful rendering of the subject but the 
relationship he creates between the subject and her environment. Indeed, the disaffected 
expression of the barmaid is reminiscent of those expressions that we find on the face of the 
sitter in the photographic portraits of the late nineteenth century. The weights and neck clamps 
used by the photographer in the studio made the photographic portrait an event that had to be 
endured by the sitter. With this in mind I claim that Manet’s technique and stylistic approach 
creates a picture that not only seems to situate the viewer in the room, but in that moment. As 
Galassi notes in comparing the compositional structures of Uccello and Degas, the Post-
Impressionists did not consider the frame as a tool which should contain merely the depiction: ‘A 
comparable sense of these changes may be had by ignoring the artist in favour of the viewer. The 
latter has no place in Uccello’s picture, but he is a virtual participant in Degas’s.’112 I think that 
in Galassi’s observation we find a difference in attitude towards representing the subject. This 
difference relates to the way in which the artist thinks not only about the depiction as an 
expression of a thought but also – and in some ways equally as important – the depiction as a 
document of the moment. 
 
In Degas’s The Orchestra at the Opera (1870) for example his use of framing seems to disrupt 
rather than unify our interest towards the scene he is depicting: Our attention is directed towards 
a depiction of the orchestral pit. In the background we are able to see, half cut off and out of 
focus, a troupe of ballerinas mid-performance. As in Manet’s bar scene, our interest towards the 
painter’s subject is realised within the moment that he has depicted. As Carol Armstrong notes, 
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Degas, although derisive of the photographic medium, appropriated it because it enabled him to 
challenge an understanding of the parameters of creativity: 
 
Degas had always tended to disparage photography for its 
instantaneity and its lack of art. Yet its fascination for him 
seems to have lain precisely in that which he disparaged. 
Though, with his predilection for difficult viewing conditions 
and long posing times, he worked against the instant vision of 
the medium, he also appears to have been drawn towards its 
process of reflexivity and self-generation, and to have found 
within it a way of dissolving the fixed, authorial self of 
representation within the very process of repetition out of 
which representation is constituted.
113
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9. Edouard Degas, The Orchestra at the Opera, 1871 
 
 
 
 
2.5: Outside the frame 
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The photographic frame enables a sense of realism that whilst inclusive of those objects before 
the lens is notably exclusive of those objects outside the frame. Sometimes we may even be 
interested to know what is happening outside the frame; and even feel that it may better our 
understanding of what we see in the frame. Indeed it may be the absence or unintelligible 
appearance of the photographic record that may provoke an interest not merely towards the 
object photographed but the event that the camera records. As in Crewdson’ work, we often feel 
that the moment exposed onto the 8x10 plate reveals a fragment of a narrative. The narrative that 
we see unfolding in the composition is often compelling because we feel that it does not contain 
the whole story. 
 
The photographic narrative, I claim has a fragmentary quality: the viewer is unable to say that 
the photograph is an expression of a thought about the subject, in the same way that we think of 
in painting. Expressivity, therefore, is not unified by the artist’ intention, nonetheless, it affords 
the artist a different approach. An interest towards the representational meaning in Crewdson’s 
work for example, is caused not by the intention to see the subject in a certain way but by taking 
an interest in the photographic event.  
 
The photographer is able to record virtually everything that passes her lens. Nonetheless, in 
doing so she is faced with another challenge. How to make an image that is expressive of her 
perspective or interest towards the subject. Yet, this quandary, I claim, has the potential to mask 
what is most fruitful about the almost arbitrary infinitude of choices available to photographer 
when framing her shot. Whilst it allows her to take her time over framing her subject it also 
allows her to purposefully do away with traditional composition. In the work of Edouard Degas 
for example, the influence of the mannerisms of photographic frame is used to give his images a 
disruptive quality. Degas’ decision to photographically crop his subject awkwardly often creates 
a fragmentary perspective: Our interest towards the work as evidence of a unified intention is, I 
contend, in the same way that we think of it in photography, brought into question. We start to 
think of the picture as not only an expression of a thought about the subject but as the document 
of a moment. As Carol Armstrong acknowledges, this gives the pictorial surface a fragmentary 
rather than a unified quality: 
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…the photographic crop… singled out Degas’s use of 
fragmentation as the signature of his work. Unexpected 
points of view, the human body never seen as a whole or as a 
unity, a way of framing that is to crop and cut into and never 
to close off…114 
 
2.6: Striking the imagination 
 
Within this discussion I have examined contra Scruton that the qualities of intentionality and the 
interpretive are central to our understanding and appreciation of a picture as an aesthetic 
representation. I have begun to develop the idea that photography has offered the artist an 
alternate perspective with regards to her treatment of intention; and in Scruton’s discussion there 
is a gap in terms of a positive exploration of the creative potential of photography.  
 
For Scruton, the aesthetic representation and the interpretive are bound together insofar as the 
former is determined by our interest being provoked by the latter. Representational art, he 
argues, holds our interest not because we see merely the subject depicted but because we find 
something expressive about the way in which the subject is depicted. For Scruton, what is 
expressive we attribute to a thought about the subject or an intention to see the subject in a 
certain way and not an appearance we attribute to the subject itself.
115
  
 
Therefore, we attribute the meaningful value of the depiction to the artist’s intention to 
communicate or share some understanding about the way something appears: even if we 
appreciate the painting for the way in which it appears to resemble the subject, it is our 
understanding of artist’s skill that fosters this appreciation.  
 
Yet, I contend that there is something problematic in this formulation. Since photography has 
enabled artists to make studies of their subject, I claim that our interest towards seeing the 
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subject depicted has taken on a different importance. Insofar as the photographer is able to make 
a record of her subject – in a way in which the painter cannot – our interest towards the subject in 
pictures has necessarily begun to take a different shape.  
 
Photography, I contend, has endowed the artist with a tool that is able to depict in such a way 
that the intentional is de-centred; we not only think of the aesthetic representation as a product of 
the artist’s imagination but as a comment or reflection of the complex relationship between 
objects and their meanings. 
 
2.7: Documenting Meaning 
 
Rene Magritte’s Ceci N’est Pas une Pipe (1926), I claim, illustrates deftly the complexity of the 
photographer’s attitude towards intention. The depiction of the text and image in Magritte’s 
painting expresses a playfully satirical interpretation of the relationship between objects and their 
meaning(s). The realistic depiction of a pipe and the underlining text that informs the viewer that 
this is not a pipe, I claim, can give us insight into the complexity of the expressive in 
photography. 
 
In this chapter – and the previous chapter – I have been discussing the possibility that we may 
appreciate the photograph as an expression of a thought about its subject. The initial problem 
encountered in stating this claim is underlined by Scruton: how can you take an interest towards 
the photograph as an expression of a thought about the subject when you recognise that a 
photograph is causally related to the subject? If a photograph is aesthetically interesting – which 
Scruton does not deny – then it must be the subject that is the cause of our contemplative 
interest; so we attribute the expression of a thought/idea to the subject?  
 
I am unconvinced by this conclusion for the same reason that Scruton gives in his rejection of 
intentional control. How is it possible to regard the subject as the sole cause of our contemplative 
interest? We may not always be able to say that it is the subject that draws our contemplative 
interest. In documentary photography, for example, it is often the context – social, historical, 
geographical, etc – that defines our interest towards the subject. But we may not always have 
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access to a context; a photograph may be of a detail or out of focus and still remain aesthetically 
pleasing. I claim that the photographer may indeed use her medium to express a thought about 
the subject, yet we need to alter our approach towards how we think about the act of intention – 
maybe even seeking to discard it altogether in its current use, when thinking about photography. 
 
Magritte’s painting, I claim, may give us some insight into how we might approach a better 
understanding of the photographer’s art. The relationship between image and text in one sense, I 
contend, reflects the photographers understanding of the relationship between the subject and 
photograph. A photograph, as we have discussed in Michals’ work does not necessarily express 
what the photographer thinks about the object photographed; the thought itself emerges as 
something akin to a possibility or suggestion that we may describe as narrative like in form. For 
Michals, photography is disruptive of the traditional relationship between artist and intention in 
such a way that it allows him to create images that deal with the complexity of expression. In his 
work we may relate our aesthetic interest to our seeing the subject but do not necessarily find the 
subject to be the cause of what is expressed. For Magritte the potency of expression is often 
found not merely in the expression of a thought but by exploring the complexity of its 
articulation: ‘Everything that is visible hides something else that is invisible.’116  
 
Magritte’s paintings are often challenging because they have a disruptive quality. Scruton claims 
that our interest towards the appearance of a painting is caused by our acknowledging the artist’s 
intention. However, Magritte is able, rather masterfully, to disrupt this relationship; his 
presentation of appearance confronts our assumption that the contents of a depiction are unified 
by the artist’s intention. Instead, as in the case of Ceci N’est Pas Une Pipe Magritte reveals that 
the intention to express a thought and its articulation are not necessarily unified. 
 
Michel Foucault realises, that in Magritte’s work, the intentional is challenged. Rather than 
placing the imaginative on a pedestal he seeks to describe it as indicative of a complex and 
multi-layered narrative; ‘... at the moment when he should reveal the name, Magritte does so by 
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denying the object is what it is.’117  For Galassi, this disruptive quality of the pictorial 
representation is a characteristic peculiar to photography: ‘That we now value photography’s 
disruptive character is perhaps the best measure of the degree to which the medium has shaped 
our conception of modern art.’118 
 
 
10. Rene Magritte, Ceci n’est pas une pipe, 1926 
 
Foucault explores the way by which Magritte’s The Treachery of Images (1928-29) underlines 
the fragmentation of meaning that emerges through the communication of a thought. For 
Magritte the representational does not necessarily engage the viewer as the communication of a 
unified thought but also as a multiplex of meanings; in this sense what is expressed emerges 
more akin to a dialogue than an expression of a unified thought about the subject. As Foucault 
observes, the representational in Magritte takes place as a dialogue between resemblances: 
‘Resemblance makes a unique assertion, always the same. This thing, that thing, yet another 
thing is something else. Similitude multiplies different affirmations, which dance together, tilting 
and tumbling over one another.’119 
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Magritte’s work, I contend, allows us to look again at the way the artist perceives intention as the 
communication of a thought. His paintings allow us to challenge the view – held by Scruton – 
that in order for us take an aesthetic interest towards a representation there must be some sense in 
which we see that representation as unified by the communication of an intention. Magritte’s 
paintings seem fascinated by the way in which meanings relate to appearances and I contend that 
there is something remarkably photographic about the way in which he achieves this end.
120
 We 
may not only attribute the expression to the artist’s intention but the artist’s interest in the 
complexity of expression. In Magritte’s work, we often engage with a content that, I contend, is 
informed by the mechanically derived causal process; insofar as we appreciate the image for its 
expression of an underlying incongruity in the relationship between appearance and meaning. 
Yet the expression of such an inconsistency is not defined by a centralising intention but its 
lacking.  
 
In these two opening chapters, I have criticised the established view of photography in relation to 
creative practice. In the first chapter I examined an understanding of the aims of creative 
photography and in this chapter I have explored the positive view of the impact of photography 
on the creative practice of pictorial representation.  
 
Rather than contradict Scruton’s claims regarding the ideal photograph I have examined how the 
mechanically derived causal process has enriched the artist’s creative attitude towards picture 
making. Photography, I claim has enabled the artist to reconsider her role as interpreter. In this 
chapter it has been my intention to reconsider how we think about photography in terms of the 
impact on representational art. In taking this approach I have underlined a need to move away 
from a centralised notion of intentionality. 
 
However, I have only addressed the impact of causal dependency on creative practice. I have not 
explored the de-centred notion of intentionality beyond a discussion of the need to outline its 
characteristics and examine why they might enrich our understanding of the photographic 
artform. Scruton, in his discussion of representational art presents us with what I agree is an 
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important demarcation; that being the differentiation between the representational value of a 
photograph and a painting.  
 
Causal dependency, he argues denies the artist the potential to make a representation that the 
viewer may take an aesthetic interest towards that is separate from an interest caused by seeing 
the object photographed. In this chapter I have argued that Scruton’s comparison whilst useful is 
problematic insofar as it is dependent on an understanding of the relationship between the artist 
and her intention that does not look beyond its formation in painting. Therefore, I claim it is 
necessary to re-examine a configuration of intentionality in relation to photography. However, 
before I make such a study it is first necessary to make clear the parameters within which we are 
able to talk about intentions – specific to the photographic medium.  
 
Therefore, in the next chapter I will consider a different approach towards the understanding of 
causal derivation in photography and how this effects our exploration of the creative potential of 
the medium – in terms of appreciating the representational value of a photograph. In particular I 
will discuss Kendall Walton’s claim that a photograph enables us to see literally the subject 
through the photograph.  
 
Before concluding this chapter I will consider some further criticisms of Scruton’s argument. My 
aim in giving an exposition of Scruton’s detractors is to illustrate a trend in some of the criticism 
levelled at his claims. For the most part, whilst clear, the criticisms operate on the same 
assumptions as Scruton’s argument. By this I mean that their conception of a photographic 
aesthetic refers to an understanding of pictorial representation based on the painterly. Whilst we 
may take some interesting points from these arguments, they highlight the need for a 
reassessment of the epistemological foundation of our discussion of the creative potential of 
photography. 
 
 
 
2.8: Some reactions to Scruton’s transparency thesis 
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So far I have considered some of the problem’s concerning Scruton’s understanding of aesthetic 
representation pertaining to the artwork. I have not, however, considered the possibility that the 
ideal photograph could be judged as an aesthetic representation according to standards by which 
Scruton claims paintings should be judged – in terms of the aesthetic representation. This notion 
that – akin to the painting – a photograph can be appreciated as an aesthetic representation is 
supported by a few philosophers. Robert Wicks takes up such a position without appearing to 
disagree with Scruton’s prognosis; ‘a photograph, ideal or actual, captures and preserves the 
appearance of its subject.
121
  
 
For Wick’s, causal provenance enhances our experience of the subject. Although the photograph 
is causally related to its subject he argues that it also allows the viewer to take a disinterested 
attitude towards the subject.  Wicks argues that in order to grasp the photographic aesthetic; ‘one 
must attend to the image’s features that arise from the photographic medium itself.’122 What 
characterises the difference between a transparent interest towards the subject – which for 
Scruton is the only form of aesthetic interest that we can take towards the photograph – and an 
interest towards the photograph as an aesthetic representation is not the momentary but the 
preservation or freezing of the moment. For Wicks, that the photographer is able capture and 
preserve is enough to allow that we are able to interpret the photograph as an aesthetic 
representation. But is this enough to counter Scruton’s contention? 
 
Wick’s argues that the tools available to the photographer are sufficient evidence of artistic 
gesture or intention. However, it is not Scruton’s intention to deny the difference between my 
experience of the photograph depicting my friend standing in the rain and my standing in the rain 
beside the subject whilst the photograph is taken. From his argument it follows that the 
photograph is transparent to the subject, so any aesthetic interest must be towards the subject 
rather than photograph. It is not the difference between seeing the subject as photographed or in 
the flesh but the photographer’s inability to control or arrange the subject – in the manner 
available to the painter. 
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Wicks contends that by photographing the artist is able to transform the object photographed. In 
this sense, we think of the act of photographing as in some way, an act of interpreting. Yet, as 
Scruton contends, to posit this belief is to accord photography qualities that we understand as 
painterly. Problematic to the approach taken by Wicks, is an inability to discern a photographic 
aesthetic; to underline qualities that we might take to be peculiarly photographic.  
 
To say that my interest in the photograph is an interest towards certain features of the picture that 
we refer to as photographic is for Scruton to misrepresent the creative potential of the ideal 
photograph. Therefore, whilst Wick’s offers us an interesting approach to our understanding of 
photographic practice he does take seriously the medium itself. Conversely, Scruton does as we 
have discussed allow that a photograph may tell us something different about the object 
photographed, yet he does not attempt to characterise this difference. It is my task within this 
investigation to describe the artistic relevance of these characteristics. 
 
One such approach that elaborates on this idea we can attribute to the philosopher William King. 
King gives an account of someone captivated by a photograph of the Notre Dame: ‘It isn’t that I 
don’t remember what it looks like. I do. It’s sitting here alone, lingering over details, I relive a 
pleasant May of wandering about the island, sunning along the river.’123 King argues that as well 
as taking an interest in the subject, we also engage with those memories and feelings attached to 
our interest in the subject. In this sense, one treats the subject itself as an abstraction; it does not 
stand for itself, but those emotions that I recall when looking at a photograph of the Notre Dame.  
 
It is this abstraction that King argues is sufficient for one to consider the photograph as an 
aesthetic representation; ‘The dominant interest here is not in knowing the appearance of the 
subject. One remembers that. The interest is in memories that are stirred, feelings that are 
evoked.’124 King does not contradict Scruton’s claim that the photograph is transparent to the 
subject. He claims that we recognise that a photograph is of the Notre Dame yet still take an 
aesthetic interest towards the picture. For King, the photograph provokes our aesthetic interest by 
appealing to emotions and meanings attached to our memory of the subject.  
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It is because I realise that this picture is a photograph of the Notre Dame that I am reminded of 
its existence and those feelings that are attached to that memory: ‘The interest is in memories 
that are stirred, feelings that are evoked. Again, as Scruton argues, the interest is in the subject, 
and – we add – its emotional impact, not in the photograph itself.’125 However, one might ask 
King; if I have not seen the Notre Dame would I still be able to consider a photograph of it as an 
aesthetic representation? Photographs, we might easily agree do hold the potential to stir our 
memory. However, surely that is because the object photographed provokes a memory of a 
certain event, not because of an interest towards the photograph itself. This image of the 
aesthetic character of photography is certainly more appealing yet it is not further developed. 
Therefore, it does not seem that King offers a successful rejection of Scruton’s claim.  
 
Whilst we may appreciate that the aesthetic quality of the photograph is its ability to provoke 
certain memories or feelings we might also argue that certain paintings may provoke such an 
interest. For Scruton, however, to say that our aesthetic interest towards the photograph is 
characterised by a sense nostalgia amounts to the claims of a fantasist: Since he regards that our 
interest is provoked, primarily, by the object photographed and to take an aesthetic interest 
towards the photograph is to endow it with the quality of representation that it does not have. 
 
In this section I have considered views that seek to undermine Scruton’s claims regarding the 
consequence of photographic transparency – in relation to our aesthetic interest towards the 
photograph. Although, there are some interesting counter-claims, none of these criticisms 
address the problem that is at the heart of Scruton’s argument; can we appreciate the ideal 
photograph as an image that is causally related to the artist’s intentions? What is required, I 
claim, is a thorough exploration of characteristics that we might say are peculiar to photography 
as a representational art. 
 
2.9: Conclusion 
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‘“Blank” as the creative photographer’s state of mind is, 
uncritical as it is while photographing, as sensitized, as 
prepared for anything to happen, afterwards with the prints 
safely in hand he needs to practice the most conscious 
criticism. Is what he saw present in the photograph? If not, 
does the photograph open his eyes to something he could not 
see by himself?’126 
 
Minor White’s estimation of the process of photographing may help to put in perspective, 
Scruton’s understanding of both the ideal in photography and painting. The aim of the painter, 
according to Scruton is not the ‘accurate copying of appearances’127 but the intentional, 
imaginative and interpretive representation of the object before the lens; even a faithful depiction 
of her subject does not allow the viewer to see the subject in the same way that is possible in our 
appreciation of a photograph. Photography, to reiterate, cannot – according to Scruton – achieve 
this due to the causal relation to its subject. White does not seem to contradict Scruton’s 
contention, however, he conceives of a creative impulse that is peculiar to photography.  
 
For Scruton, our understanding of an aesthetic representation is separable from our interest 
towards the object represented. For White the representational is manifest only if the artist has 
the ability to engage with rather than interpret their subject matter. It is not necessary for the 
artist to consider their work as a unique interpretation in the sense that Scruton requires.  
 
In this chapter my aim has been to articulate and challenge Scruton’s assessment of the creative 
potential of photography. What separates creative expression from simulacra he argues is our 
understanding of the artistic representation as the intentional creation of an appearance. The 
causal relationship between a photograph and the object before the lens disallows the artist the 
potential to make an artistic representation in this sense. I have explored an approach towards the 
creation of representational art that reconsiders the role of the artist. Informed by the camera’s 
dispassionate eye, the Post-Impressionists set out to create representations that explored not only 
the way things look but to express the momentary. We can see in the quick brushstrokes, 
awkward framing and attention to the detail of the environment that they depict an interest in the 
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temporality of their subject matter: The Post-Impressionists did not seek out the infinitude in 
meaning but its contemporary configuration. Manet and Degas sought out to create a viewer who 
took an interest towards their representations not as a dispassionate appreciator but – as Galassi 
describes – a participant. In Magritte’s work we see a development of this theme that, I contend, 
is also influenced by the photographic. Magritte’s surreal imagery of the pipe illustrates this 
deftly as he sets out to explore the subtle narratives in the causally created relationship.  
 
In the last two chapters my discussion of creative practice has underlined in the mechanically 
derived causal process a different kind of relationship between the artist and her intentionality. In 
considering the impact of photographic realism on creative practice I have opened up discussion 
for the possibility of a reassessment of the role of the artist in relation to photography. By the 
close of this thesis it is my aim to present an illustration of the role of the artist that we might say 
is peculiar to the photographic medium. Before I outline this approach, however, it is first 
necessary to consider what is unique about the photographic representation in order to establish a 
need for a discussion of its aesthetic character. 
 
I will now give a critical exposition of Kendal Walton’s radical version of causal provenance; as 
a consequence of which he describes the photograph as a transparent picture. Whereas Scruton’s 
explication of the causal derivation is concerned with the parameters of creative practice, Walton 
attempts to underline what is peculiar about the photograph in terms of our visual experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Transparency and the visual  
 
3.1: Introduction  
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To recall the argument so far: The view held by Scruton, that the photograph is a transparent 
image, is set in context of clarifying the values peculiar to our understanding of the aesthetic 
representation. In describing the qualities of an aesthetic representation he assesses the potential 
for a photograph to hold our interest as representational art. Due to mechanically derived causal 
process Scruton concludes that we are unable to take an aesthetic interest towards the ideal 
photograph. The causal relationship between the photograph and its object photographed denies 
the possibility of an intentional act that for Scruton enables us to take an interest towards the 
representation that is not wholly determined by our seeing its subject matter. 
 
In the last two chapters I have underlined Scruton’s claim as problematic insofar as our 
understanding the creative potential of photography is concerned – in particular in relation to a 
progressive understanding of the role of the creator. Whilst I agree with Scruton’s conception of 
the ideal photograph; insofar as he recognises that the photographer is unable to create an image 
that is causally related to her intentions, I propose that this aspect of the medium is central to its 
creative appropriation.  
 
Scruton’s negative assessment of the intentional act in relation to photography illuminates the 
need for a reassessment of the creative potential of the medium. This is because, I claim, his 
interpretation of the intentional act is based on a model that is peculiar to painting: Scruton may 
not base his argument on the assumption that the photographer is using the camera with the aims 
of having the intentional control of the painter. Yet, the merit of his argument, which finds 
creation of an aesthetic representation to be based on what I consider to be a centralised 
conception of intentionality is characteristically painterly; this conception disallows a discussion 
of creativity that I claim is peculiar to the artistic appropriation of the ideal photograph. 
However, in making a study of the creative potential of photography I agree that it is necessary 
to look to comparison; in the preceding two chapters Scruton’s characterisation of the intentional 
is closely bound to painting and this, I agree, allows us a platform upon which we may recognise 
a difference; between the approach of the painter and the photographer. However in chapters 3 
and 4 I will move away from study of the intentional and towards a description of some of the 
qualitative differences between the two mediums. 
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I will consider what is peculiar about the aesthetic experience of a photographic picture; in terms 
of how the viewer considers the relationship between the viewer and the image. Ultimately, I 
will relate this to the intentionality debate but that aspect will be explored later, from chapter 5 
onwards. Over the course of the next two chapters I will discuss the relationship between the 
photograph and the object photographed and examine our understanding of the parameters of 
perceptual access that it entails. Whilst this chapter involves a discussion of perception I do not 
debate the value of the technical details explored in relation to photography; since in this debate I 
am concerned with outlining the problems in the philosophy of art pertaining to the parameters 
of creativity, and in particular in relation to intention.
128
 Therefore, I will discuss the impact of 
the mechanically derived causal process on our conception of pictorial representation. A 
discussion of Kendal Walton’s important essay on photographic transparency will inform the 
basis of this dialogue. 
 
Primarily, this discussion concerns the relationship between the viewer and image. For Walton, 
the viewer’s experience of the photograph, due to causal derivation is caused by seeing the object 
photographed. Walton claims that ‘… the viewer of a photograph sees, literally, the scene that 
was photographed.’129 In making this claim he is attempting to show amongst other things, the 
difference between realism that we attribute to painting and realism that we afford the 
photograph. In particular he wants to distance a conception of photographic realism from Andre 
Bazin’s association with a historical lineage that traces back to picture makers of the 
Renaissance: For Bazin, the discovery of photography signals the end of the aim to make 
pictures that are true to reality; allowing that photographs are a part of this project for Walton 
dilutes what is special about photographic realism: 
 
I shall argue that there is a fundamental difference between 
photographs and painted portraits of Lincoln, that 
photography is indeed special, and that it deserves to be 
called a supremely realistic medium. But the kind of realism 
most distinctive to photography is not an ordinary one. It has 
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little to do with the Post-Renaissance quest for realism in 
painting or with standard theoretical accounts of realism.
130
 
 
By dissociating photographic realism from the aims of realism in painting Walton sets out to 
describe the relationship between the viewer and image in terms that are peculiar to the 
photographic medium. What is particular about photographic realism – and indeed makes it 
distinct from realism in painting – is that a photograph, argues Walton, allows the viewer to see 
the subject, recorded by a mechanical causal process: photographs are transparent pictures. 
Starting from this point Walton sets out to show how photographs, in one sense, put us in 
perceptual contact with the subject photographed: ‘… to perceive things is to be in contact with 
them in a certain way. A mechanical connection with something, counts as contact whereas a 
humanly mediated one, like that of painting, does not.’131 
 
At a glance, Walton’s claim appears to be in line with Scruton’s argument that photographs 
cannot be considered as aesthetically engaging pictures. Yet as I will unfold in my exposition of 
Walton’s argument, his discussion of the causal relationship between photograph and object 
photographed does not delimit creativity; moreover, in chapter 4 I will discuss the possibility of 
exploring the aesthetic character of photography based on Walton’s transparency thesis.  
 
Yet the problem of coupling the mechanically causal process with artistic creativity remains; if a 
photograph enables the viewer to see literally the subject through the photograph then how is it 
possible to take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph as representing a thought about its 
subject? Whilst I do not seek to undermine Walton’s claims, I am also reticent to accept that 
photographs enable the viewer to see literally the object photographed; artists such as Charlie 
White and Duane Michals – discussed in the previous chapter – often use the camera to 
challenge the notion that photographs give the viewer perceptual access to the subject 
photographed; because our interest towards the object photographed is held not merely by the 
appearance but also the event.  
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Duane Michals’ Things are Queer (1973) explores the complex relationship between appearance 
and meaning; important to this correlation is recognition of an event that punctuates and unfolds 
the complexities of his images. The representational meaning often emerges not merely in 
relation to the object photographed but the event in which we find that object. Michals creates a 
body of work in which each picture in the sequence is used to disrupt or interrupt the viewer’s 
understanding of the perceptual relationship that is held in the previous image. Whilst the images 
do enable perceptual contact, this does not mean that the viewer is able to identify correctly the 
subject that is photographed; for example each image in Michals’ series seems to undermine our 
perceptual relationship with the subject photographed in the previous image. Michals’ series in 
one sense represents the complex relationship between perception and belief: In the first image 
we see a photograph of a bathroom, yet in the next image we see the same bathroom dwarfed by 
a naked human leg. The leg seems to be saying to the viewer; this is not a bathroom.  
 
As we considered in the previous chapters the creative use of photography often represents a 
tension that exists between the subject photographed and its appearance in the photograph. This 
tension, I claim may be caused when photography is used to stimulate a discussion of the 
relationship between visual experience of the world and how meaning converges and diverges 
from this experience. What makes this tension all the more potent, I claim, is the absence of 
authorial intention that is present in painting; it holds the potential to stimulate a sense of 
ambiguity and suggestive power in the photographic work of art. Walton’s description of the 
transparency does indeed leave room for this kind of debate. Yet, there is, as we will consider no 
exploration of the possibility that the qualitative difference between photographic and painted 
pictures may also incur an important difference in the creative appropriation of the two media. 
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11. Duane Michals, Things are Queer, 1973  
 
Walton does not claim that the causal relationship between subject and image disallows an 
interest that is determined by seeing the photograph. He argues that our visual experience of a 
photograph is caused by our seeing the object through the photograph: ‘…to be transparent is not 
necessarily to be invisible. We see photographs themselves when we see through them.’132 
Because photographs are transparent they are also pictures that are unaffected by the 
photographer’s intentional act or beliefs – about the way the subject looks.  
 
           I aim to show that the presence of the photographer does have an effect on our perceptual 
relationship with photographs and the object of which they are a recording. Yet, in observing the 
photographer’s intent, it is first necessary to establish the confines of such a discourse. As the 
photographer Bert Krages deftly illustrates the relationship between the photographer and her 
tools impacts significantly on her approach towards image making; to such an extent that I claim 
we cannot mean the same thing when we mention intentionality in relation photography – that is 
recognisable from a discussion about painting: 
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Photography is more difficult than visual arts such as drawing 
and painting because the camera records the objects in front 
of the lens. For example, if an artist drawing a flower fails to 
see lint stuck between the petals or on the stem, it will not 
show up in the drawing. Photographers do not have the 
luxury of unconscious omission.
133
 
 
I will argue that whilst a photograph does allow the viewer perceptual access to the subject 
before the lens, the potential for the creation of an aesthetic representation remains. Yet, due to 
the differences in pictorial representation that Walton discusses, it is a different kind of approach 
towards creative intention that we find in painting. The photographer Gary Winogrand once 
remarked that he did not photograph to capture the object before his lens but to ‘…see what 
things looks like photographed’134. Walton’s transparency thesis, I propose, goes some way 
towards opening up the debate of an understanding of creative practice in a sense that is 
peculiarly photographic. My aim is to describe how the mechanically derived causal process and 
subsequent loss of intentionality – in the sense that we are familiar with in painting – has 
impacted on the artist’s approach towards the creation of representational art.135  
 
 
3.2: Walton’s transparency: The potency of photographic realism 
 
To suppose that a photograph is or has a transparent quality invites the question; how does this 
affect our appreciation of the photograph? The philosopher Kendall Walton argues that to ask 
this question is a mistake – at least insofar as our normal understanding of how we think about a 
picture is concerned. Photographs, claims Walton, are transparent pictures and to understand 
what this means we first need to dissociate the term picture from our usual understanding of it in 
reference to paintings and drawings.  
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Photography, he argues, has enabled us to extend the boundaries of our ordinary visual 
experience; therefore, we should not think of photographic pictures in the same category as other 
kinds of pictures. Rather than taking the photograph as a descriptive kind of picture, 
photographs, argues Walton ‘…gave us a new way of seeing.’136  
 
As with Scruton, Walton illuminates this claim by marking out a distinction between the 
representational and a non-representational content of a picture. By demarcating the territory of 
the representational as determined by and also determining the scope of human intention, 
photographic picturing is described in terms of the mechanically derived causal relationship. 
However, his claim does not stand as a measure of aesthetic value in the same manner as Scruton 
considers. Walton’s aim is to consider how and in what way photographs picture things.  
 
For Walton, the visual information of a photograph is inseparable from the object photographed. 
Nonetheless, there is a qualifying difference between seeing the object ordinarily and seeing it 
through the photograph. In order to illustrate this difference, Walton seeks first to expose and do 
away with the confusion surrounding transparency. In particular, Bazin’s view that a photograph 
is a surrogate for the thing it pictures. Walton argues that a photograph does not put us in the 
presence of the photographed subject. In seeing the subject we do not forget that we are looking 
at the surface of a photograph; the unnatural depth of field or rectangular picture frame which 
cuts off other objects from view: ‘Only in the most exotic circumstances would one mistake a 
photograph for the objects photographed… photographs look like what they are: 
photographs.’137   
 
Yet  technical and stylistic tropes – like film speed, depth of field, printing technique, etc – and 
the edges of the frame that remind us that we are not in the presence of the subject do not lead us 
to believe that we are hallucinating. Or that it is something other than the subject that we see 
when looking at the photograph.  
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In Bazin’s argument Walton finds a starting point: He finds useful – yet not entirely clear – 
Bazin’s claim that the screen puts the viewer ‘"in the presence of" the actor. It does so in the 
same way as a mirror – one must agree that the mirror relays the presence of the person reflected 
in it – but it is a mirror with a delayed reflection…’138 In Bazin’s conception of the photographic 
image as a mirror he underlines what he perceives to be peculiar about pictures made using a 
camera.  
 
The mirror analogy, for Walton, underlines something characteristic about the kinds of pictures 
that photographs are. Different from Scruton’s use of the mirror conception – insofar as Scruton 
likens the photograph to a mirror in order to show that photographs enable the viewer to see the 
subject and not the artist’s representation.139 For Walton, photographs are like mirrors inasmuch 
as they help us to see things, but we do not confuse the image they produce with the object they 
enable us to see. For Walton this tells us that photographs are the kinds of pictures that we may 
describe as prosthetics: ‘Photography is an aid to vision also, and an especially versatile one. 
With the assistance of the camera, we can see not only around corners and what is distant or 
small; we can also see into the past. We see long deceased ancestors when we look at dusty 
snapshots of them.’140 
 
3.3: The Real in art 
 
Yet, in making this assumption we seem to be left with a familiar problem; how can a picture 
become akin to or like our ordinary visual experience? For Snyder and Allen, the idea that 
photographs enable us to see as we do ordinarily is a predictable yet pedestrian error. They claim 
that philosophers who discuss the relationship between perceptual access and the photograph 
often neglect the affect of a process on the making of a photographic picture:  
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A photograph shows us “what we would have seen” at a 
certain moment in time, from a certain vantage point if we 
kept our head immobile and closed one eye and if we saw 
things in Agfacolor or in Tri-X developed in D-76 and 
printed on Kodabromide #3 paper.
141
 
 
Indeed, Snyder and Allen are to be celebrated for their claim that the photographic process does 
have an impact on our interest towards the object photographed.
142
 Nonetheless, Walton does not 
reject the claim that photographs have the potential to stimulate our interest as interpretive 
images. Central to his argument, nonetheless, is the notion that our visual experience of the 
photograph is caused by seeing the subject rather than a pictorial description or interpretation.  
  
3.4: Walton’s neurosurgeon 
 
 ‘Photographs are transparent. We see the world through them.’143This statement is as bold as it 
appears; when we look at a photograph – according to Walton – we are in perceptual contact 
with the object photographed and, therefore, photographs are like prosthetic aids to our vision; 
they help us to see the world. But what makes us think that a photograph helps the viewer to see 
the world as it appears? And, how would an artist appropriate a medium that makes pictures that 
the viewer is able to see through to create representation art?  
 
The second question forms as the topic of this thesis and is a problem that I am seeking to 
consider at length. The first is more pressing and concerns our understanding of the 
representational value of a photograph. Walton sets out to answer the first question, as a way to 
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show what is special about photographic pictures. He prepares two examples that show the 
perceptual similarities between looking at a photograph and looking at the object photographed.  
 
His first example illustrates the difference between what he calls ‘intentional counterfactual 
dependence and natural counterfactual dependence.’144 Intentional and natural dependence 
describe two states of visual perception regarding the pictorial representation. Intentional 
dependence refers to a state of perception that is contingent on our acknowledging that the object 
of our visual experience is guided by an intention for us to see it as we do; our interest in the 
object of our visual experience in this sense is determined not by seeing the object photographed 
but the way that we see it. Natural counterfactual dependence, conversely, refers to a visual 
experience which is caused by our relating the visual contents of that experience not too an 
interpretive or intentional thought about the object, but the object itself. 
 
3.5: Intentional counterfactual dependence 
 
Walton gives an example of a neurosurgeon who attaches the optic nerves of her patient to a 
supercomputer, thereby gaining control over the movement of her eyes. Whilst the surgeon may 
believe that her patient is receiving an objective visual experience, ultimately it is dependent on 
intentions of the neurosurgeon; the neurosurgeon’s ‘… patient seems to be seeing things, and her 
visual experiences are caused by things she seems to see. But she doesn’t really see them; the 
doctor is seeing for her.’145 This kind of visual experience is for Walton similar to the kind of 
visual experience that we encounter when looking at a painting; because our perceptual 
experience is guided by the intentions of the painter.  
 
3.6: Natural counterfactual dependence 
 
To illustrate a contrast between the transparent and intentionally produced picture, Walton 
introduces an example of a patient who has received an eye transplant. As with the 
neurosurgeon’s patient, in a sense, the transplant patient’s visual perception is mediated. 
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However, whilst the neurosurgeon’s patient’s visual perception is, for Walton, intentionally 
dependent on the neurosurgeon’s supervision, the transplant patient’s visual experience is 
naturally dependent on what they see. Naturally dependent seeing is not influenced or mediated 
by the intentions of an intentional force. Whilst the transplant patient is able to see due to the aid 
of a donor, her visual experience is not mediated – as is the neurosurgeon’s patient.  
 
Therefore, she is in control of her own visual experience; the patient’s visual experience is not 
dependent on the beliefs of the neurosurgeon – as they are for the patient whose eyesight is 
controlled by a machine. Walton makes this example to show the difference between our visual 
experience of a painting and a photograph: ‘In order to see through the picture to the scene 
depicted, the viewer must have visual experiences which do not depend on the picture maker’s 
beliefs in the way that paintings do.’146  
 
Central to Walton’s conceptual analysis of our perceptual experience through the photograph 
regards not only transparent status. He is also concerned with classifying transparency in terms 
of photographicity: photographs are aids to our vision argues Walton, therefore, we think of 
them as pictures that we see through rather than pictures that enable us to see directly. Critics of 
Walton’s transparency thesis – whom I discuss in the next chapter – often argue against 
transparency due to a belief that it denies photographicity. Nonetheless, as I will underline, 
Walton’s notion of pictorial transparency entails photographicity; insofar as it is an argument 
that seeks, in one sense, to underline the difference in kind between photographic and painted 
pictures.  
 
Before we consider some objections to Walton’s transparency thesis we have yet to discuss how 
he understands the photograph as a visual aid that places the viewer in perceptual contact with 
the object photographed but also is to be distinguished from our ordinary visual experience. 
Central to this configuration is for Walton an exploration of the difference between photographic 
and descriptive pictures.  
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3.7: Transparency and the descriptive 
 
Walton acknowledges that our beliefs about and interaction with the world does affect our visual 
experience of photographs.
147
 Yet, when it comes to thinking about what determines our 
response to the conceptual content of a picture there is, for Walton, a distinct difference between 
transparent and descriptive pictures. For example, no matter how realistic the painterly or written 
description may be, we recognise that what we are looking at is dependent on the beliefs and 
intentions of the individual who has made the description. Photographs, he argues, are different 
because perceptual contact is not mediated by the intentions or beliefs of the photographer: 
‘Investigating things by examining pictures of them (either photographs or drawings) is striking 
analogous to investigating them by looking at them directly and disanalogous to investigating 
them by examining descriptions of them.’148  
 
What makes photographs different from written or intentionally dependent descriptions concerns 
the way in which we understand the instance of the mechanically derived causal process. Taking 
a textual description as example, Walton shows how a reader might mistakenly identify the 
object that is being described because of the visual dissimilarities between word/number: ‘The 
numerals “3” and “8” are sometimes easily mistaken for each other. So when reading about a 
tree which is actually 85 feet high, one might easily take it to be 35 feet high.’149 
 
This shows us, claims Walton that the visual content of descriptive pictures is not always 
dependent on having real similarity relations with the objects they depict. Whilst a photograph 
may depict something in such a way that we do not recognise that object the viewer is unlikely to 
mistake the subject photographed for something that it bears no visual resemblance to. Even in 
cases in which the photograph is blurred, made in close up or the negative is over/under exposed, 
perceptual contact – however unremarkable the quality of the picture may be – with the subject 
photographed is not broken; we do not, for example, take it that the subject itself is blurred. Due 
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to mechanical causality photographs, unlike paintings and descriptive pictures, argues Walton, 
allow us to see as we do ordinarily; insofar as our perceptual contact is dependent on the way 
something looks rather than a human belief or intention: 
 
 
We have learned that perceptual contact with the world is to 
be distinguished from two different sorts of nonperceptual 
access to it: access mediated by intervening descriptions as 
well as access via another person. The common contrast 
between seeing something and being told about it conflates 
the two. When someone describes a scene to us, we are 
doubly removed from it; contact is broken both by the 
intervention of the person, the teller, and by the verbal form 
of the telling. Perceptual contact can itself be mediated-by 
mirrors or television circuits or photographs. But this 
mediation is a means of maintaining contact. Viewers of 
photographs are in perceptual contact with the world.
150
 
  
3.8: Conclusion 
 
By underlining what is special about photographic pictures, Walton may have set up the 
parameters for an approach towards a positive discussion of the creative potential of the medium. 
Differentiating photographs from other kinds of pictures, I claim, may enable us to consider the 
aesthetic and creative in characteristically photographic terms without appealing to comparison – 
with painting – for verification of value. However, at present the job of discerning the aesthetic 
value of a photograph – due to its status as a transparent picture – looks somewhat difficult; 
whilst Walton does not seem to be arguing that photographs are devoid of aesthetic potential his 
claim that we see through photographs may suggest a negative prognosis. 
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In chapter 4 I will consider some criticisms of Walton’s transparency thesis; in which the claim 
that we see through the photograph or literally, the subject photographed is taken to be 
problematic. In offering a counter to his claims about photographic transparency I will discuss 
the argument that due to the viewer being removed from the scene – photographed – photographs 
are pictures that are not transparent in the way that Walton proclaims. However, I propose that 
Walton’s transparency thesis enables us consider that which is peculiarly photographic in value, 
aside from the painterly. Therefore, I will consider the possibility of establishing an aesthetic 
discourse on photography taken from Walton’s transparency thesis.  
 
At this stage I am inclined to agree with Walton, insofar as I think it is necessary to think of 
photographs as pictures that are different in kind from paintings and drawings. I also agree that 
they do in a way act as a kind of prosthetic; we do not mistake a photograph for its subject but it 
does in a way enable us, potentially, to see the subject – photographed. Yet I also think that 
implicit in Walton’s argument is a danger relating to a positive discussion of the creative and 
aesthetic potential of the photographic medium. Although the propensity for creative potential is 
not denied by Walton’s thesis, there is no serious consideration of the possibility that the loss of 
intentional control as it commonly understood has had a positive and interesting impact on the 
artist’s creative process. Therefore, I intend to consider the qualitative difference that is 
underlined by Walton and assess the possibility that it has a positive impact on creative 
expression. 
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Chapter 4: Seeing through Walton’s transparency thesis 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
Walton claims that a photograph can act as an extension of visual perception. This is not to say, 
however, that photographs are unextraordinary: whilst photographs may put us in perceptual 
contact with the objects they depict, argues Walton, this does not mean that they are also 
inconspicuous or uninteresting.
151
 The viewer is not blind to the fact that it is a photograph that 
she is looking at – as opposed to believing that she sees the subject in the photograph before her. 
Yet neither does the viewer think that what she is looking at is anything other than the object 
photographed: ‘We see photographs themselves when we see through them.’152 Some 
philosophers find Walton’s conclusion difficult, in particular when trying to outline a discussion 
of the possibility that photographs are aesthetically interesting.  
 
Walton’s claim that we see through photographs may appear problematic when discussing the 
aesthetic and creative potential of the medium. This seems all the more troubling when he 
presses home the point that we should not treat photographic pictures as we do paintings or 
drawings; it may not be the photograph that creates our interest since as Walton argues they are 
pictures that we see through: ‘One may pay no attention to the photographic images themselves, 
concentrating instead on the things photographed.’153  
 
Walton’s interpretation of photographic transparency, for a number of critics, poses a serious 
problem with regards to the aesthetic value of the medium. In this chapter I will consider some of 
these arguments that seek to successfully contradict Walton’s claim – that photographs are 
transparent pictures. My aim is to explore the claim that by basing a discussion of photography 
on transparency as the consequence of the mechanically derived causal process, we delimit a full 
and interesting exploration of the aesthetic and creative potential of the medium. However, as 
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Walton does not deny that photography can be used creatively, I will also discuss an aesthetic 
interpretation of his transparency thesis.  
 
4.2: The context theorist 
 
The context theorist proposes that if we are to argue that photographs allow us to see literally, 
the object photographed, then it is possible that we are in danger of neglecting the different uses 
of the photographic medium; for example, recognising the distinction between the function of a 
passport photograph and a family portrait. We might imagine, for example that our interest 
towards a photograph is affected not – solely – by the objects photographed but circumstances 
that we may regard to be external to the documentary value of the photographic picture. In this 
sense, we may think of our interest towards the photograph as not – solely – determined by 
perceptual contact but it is also dependent on our acknowledging the imprint of a certain context. 
This position I will refer to as the context thesis. 
 
The context theorist understands that our seeing something is not determined literally by our 
seeing that object photographed, but acknowledges that our visual experience is also dependent 
on our acknowledging a certain context. This notion, I contend is expressed neatly by the 
philosopher Bas Van Fraassen: ‘To understand representation we must... look to the practice of 
representing, to how representation is a matter of use; and this involves attention first of all to the 
users in a broad sense of “use.”’154  
 
To engage with something as a representation, is for the context theorist to think about the use in 
which the medium that created the object holding our interest is being employed. This concerns 
not only the intentions of the artist/picture maker – although these concerns are not neglected – 
but the manner in which the medium is used to communicate its subject matter. Indeed, for the 
context theorist representation is not defined by appealing to the intentional but the context in 
which we engage with the object represented. 
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If determining how a picture functions as a representation is problematic perhaps it is because we 
have so far discussed its parameters in terms of a particular medium – the painterly; our interest 
in context has been to this point concerned with the intentions of the picture maker. Van 
Fraassen argues that our mistake is to consider the concept of pictorial representation as defined 
by medium – or qualities that are medium specific. In doing so, we ignore the defining 
characteristic of pictorial representation, which for Van Fraassen, is determined by use value: 
 
…if it is an image of something at all then what it is an image 
of depends on the use, on what I use it to represent. So the 
question what does it represent? must in this case be taken as 
elliptic for what is it being used to represent?
155
 
 
To say that our visual experience – ordinarily or otherwise – is dependent on a certain context 
often means that our visual experience is determined by seeing an object as something else or 
according to a certain situation: for example I may see Jack Nicholson as a lothario in one press 
photograph and as a psychopath on a poster for Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining (1980). Whilst I 
would not claim that I am looking at a different person, it would be inadequate – according to the 
context theorist – to say that we literally see the same person. Probing this aspect of our visual 
experience further, Van Fraassen argues that even looking at a photograph of something, seeing 
the object – even under Walton’s terms – requires us to make an interpretation. The 
interpretation, in this sense is made in line with a particular use:  
 
What is represented, and how it is represented, is not 
determined by the colors, lines, shapes in the representing 
object alone. Whether or not A represents B, and sometimes 
only, on the way in which A is being used. “Use” must here 
be understood to encompass many contextual factors: the 
intention of the creator, the coding conventions extant in the 
community, the way in which an audience or viewer takes it, 
the ways in which the representing object is displayed, and so 
forth.
156
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For the context theorist, to reiterate, to say that we see the object photographed – through the 
photograph – neglects the context in which we think about our seeing that object. Our seeing that 
object is not only counterfactually dependent on seeing that object through the photograph. 
Although, we might say that this is one aspect amongst others: ‘Even for the optical microscope I 
am offering a change in view, by favouring and emphasizing the “creation” metaphor over the 
“window” metaphor. Though valuable as a heuristic guide, to take the “window” metaphor 
literally acts as a brake on the possibilities of interpretation.”157 To say that a visual experience is 
determined merely by perceptual contact seems to overlook not only the medium but the 
contextual; our visual experience, for Van Fraassen is not crafted by perceptual contact, 
moreover, perceiving is identified as an act that is specific to a particular context. 
 
However, I do not think that this description of our understanding of photographic representation 
as dependent on a context or use overpowers the force of Walton’s statement. Whilst we may say 
that the context defines or illustrates a particular meaning relative to the subject it is synthetic 
and therefore, not descriptive of the kind of perceptual contact that photographs allow. It is not 
the context or use that the viewer is in perceptual contact with when she has a photograph in her 
hand. Context may indeed be applied to what the viewer is looking at – the subject photographed 
– although it does not alter or undermine transparency. Nonetheless, the context theorist does 
underline something interesting about photographs that I think that the transparency theorist may 
overlook. The way we look at photographs – apply meaning, take an interest – may also tell us 
something about their value as prosthetic aids. Taking an interest towards the photograph as 
determined by a context rather than the subject photographed may in one sense be illustrative of 
their value as representations. 
 
By arguing that photographs may be meaningful in ways that seem to be at odds with their status 
as transparent pictures we acknowledge the peculiar way that photographs give us access to their 
content; or perhaps even disallow access to the subject. Since we are only given visual access to 
the subject photographed, recognising meaning or context is not necessarily straightforward. In 
this sense, the context theorist has a point, but I think it can be put in a different way: Whilst we 
may acknowledge that due to mechanical causality, ideal photographs are transparent pictures, 
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nonetheless, the meaning of a gesture, smile or shape may only be taken as a possibility. The 
possibility we attribute not merely to the appearance but the appearance as representative of the 
photographic event. This approach I claim may give us fresh insight into the exploration of 
representational art and intentionality relating to the photographic artform. 
 
4.3: Seeing through interpretation 
 
If we are to agree with the context theorist; that we see contextually not literally then we may be 
inclined to ask what affects our interpretation of those objects we see? Do we take an interest 
towards the context in which the object photographed is found? Or, perhaps it could also be the 
social or political circumstances that surround our experience of the photographic picture? The 
context theorist asks us to consider what else other than perceptual contact effects, or has a 
bearing on our understanding of a visual experience that in turn informs perceptual contact.  
 
The context theorist certainly presents a challenge to the transparency theorist claim that we are 
able to see through the object photographed by posing this question. However, it is a position 
that does not tackle the transparency theorist assertion that we are able to see literally. Regardless 
of the context or use in which we experience the picture, we still recognise that it is a photograph 
of something – causally related to the object photographed. 
 
One such position that does consider the literal in relation to transparency is found within a 
viewpoint I will refer to as the egocentric theory. The egocentric theorist argues that our ordinary 
visual experience is marked by a sense of autonomy; when we see as we do ordinarily, we 
acknowledge that object in both spatial and temporal relation to ourselves – insofar as ordinary 
or literal seeing involves an egocentric relationship.  
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In ordinary seeing we get information about the spatial and 
temporal relations between the object seen and ourselves. We 
learn, not merely that some possible states of affairs is actual, 
but that it is actual here and now. Call this “egocentric 
information.” That seeing provides us with egocentric 
information is connected to the fact that seeing is 
perspectival.
158
 
 
So if I see Wayne Rooney ordinarily – am in perceptual contact with him rather than an image of 
him; I acknowledge this experience in relation to my presence within this room and at this 
moment. To see Wayne Rooney in a photograph is to remove my awareness of the 
spatiotemporal relationship that is a quality of our ordinary visual experience for the egocentric 
theorist.
159
 
 
My visual experience in this sense is autonomous from the spatiotemporal relationship that I 
would need to acknowledge that a photograph is transparent and therefore claim that I am in 
perceptual contact with Rooney. My experience of seeing him through a photograph is not just 
dependent on perceptual contact, argues the egocentric theorist, but also a number of factors that 
are external to this. For example, I may be holding the picture in my hand or studying it on a 
desk, whereas when I am in the same room, my visual experience is not necessarily mediated or 
controlled in the same manner. When Wayne Rooney is in the room with me, I am aware of the 
egocentric element in my visual experience; it is me doing the looking, therefore, there are no 
special circumstances surrounding my perceptual contact. 
 
For the egocentric theorist, to see literally we need also acknowledge ‘temporal relations 
between the object seen and ourselves.’160 To be in perceptual contact with the world requires 
some recognition of the spatiotemporal in that experience; in particular acknowledging that this 
visual experience is determined by the perspective of the beholder. Characteristic of the visual 
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experience that I am having, is for the egocentric theorist underpinned by a belief that the 
experience is of the ‘here and now.’161 Whilst I may have the photograph in my hand in the here 
and now I do not think that the object photographed as present in the here and now. 
 
To be in perceptual contact with something, argues Currie, we must recognise that part of the 
content of this experience involves ‘egocentric information.’162 Egocentric information is the 
evidence that supports the belief that perceptual contact relates the beholder’s perspective. 
Egocentric information, according to Currie denotes ordinary seeing; which we may recognise as 
determined by a direct spatiotemporal relation to the subject we are looking at: ‘That seeing 
provides us with egocentric information is connected to the fact that seeing is perspectival. I 
could not place myself in the world if I saw the world from no particular perspective.’163   
 
Ordinary seeing, according to Currie, necessitates that we engage with objects in physical and 
psychical relation to ourselves; my perceptual experience of the world related to my 
perspective.
164
 Yet should we take this view as conclusive? One might argue, for example, that 
whilst I recognise that my perspective does not stand in egocentric relation to the object 
photographed I may interpret the object in terms of ordinary seeing insofar as I acknowledge that 
object photographed to be the cause of my visual experience.  
 
Both the context theorist and the egocentric theorist present an interesting counter to the 
transparency theorist; they argue that in order for me to say that I am seeing literally – that I am 
in perceptual contact with the subject – the parameters of that experience must be in line with my 
spatiotemporal situation. For the context theorist, to claim that the photograph may be interpreted 
as a pictorial representation does not deny provenance of the mechanically derived causal 
process. Nonetheless, it also offers an interpretation of our visual experience – of a photograph – 
as not wholly dependent on the object depicted but also relative to the context in which we see 
the photograph – as an object to be contemplated for its own sake. For Van Fraassen 
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representation is contextually realised. Because in a sense we understand the photograph to be 
taken from the ordinary, it suggests a remove from that which it is causally related to.  
 
In Walton’s Marvellous Images he dedicates the better half of a chapter to the challenges set 
against his version of the transparency thesis.
165
 He begins by addressing the foundations of his 
claims regarding photographic transparency; involving the prognosis that the viewer literally 
sees the subject through the photograph. Walton reinstates his position by claiming that the 
meaning of literally is misinterpreted by his interlocutors: transparency, argues Walton, does not 
disallow aesthetic representation or creative appropriation. His aim is to outline the character of 
photography as different from painting, not calculate the difference as an evaluation of aesthetic 
quality:  
 
My position is that photographs… induce imagining seeing 
and are representation (depictions, pictures), in addition to 
being transparent... As I emphasized in “Transparent 
Pictures”… interaction between the role of photographs as 
aids to vision and their role as representation, is one of 
photograph’s most important and intriguing characteristics. 
To construe transparency as excluding imagining seeing is to 
miss out on it completely.
166
 
 
By describing photographs as transparent pictures, I contend, he enables the potential to describe 
qualities peculiar to the photographic medium; foregrounding this, he also underlines a 
discussion of transparency as a quality that makes a photograph a different kind of picture from a 
painting. Currie does not contradict Walton’s claim that a photograph is causally related to the 
object photographed. Yet in taking Walton’s understanding of literal to mean ordinary, Currie 
objects to Walton’s interpretation of photographs as transparent pictures. Yet, Walton also 
acknowledges that literal in his sense is different from normal or everyday in terms of how 
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photographs enable the viewer to see their contents. Whilst Walton argues that photographs put 
the viewer in perceptual contact with the world, photographs are described as prosthetics or 
visual aids. This description, I claim, successfully avoids any of the confusion that Currie 
suggests is occurring in his egocentric thesis. Because, as Walton argues, we see through 
photographs it is less likely to conflate our visual experience of the picture with an ordinary 
visual experience of the subject. Taking this into account, we may begin to think of the 
photographic picture as affording us a different kind of access to an experience of the pictorial 
representation.  
 
 
4.4: pictorial status 
 
If we refer to the photograph as a picture do we call into question its status as a transparent 
object? In the first chapter, we discussed Scruton’s important essay on photography and aesthetic 
representation in which he does not refer to the photograph as a picture. Whilst this move may 
not be intentional, it seems to underline Scruton’s claim that photographs may not be interesting 
as representations. The context theorist argues that our interest in a photograph is also 
determined by a certain context or set of circumstances that are separate from the visual 
information. Walton does not reject that I acknowledge the photograph as a picture. But, since I 
do see the object photographed, he argues that I must be looking at that object and not a 
representation. But is it possible to both see through and take an interest in the photograph as 
pictorial representation at the same time? 
 
The answer is no, according to those who claim that due to its pictorial status we are unable to 
see literally the object photographed. The photograph’s status as a picture, in this sense affects 
significantly not only how we see but also interpret the objects photographed. The pictorial status 
view contends that our visual experience of something we see in a picture is determined by codes 
that form our conception of a picture. 
 
Gene Blocker argues that there are four characteristic elements that constitute pictorial status. 
When taking an interest in something in a picture, our experience is interpreted according to 
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these rules. But what gives the photograph its status as a picture? Firstly, ‘that the picture is a 
picture of one thing (or an event) to be picked out against a background.’167Secondly, the event 
or one thing photographed is the most prominent object within the picture frame. Third, the 
background is rendered – conceptually – as generic, for example; a photograph taken with a 
section of Central Park woodland in the background is interpreted generically as woodland. 
Finally, knowledge of the object or event is construed contextually dependent on its size in 
relation to background and furthermore the viewer’s contextual knowledge of the objects 
photographed: We consider those objects most prominent within the frame to guide our 
interpretation of the background. Blocker’s view that our visual experience of a photograph is 
dependent on pictorial conventions seeks to successfully undermine Walton’s notion of natural 
dependency. It also suggests that our interest towards a picture may be determined in such a way 
that is regarded as autonomous from the object depicted.  
 
For Blocker, our visual experience of the object photographed also involves recognising certain 
pictorial conventions. Yet, I am inclined to think that it also neglects the very fact that the picture 
is a photograph: If I am looking at a photograph, I recognise qualities that distinguish it from 
other types of pictures – even if by degree. We may acknowledge certain pictorial conventions 
yet we also notice that the photograph is causally related to the object photographed.  
 
The claim that pictorial status indicates that our visual experience is affected by certain societal 
norms or traditions represent a view that is also shared by the context theorist: That the 
photograph communicates not simply what it is a photograph of, but reveals something about the 
context in which the visual experience is found. Our understanding of something that is 
communicated – such as a photograph – for Van Fraassen presupposes certain conventions be 
they social or otherwise; ‘Since communication presupposes community to some significant 
extent...’168  
 
The pictorial/context/egocentric theorists argue that photographs are pictures that are more than 
just aids to our vision. In taking up this charge in opposition to Walton’s claim that photographs 
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are transparent pictures, these counterarguments, I claim, misrepresent the core of his thesis. 
Walton argues that whilst photographs are transparent pictures; they are not invisible.  
 
Yet, this dissatisfaction with Walton is in one sense well founded: His argument although keen to 
differentiate photographs from other kinds of pictures seems to neglect aesthetic or creative 
potential; insofar as he reiterates that transparency denies that the viewer may take an interest 
towards the photograph that is not caused by the object photographed. Although I am inclined to 
see Walton’s view not as a criticism of the creative potential of photography, but as a challenge; 
to open up a discourse on the creative appropriation of photography that is not dependent on 
describing a value system that seeks to be or is comparative with painting. 
 
4.5: Aesthetics through the lens 
 
Walton does not explore the potential of a transparent aesthetic, only that photography allows us 
a new way of seeing: ‘The invention of the camera gave us not just a new method of making 
pictures and not just pictures of a new kind: it ‘gave us a new way of seeing.’169If we are to 
establish photography as a new way of seeing does it also require us to re-think our aesthetic 
understanding of representational art in the context of the photographic medium? Or at least 
consider a kind of transparent aesthetic? Walton does not explore this, at least explicitly; 
however, his view that photographs are prosthetic aids to our vision does enable the potential to 
think about them as having an intrinsic representational value that could provoke aesthetic 
contemplation.  
 
There are those who hold the position that due to its status as a transparent picture a photograph 
is able to afford the viewer a unique aesthetic experience. This position, which I will refer to as 
the transparent aesthetic view, does not reject Walton’s version of transparency; insofar as it is 
an argument supportive of the claim that we are able to see literally, the object through the 
photograph. However, central to this position is that we are able to take an interest towards the 
photograph as a photograph – providing we also accept that a photograph is a transparent image. 
By claiming that we are able to take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph as a 
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photograph, the transparent aesthetic theorist is in disagreement with Scruton’s version of 
transparency. 
 
For Scruton, to recall, we are unable to take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph as 
representational art. His understanding of the ideal photograph seeks to convince us that 
photographic representation cannot be the cause of aesthetic interest since a photograph is a 
transparent object. However, as Dominic Lopes contends art and our appreciation of the aesthetic 
is no longer removed from the ordinary or every day.
170
 Artists often remove/take what we might 
consider to be ordinary or uninteresting objects and re-appropriate them as a work of art without 
altering the appearance of the object represented – in their interpretation.  
 
Photographs are not dissimilar in this sense; the artist, her toolbox, materials, techniques and 
attitudes towards creativity, contends Lopes, are concepts in a continually transforming 
landscape; because of this we are required, regularly to re-visit our understanding and 
interpretation of aesthetic character:  
 
 
Anybody interested in the aesthetic value of art must now 
wonder how an encounter with a work of art (for example, 
Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes) can engage any aesthetic 
interest not also engaged by a very similar non-art object (for 
example, Brillo boxes).
171
 
 
Lopes does not contradict Walton’s assertion that we literally see the object through the 
photograph. His claim is in part as a response to Scruton’s assertion that an aesthetic interest 
towards the photograph must be purely an interest towards the object photographed. Both 
Scruton and Walton agree that the photograph is transparent inasmuch as it stands in causal 
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relation to the object photographed. The difference between the two rests on the understanding of 
aesthetic parameters of the medium.  
 
For Scruton, it is the aesthetic value of representational art that is his main concern. Therefore, 
his conclusions rest on a comparative study with painting. For Walton, however, comparison 
operates as a way of making distinct the two mediums – painting and photography. In this sense, 
the value of photography is not dependent on a comparative value of representational art since he 
notes that photographs are different in kind from paintings – in terms of their value as artworks. 
Furthermore, Walton does not deny that photographs can be interesting as representations: ‘My 
position is that photographs, documentary photographs included, induce imagining seeing and 
are representations (depictions, pictures), in addition to being transparent.’172 
 
What appeals to Lopes in Walton’s interpretation of transparency is the acknowledgment of a 
pictorial surface; we see literally, through the picture surface; therefore, for the transparent 
aesthetic theorist this is evidence enough to suggest that in taking in an interest in the photograph 
as a transparent picture we also take an interest in the photograph: ‘Photographic transparency is 
not photographic invisibility.’173  This point, I contend, underlines not only the difference 
between Walton and Scruton’s interpretation of photographic causality but also highlights the 
way ahead in undertaking a study of the medium’s creative potential.  
 
To distance the transparency thesis from Scruton’s interpretation Lopes also contends that the 
viewer is able to appreciate the photograph as a culmination of the photographer’s intention: 
‘A… mistake is to think that photographic transparency rules out either intervention on the part 
of the photographer or the role of photographic conventions in the photographic process.’174 This 
aspect of Lopes’ transparent aesthetic is an extension of Walton’s idea that photographs are 
similar to prosthetic aids; insofar as they are pictures through which we see the world. In this 
sense, Lopes is pointing out that we may take an interest towards the photograph due to some 
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intentional input; because we recognise that the photographer wants us to show us how 
something looked, from a particular angle, in a certain light, etc… 
 
The difference between our experiencing the object as seen in normal everyday seeing – face-to-
face – and through the photograph is central our recognising the aesthetic character of the 
medium for Lopes. In Scruton’s comparative study, he underlines why he thinks photographs 
should not be appreciated in the same way as paintings; because, due to causal derivation they 
are transparent. Walton, in separating photographs from other kinds of pictures – such as 
paintings – shows us that a comparative study does not tell us anything about photography, but 
risks conflating photographic seeing with everyday face-to-face seeing.  
 
Therefore, Lopes in showing the difference between everyday face-to-face seeing and seeing 
through the photograph seeks to underline the aesthetic character of photography; insofar as 
seeing through the photograph ‘…isolates the photographed object from the context it would 
normally be seen to inhabit... seeing through photographs decontextualizes.’175 
 
Seeing the subject face-to-face, agues Lopes, means that under normal circumstances we are 
affected by our present to conscious experience of that object. However, our visual experience of 
the subject through the photograph may enable us to take an interest towards the subject 
differently from our seeing it ordinarily. In seeing through the photograph, the viewer is in 
recognition of the subject’s absence; and in acknowledging this absence there is also the 
potential to recognise a sense of autonomy – insofar as the viewer is able to take an interest 
towards the subject that is different from how she might do when face-to-face with that subject.  
 
For Lopes, absence of the subject – seen through the photograph – is important insofar as it 
shows us that photographs can help us see the subject without thinking of it as being present; 
‘…photographic seeing through normally obtains in the absence of the object seen, whereas face-
to-face seeing obtains only when the object lies before the eyes. Put another way, photographic 
seeing through bridges distances, either spatial or temporal.’176 By recognising the absence of the 
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subject the viewer also acknowledges a difference that enables her to think of her visual 
experience as different from seeing face-to-face.  
 
I contend that we can also think of the absence of the subject from the viewer’s spatiotemporal 
environment as important to our understanding of the representational meaning of a photograph. 
Photographers use this absence to represent the often strange understanding we have of reality. 
Hiroshi Sugimoto is one such photographer who uses the camera to record scenes that challenge 
how we relate to reality and the here and now.  
 
Sugimoto’s Diorama (1972-1994) series is striking example of this pursuit. In photographing 
stuffed animals set against a faux backdrop, Sugimoto represents the often blurred lines between 
the real and the fake: Photography enables the viewer to see what is photographed, yet 
Sugimoto’s innocuous compositions give the viewer perceptual access to a scene that is itself 
removed from the subjects it represents: 
 
I visited the Natural History Museum, where I made a curious 
discovery: the stuffed animals positioned before painted 
backdrops looked utterly fake, yet by taking a quick peek 
with one eye closed, all perspective vanished, and suddenly 
they looked very real. I’d found a way to see the world as a 
camera does. However fake the subject, once photographed, 
it’s as good as real.177 
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12. Sugimoto, The Devonian Period, 1992  
 
4.6: The presence of the camera 
 
For Lopes, the subject and how it is appreciated is also affected by the presence of camera. It is 
often true that the presence of a camera can alter or change the context in which the object 
photographed is seen. One only has to think of the varying attitudes and reactions that people 
adopt whilst standing in front of a camera; its presence can provoke vanity and hostility in equal 
measure. Yet, regardless of the type of response, for Lopes its presence is intrusive; ‘the 
camera… intrudes upon or disturbs what it photographs, especially when it is a person, thereby 
showing it in a way inaccessible to the naked eye.’178 This claim seems to echo Susan Sontag’s 
intuitive response to the effect of the mass produced camera.  
 
For Sontag through the act of photographing, the photographer metaphorically removes the 
object photographed from its natural setting; photographers capture their subject, for Sontag, in 
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the literal sense of the word. To say that we are able to see something in a photograph as we 
would not have been able to otherwise is for Sontag to say that that object has been removed 
from its environment; in this sense we appreciate the photograph for its quality as a capture 
rather than as an image that we see through: ‘A photograph is both a pseudo-presence and a 
token of absence.’179 
 
Lopes’ conception of a photographic aesthetic, in one sense, seems to reflect Sontag’s dualistic 
conception of the photographic image as an uneasy truce. If we are to express an interest in the 
photographic image this also involves an interest in the object photographed; ‘…seeing 
photographs is typically twofold in the sense that it melds seeing the photographed objects and 
its properties with seeing the photograph itself and its properties.’180  
 
For Lopes, our aesthetic interest towards the photograph is twofold because we see through the 
photograph and acknowledge it as captivating at the same time. This seems problematic in terms 
of articulating or disseminating what is aesthetically interesting about photographs. If it is the 
object photographed that we take an interest towards then it might not always be possible to take 
a disinterested view towards the photograph. One could, for example, imagine that a for the 
viewer who has lost a finger in a tragedy involving a coach and horses, Alfred Stieglitz’s The 
Terminal (1892) may be a reminder of a terrible memory. Whilst a painted version of this 
photograph may also produce such an emotional response in the case of Stieglitz’s image it is the 
objects photographed and not a representation that is imagined by the artist. In the photographic 
version of a coach and horses there is in one sense, a real relation between the image and the 
object; it is not a fictively realised depiction of the object that we are looking at but a depiction 
that is causally related to the object, as we see it photographed. To say, therefore, that it is 
primarily the object photographed that holds our interest seems problematic to an aesthetic 
realisation of our interest.  
 
Photographing, as Sontag suggests, potentially reveals a complex relationship between the 
subject and the structure of meaning that holds our interest when we look at it in a photograph; 
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the camera assumes the position of a beholder who is somehow removed or autonomous from 
the scene depicted – insofar as we attribute the perspective to the camera; yet we also recognise 
that our interest is directed by the photographer’s decision to photograph a particular scene. 
There is, therefore, a tension between the photograph and its subject; our interest is caused by 
seeing the subject due to mechanically dependent causal process, nonetheless, our interest 
towards the subject is not wholly caused by the subject; since the causal process is not 
necessarily a record of the appearance of the object before the lens but the duration of the 
exposure.  
 
The ability to provoke an aesthetic interest towards the subject as taken from the environment in 
which it is photographed I contend we must attribute to the photographer’s intention. Whilst I do 
not mean intention in the same sense as Scruton – that it is recognised in representational art as 
the expression of a thought about the subject that we take to be unified by the appearance of the 
subject that is constructed by the artist. The photographer may indeed intend for the viewer to 
engage with her work as expressive of a certain thought about its subject, yet I claim that the 
photographer does not treat the work to be unified by that thought. I will describe this 
understanding of intentionality – or indeed lack of intentionality – in chapter 7 and 8. 
 
Photographs, as Sontag understands reveal certain details that are potentially able to hold our 
contemplative attention. Once we begin to contemplate these details, for Sontag we are no longer 
looking at the scene that was photographed; in a sense the detail is removed or taken from the 
scene depicted. Sontag saw in Diane Arbus’ work an expert understanding of this: ‘To 
photograph a thing is to appropriate the thing photographed.’181 The idea that photography has 
altered how we think about looking requires further attention. For Sontag a photographer invites 
the viewer to pass judgement on the object photographed whilst denying access to that object. 
 
4.7: The aesthetic frustration 
 
Lopes’ approach is refreshing insofar as it underlines what is photographic about photographs 
and proceeds to show that these qualities do not necessarily deny aesthetic potential. Within this 
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approach, however, there is secreted the remnants of the ideological tug of war from which it 
seems to follow that because photographs are causally related to their subject matter they are not 
aesthetically interesting as representational pictures. Lopes presents this without denying the 
potentially negative view that; ‘… [t]he materials of photography are the world itself. They are 
handled by determining the content of seeing through.’182  
 
Yet embedded within Lopes’ adherence to the transparency thesis is Walton’s claim that we see 
through the photograph and therefore as pictures they do hold our interest. Considering this view 
as expressive of an aesthetic and creative potential is possible insofar as it recognises the 
photograph as a picture that is different in kind from paintings and drawing and therefore an 
aesthetic appraisal requires a fresh approach. Lopes’s argument is useful insofar as he illustrates 
the need for a completely new approach. 
 
4.8: Conclusion 
 
Seemingly, an attempt in earnest to describe the aesthetic or creative potential of photography 
has so far either veered towards a comparative study with painting or a description of 
photographic transparency that seeks to separate the medium from other kinds of media that are 
used to create pictorial representation. The former approach, I claim, is based upon a painterly 
conception of the pictorial and the latter, attempts to describe the aesthetic character of the 
photographic representation understood as a kind of prosthetic representation.  
 
In this chapter, my discussion of the transparency theory in relation to photographic creativity 
has raised two concerns; firstly, the problem of seeing literally: The argument that transparency 
theory conflates seeing through with seeing literally. A problem, that as Walton has underlined 
illustrates a misunderstanding of his thesis. Secondly, there has arisen the problem regarding 
pictorial representation. Those who oppose Walton’s transparency thesis argue that photographs, 
due to their being removed from the spatial and temporal realm are not transparent. The problem 
remains, however, in showing if photographs do not enable us to have perceptual contact with 
the subject photographed, then what else is it that we see? Denying transparency, therefore, 
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seems problematic. However, as Walton and Lopes contend transparency does not mean 
invisibility. 
 
I think, therefore, we need not involve ourselves any further in a debate that demarcates 
transparency as having negative implications on a discussion of the aesthetic potential of 
photography. Nonetheless, points raised by Lopes, in his interpretation of Walton’s thesis could 
perhaps be developed further. In particular, the relationship between transparency and absence; 
Lopes claims that photographs bridge the gap, insofar as they enable us to see something that is 
not materially present in our spatial and temporal domain. I have offered that photographs may 
also do the opposite for the exact same reason: Identifying the appearance of the object 
photographed may be understood as not always possible. Yet this does not mean that we need to 
relinquish the claim that photographs are transparent pictures. This might reasonably be assumed 
because of real-similarity relations or due to photographic techniques such as close up 
techniques, focal length or under/over exposure.  
 
Employing a shallow focus or long exposure can lead to a creation of an image in which the 
object photographed appears as indiscernible or indistinguishable. This can, I claim, heighten a 
sense of the absence or distance that the viewer feels towards the object photographed. 
Nonetheless, I think that this kind of absence that is preserved – under normal circumstances of 
seeing through a photograph – may tell us something peculiar about the aesthetic and creative 
potential of the medium. This is underlined in Michals’ work that we discussed earlier. Michals 
often documents – and also stages – a dialogue or exchange between two people in his work. 
What holds the viewer’s interest is I contend caused by the absence of the spatiotemporal realm 
in which we see the subject; the viewer is unable to engage with the exchange or conversation 
that Michals’ documents and therefore, our understanding of it may become representational – 
insofar as the viewer takes an interest towards the photographic event as a disinterested 
participant. 
 
In exploring this gap or absence further I think we may come to a better understanding of the 
creative and aesthetic potential of the medium; in particular relating to the role of the artist. I 
agree with Walton and Lopes insofar as it is important that we think of photographs as pictures 
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that are different in kind from paintings and drawings; like prosthetic aids they are pictures that 
enable us to see the object photographed – rather than a representation of the subject. In this 
chapter I have underlined the difference in terms of the relationship between the viewer and the 
picture. Unlike in Scruton’s interpretation of photographic transparency, however, I have not 
ruled out the potential to appreciate the photographer’s intervention. Nonetheless, in accepting 
this potential we have yet to make an exploration of this relationship in terms that are expressly 
photographic. Lopes himself, points out that in differentiating between face-to-face seeing and 
seeing through the photograph he does not evaluate the aesthetic potential of seeing through:  
 
Granting that an interest in seeing things through photographs 
may not be satisfied by seeing the same objects face-to-face, 
the case has not yet been made for a photographic aesthetic: it 
remains to be shown that the interest is an aesthetic 
interest.
183
  
 
In the next chapter I will continue to explore the relationship between the viewer and the 
photograph. My aim is to underline what is characteristically aesthetic about the experience of 
seeing through the photograph by examining what informs this kind of interest. In particular I 
shall consider the perspectival aspect of the relationship as important to our re-examination of 
the role of the artist. I hold the perspectival to be an important feature of this discussion because 
it involves not only a discussion of the relationship between viewer and the image but also the 
image and its construction.  
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Chapter 5: Through the picture 
 
5.1: Introduction  
 
In this chapter I will examine further the relationship between the viewer and the world through 
the photograph. I am particularly interested in discussing the role that the photographer has to 
play in determining an aesthetic interest towards the photograph. I will consider the role of the 
photographer, in the context of the composition. The composition is an important aspect of a 
discourse concerning intentionality in representational art; insofar as it involves the act of putting 
together parts with the intention of creating a whole. The parts of the composition of an aesthetic 
representation may be divided, argues Scruton, but each part is meaningful only as a 
representation of the whole: 
 
It is clearly true that we understand the representational 
meaning of, say, a Carpaccio through understanding the 
representational meaning of its parts. But the parts 
themselves are understood in precisely the same way…184 
 
I agree with Scruton that in dividing up the parts of the representational meaning of a photograph 
we may reveal meanings that are not peculiar to the image but depend upon the ‘…reference of 
its parts…’185 The parts of a photograph in Scruton’s estimation are not appreciable as parts of a 
unified representational meaning but in relation to the objects that they depict. However, I 
contend that in discussing the photographic composition we may discover a more fitting 
approach towards an understanding of its value as an aesthetic representation; that does not put 
stress on appreciating representational meaning as dependent on acknowledging that an 
appearance is determined by the artist’s intention.  An important aspect of the composition that I 
will be focussing on is the perspectival. Perspective as it is discussed in this chapter regards the 
relationship between composition and the creative intentions of the photographer. James Elkins 
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refers to this kind of consideration of the perspectival as the metaphorical discourse on 
perspective.
186
 This is because it is a consideration of perspective concerned not with 
mathematical description of spatial relations but the symbolic, historic and meaningful relations 
that can be derived from a discussion of the composition in relation to the perspective 
represented in the picture.  
 
In this chapter I will discuss the possibility that we may consider the photographer to be the 
author of the composition. My intuition is that we are not able to do so – at least not in the same 
way as we do for the painter. Yet I do not think that this means the viewer is unable to take an 
aesthetic interest towards the photograph as representational art. I do think, however, that it 
requires that we take a different approach towards our dissemination of the role of the 
photographer in relation to the creative practice of pictorial representation.  
 
Walton’s transparency thesis goes some way towards showing the way forward in outlining this 
approach: since it requires the viewer to recognise that – to a certain extent – their aesthetic 
interest is caused by the subject as it is seen through the photograph. Therefore, I will argue that, 
in one sense, the perspective of the viewer stands in a kind of real relation to the object 
photographed – albeit that the viewer is able to take a disinterested view towards the real 
relation. The notion of a real relation in this context enables us to establish a difference in the 
relationship between the depicted and the depiction. The perspective of the viewer of a painting I 
will often refer to as passive – by comparison – since as I will show it is a perspective that is 
subsumed by the fictive construction of perspective.
187
  
 
Photographs often strike our interest because they enable us to see the object before the lens. 
Because of the mechanically derived causal process our interest towards the relationship between 
meaning and appearance may also involve the recognition that we see the object through the 
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photograph. An appreciation of perspective from which I see the object photographed, therefore, 
is not – at least wholly – sublimated by intentions of the photographer. In looking at the 
photograph I may believe that I am looking at the object photographed through the photograph 
and this may affect my interest towards that image. This view of our interest towards the 
photographic image, I contend, need not result in a negative prognosis of our propensity to 
appreciate photography as representational art; causal dependency enables the photographer to 
take into account not only what is framed but also – as we noted in the work of Crewdson – the 
possibility of what is beyond the frame; both spatially and temporally. I will consider this 
difference as expressive of the need to form a unique approach towards a description of the 
creative role of the photographer. 
 
The previous two chapters have been focussed on discerning the value of transparency in relation 
to the artist’ intent: exploring the impact of transparency on our understanding of the creative 
aspect of picture making. From this study arose a debate regarding aesthetic potential. Walton’s 
thesis that we see through photographs is understood by some theorists as counter intuitive to a 
study of the aesthetic potential of the medium: inasmuch as the potential for the viewer to take an 
aesthetic interest towards the photograph is undermined – because the viewer is unable to engage 
with the artist’ intent. 
 
Walton counters this position by claiming that his argument has been misinterpreted: He 
reiterates the point that his conception of transparency does not deny the representational value 
of a photograph; seeing through a photograph does not mean that the viewer is unaware that he is 
also looking at a photograph. Following on from this, I also considered Lopes discussion of 
transparency in which he sought out to describe the potential for an aesthetic reading of Walton’s 
thesis; by underlining the importance of the difference between face-to-face seeing and seeing 
through.  
 
In characterising the experience of seeing through the photograph as dependent on differentiating 
seeing through from our ordinary visual experience, Lopes sets out to describe the tools for an 
aesthetic study of the medium. Illuminating the transparency thesis as the focal point in this 
study, he claims that an aesthetic characterisation of photography must be closely related to a 
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study of how we see the world; seeing through the photograph, he argues, has an impact on how 
we look at and come to think about how we look at the world: ‘…photographs afford revelatory, 
transformative, defamiliarizing, or confessional seeing when they show us objects as having 
properties that they could not be seen to have face-to-face.’188 The recognition that photographs 
document the object before the lens yet re-present that object in a way that denies the viewer 
spatiotemporal access, may, I contend offer us an insight into how the medium can be used to 
create representational art. 
 
5.2: Defamiliarizing perspective 
 
For Lopes, photographs have the potential to give us aesthetically interesting experiences 
because we see through them; and in seeing through them we are able to see the world of our 
ordinary experience in a different and sometimes aesthetically interesting manner. Taking 
transparency as the basis of an aesthetic discourse – insofar as he underlines that they are 
pictures that we see through – seems to me to be the right approach. Nonetheless, as Lopes 
points out there is work to be done.  
 
Primary to our engaging with the aesthetic qualities of a photograph, I claim, is to make distinct 
what is creatively and aesthetically interesting about seeing through: In this chapter I am 
concerned with relationship between the viewer and the photograph; in particular, in context to 
the role of the creator. My aim is to consider in what way, if at all the viewer’s aesthetic interest 
caused by the photographer’s pictorial composition.  Lopes argues that the viewer is able to see 
that the object photographed is absent from her spatial and temporal domain. The absence or 
distance between the viewer and the subject, Lopes proposes, enables an aesthetic interest 
towards the subject that is a consequence of seeing through the photograph.  
 
The notion of a seemingly paradoxical element in the perspectival relationship beholder and 
object; that both distances and bridges the gap between the viewer and perceived subject is 
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acknowledged by Erwin Panofsky in his seminal essay on perspective.
189
 Panofsky posits that a 
philosophy of perspective should recognise the historical epistemology of the relationship 
between viewer and subject. It is not only determined by mathematically governed rules but also 
the epistemology of the relationship between the beholder and the subject: 
 
Perspective creates distance between human beings and 
things… but then in turn it abolishes this distance by, in a 
sense, drawing this world of things, an autonomous world 
confronting the individual, into the eye. Perspective subjects 
the artistic phenomenon to stable and even mathematically 
exact rules, but on the other hand, makes that phenomenon 
contingent upon human beings, indeed upon the individual… 
Thus the history of perspective may be understood… as a 
triumph of the distancing and objectifying sense of the real, 
and as a triumph of the distance-denying human struggle for 
control…190 
 
Lopes also claims that due to their transparent status, photographs have the potential to both 
bridge the gap – between spatial and temporal domain – and in this sense interest the viewer 
because what is before the lens becomes defamiliarized; insofar as a photograph of a certain time 
in a certain place may be viewed in a different time and place and therefore its subject matter 
may appear in some sense as unrecognisable. I agree that photographs have the potential to do 
both when we take into account – as does Lopes – that they allow the viewer to see the world 
through a frame.  
 
In this sense, it might be argued that our judgements about the world – that are made when we 
see through a photograph – are to a certain extent dependent on how the subject matter is framed; 
one could imagine, for example, a photograph of a house taken by an estate agent that provokes a 
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great deal of interest from potential buyers. However, when the house is viewed for the first time 
it is discovered to the horror of the potential buyer that the house sits next to a working nuclear 
power plant. In this instance it is possible that the potential buyer may feel that he has been 
duped by the way the house has been framed in the original photograph. In the absence of the 
spatial and temporal, the photograph has the potential to defamiliarize the viewer; seeing the 
house through the photograph – without the presence of the nearby power plant – it is in one 
sense removed from the context of its environment.  
 
Yet, this sense of an absence as affecting the viewer’s experience of the photograph is 
unrecognisable unless he is to visit the house and see for himself the defamiliarizing effect of the 
photograph. I do think, however, that artists often use photography to make works that represent 
this absence and in doing so produce aesthetically interesting works of representational art. 
Showing this correlation; between the photograph of the object and the photographer’s intention 
is a complex task that I seek to unfold in this thesis.  
 
5.3: Constructing the Frame 
 
Considering the photographic frame and its value as a composition that is aesthetic in value 
requires us to make a survey of the foundations of an aesthetic discourse of the perspectival. My 
aim is to explore the possibility that a dialogue about the creative and aesthetic character of 
photography is possible by reconsidering the attitude towards the frame and the pictorial 
composition. Taking this approach, however, requires some work on differentiating the 
photographic composition from the representation of the frame in other kinds of media. In the 
first chapter I discussed Scruton’s claim that the framing of a photograph does not draw the 
aesthetic interest of the viewer towards the photograph.
191
  
 
I will begin by exploring the perspectival aspect of the composition: For Scruton, the framing of 
a photograph is unable to be considered as an indication of the photographer’s intention because 
it is incapable of creating a fiction or object of intentional inexistence; the frame, he argues does 
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not contain a perspective that is cultivated by or exists as an expression of a thought because it is 
an image that is causally related to the subject.  
 
Insofar as a viewer is aware of having a perspectival relationship with the photograph, it is for 
Scruton a relationship with the object photographed rather than the photograph. Following on 
from Walton’s claim that photographs are pictures that are different in kind, I will underline an 
approach that describes the aesthetic and creative potential that does not rely on a value system 
that, I contend, establishes a criterion of correctness comparative to our understanding of the role 
of intentionality in the medium painting.  
  
I will examine the perspectival in this chapter in its metaphorical manifestation. Perspective, in 
its literal or mathematical description as Bernhard Schweitzer recognises, concerns not the 
‘…“deconstruction” but “construction,” (of space) not the display of objects as they are 
experienced, but the collection of scattered objects by legitimate rules…’192  My interest in the 
metaphorical understanding of perspective concerns the relationship between the creative and the 
constructive: I will consider how this notion of the perspectival – as a entity which is constructed 
by the image maker – effects our engagement with the creative and aesthetic experience of the 
image.  
 
My claim is that the negative interpretation of the creative potential of photography is often a 
consequence of an understanding of perspective as a fictive construction: Because we are unable 
to say that the photographer is the architect of the perspective in his image, the viewer is unable 
to appreciate the image as an aesthetic representation. Whilst I agree with the view that a 
photographer is unable to cultivate a fictitious perspective, I contend that rather than nullifying 
creative nascence it affords her a different approach. Peculiar to this difference, I claim, is that 
the viewer is able to see through the picture. In recognising this, the photographer regards her 
composition not as intentionally constructed – in the same way that we think of painting as 
intentionally constructed – but as an expression of a number of possibilities. Therefore, the 
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photographer’s intentions are not central to the cause of our aesthetic interest; yet we may realise 
them as de-centred.  
 
Before I present my position which aims to invoke a discussion of the creative potential of 
photography that is not merely dependent on the intentions of the artist; I will examine what I 
perceive to be a link between the negative interpretation of photographic creativity and 
intentionality. I will explore the two interpretations of perspective in relation to the creative act 
of pictorial representation as discussed by Jonathan Friday.  
 
Friday’s critical account of the creative potential of photography does not dispense with the role 
of intentionality. He presents an integrative account of the creative and aesthetic potential of 
photography in which he discerns the conscious framing of the photograph as evidence of 
intention and construction of an aesthetically interesting perspective: ‘Fundamentally, a 
photograph transparently represents objects and states of affairs by virtue of these appearing 
within the frame of the photograph. Thus, photographs represent the objects as a result of the 
intentional framing and composition carried out by the photographer.’193 
 
This integrative position recognises that our conception of the construction of the pictorial 
representation is dependent – to a certain extent – on an interpretation of a model described by 
Alberti in 1436.
194
 Friday considers how Alberti’s model of pictorial composition impacts on our 
aesthetic interpretation of the photographic by drawing it in comparison with a study of Kepler 
conception of the pictorial.  
 
I will explore the integrative theorist’s illuminative discussion of the Albertian and the Keplerian 
models of the pictorial representation. The integrative theorist acknowledges that, traditionally 
we think of an aesthetic representation by appealing to the Albertian picture. This conception 
underlines the notion of the perspectival as an element that we may take an interest towards as a 
property of the picture; insofar as it created or interpreted by the picture maker. However, claims 
Friday, we are unable to describe a photograph as an Albertian picture; insofar as our 
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understanding of the composition is concerned. The Albertian conception of the pictorial often 
relies on a fictive conception of perspective.  
 
On the other hand, a Keplerian interpretation of the pictorial – according to the integrative 
theorist – changes direction in a discussion of the artistic construction of perspective; relating the 
viewers aesthetic interest towards the image to an experience of the object photographed rather 
than fictive interpretation: ‘… the Keplerian picture represents the frame of the visual field and 
thereby encloses a representation of the world seen, or more simply, a representation of 
vision.’195 However, as I will show, this approach retains some of the qualities that are 
distinctively related to the Albertian picture and for the sceptic are to be considered 
unphotographic in its ideal manifestation. Therefore, I will show that the integrative theorist does 
not quite go far enough in exploring a purely photographic approach towards discussing what is 
peculiar to the creative practice of picture making.  
 
The Albertian schema as we will discuss conceives of the pictorial composition as a synthesis: 
resolved by the artist’s construction of a perspective that incorporates the position of the 
spectator. Therefore, perspective in terms of the Albertian model is valued not for its relationship 
to the real world but for its abstraction; the perspectival is understood to be a fictive construction. 
The Keplerian picture, however, according to the integrative theorist allows us to engage with a 
perspective that we acknowledge as ordinary insofar as it is causally related to the subject; that is 
not an inventive, interpretative or imagined perspective but a perspective that incorporates the 
relationship between the beholder and the world.  
 
5.4: The Albertian and the Keplerian 
 
Friday’s critical re-evaluation of the photographic representational art begins with two 
conflicting interpretations: The Albertian and the Keplerian. This distinction captures very 
clearly the brevity of the problem concerning photographic pictorial representation; which in this 
chapter concerns the relationship between intention and the construction of a perspective. He 
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discusses both conceptions of the pictorial as a means of illustrating a difference in our attitude 
towards the composition: The Albertian view, claims Friday, has stood since the Renaissance as 
the test of our understanding the frame in terms of its aesthetic and creative value.  
 
Friday offers the Keplerian interpretation as a challenge to this understanding, insofar as it helps 
us to rethink our attitude towards an aesthetic understanding of the composition. Initially, I am 
inclined to agree with the integrative theorist’s claim that our aesthetic interpretation of the 
picture is dogged by an approach towards the composition that requires us to conceive of the 
viewer’s perspective as passive, insofar as it is sublimated by the artist’s composition; the 
Albertian model requires the viewer to engage with a synthetically constructed perspective and 
therefore her interest towards the subject becomes subsumed by a fictional construction of 
perspective. In Hanneke Grootenboer’s The Rhetoric of Perspective, he underlines the fictive 
quality of perspective insofar as it; ‘…splits real space outside a picture frame from the 
mathematical space that has to be imagined within the picture frame.’196  
 
Central to the Albertian conception of the pictorial, argues Friday, is that we recognise 
perspective as intentionally determined by the artist’s construction of space. Therefore, when we 
take an aesthetic interest towards a pictorial representation we acknowledge perspective as a 
quality which is interpretive of the relationship between the position of the viewer and the 
subject. The perspectival, in its Albertian conception is to be understood as fictive in this sense 
as it requires the viewer to engage imaginatively with the perspectival relationship between 
himself – the viewer – and the picture.  
 
In a Keplerian interpretation we do not take an imaginative interest towards perspectival. For the 
integrative theorist a Keplerian view enables the viewer to consider the photographic image as 
representative of a real relation between object and image in which the object is represented; 
insofar as does engage with the picture as illustrative of fictive beholder. I think that by 
demarcating this difference we will perhaps open up further a discussion of the photographic in 
terms of its aesthetic potential. Rather than looking for ways to synthesise the photographic 
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frame with the artist’s intention, perhaps we may find a better approach towards understanding a 
different kind of intentionality available to the photographer. 
 
5.5: The Albertian picture 
 
Alberti’s On Painting is recognised as shaping not only the approach towards artistic creativity 
but also the theorist’s dissemination of the aesthetics of pictorial representation. On Painting is 
split into three sections; the first discusses the geometrical element of pictorial construction and 
the following two the narrational and expressive rendering of subject matter within his 
mathematical model. Its fluid rhetoric sets out the mathematical rules of perspective by which 
Alberti claims an artist must attend to if they are to make a creatively unified representational 
picture. In the second half of the treatise he describes what we might refer to as the aesthetic 
character of an artistic depiction. In this section he outlines the correct approach towards 
constructing the expressive qualities of a painting. Our interest in Alberti’s theory in this chapter 
is concerned with the notion of perspective as an aspect of the artist’s intention – in terms of the 
attitude towards its construction. Furthermore, I am interested in considering the consequence of 
this model on our understanding of the artist’s role in relation to picture making in photography. 
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13. Albrecht Durer, Man drawing a Lute, 1523 
 
The task of the painter, in making his depiction both believable and expressive, asserts Alberti, is 
primarily to assimilate the perspective of the beholder within the picture. Therefore, perspective 
is considered to be a quality of the construction of a picture rather than a quality which relates 
directly to a beholder: The representation contains a vantage point from which the viewer regards 
the construction of a perspective that is causally related to the artist’s intent. 
 
Alberti describes his pictorial schema as a visual pyramid; the perspective of the synthesised 
beholder is represented at the apex of the pyramid. The base of the pyramid refers to the pictorial 
plane which in turn defines the psychical and physical distance of the beholder from the base of 
the pyramid. Alberti’s visual pyramid is a device that directs the artist towards making 
geometrically accurate depictions. However, its ultimate aim is not to show us how something 
looks but to subsume the perspective of the viewer within its construction: 
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The pyramid is a figure of a body from whose base straight 
lines are drawn upward, terminating at a single point. The 
base of this pyramid is a plane which is seen. The sides of the 
pyramid are those rays which I have called extrinsic. The 
cuspid, that is the point of the pyramid, is located within the 
eye where the angle of quantity is.
197
 
 
Alberti describes pictorial perspective as expressive of a vantage point that is separate from our 
ordinary visual experience. The visual pyramid, directs the beholder towards a particular 
perspective that is constructed by the artist. A sense of perspective, as contained within the 
frame, therefore, is appreciated because it creatively manufactures a synthesis; between the space 
in which the viewer is observing and the space that is represented in the picture frame. 
 
The search for the internally realised beholder, I claim, has been a common feature of the 
arguments made against the possibility of appreciating photographs as aesthetic representations. 
The role of the artist in relation to the creative practice of picture making is in this sense, I 
contend, marked by the Albertian construction of the concept of a picture as ‘…an open window 
through which I see what I want to paint. Here I determine as it pleases me the size of the men in 
my pictures.’198 We may also, I claim, appreciate the photograph as a window onto a world that 
is to a certain extent determined by the artist’s intent. Nonetheless, because the photographer’s 
window is causally related to the photographic event, it is a frame that represents the here and 
now and therefore we are unable to consider it as a portal that allows for the fictive construction 
of space. 
 
The purpose of aligning the gaze of the viewer with the perspective constructed within the 
picture is primarily, I contend, to assimilate the perspective of the viewer. Perspective, therefore, 
as considered by Alberti, is acknowledged by the viewer as representative of an imagined 
beholder; in this sense we may regard perspective as not merely representative of a vantage point 
but also as an expression of a thought about its subject.
199
 That is to say that when looking at a 
pictorial representation we engage with the picture as though it allows us to see, from where we 
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are standing a world that is beyond our own; insofar as the picture is causally related to the 
artist’s intentions rather than merely the subject depicted in the image. For the integrative 
theorist, this distinction means that our aesthetic interest is determined by identifying the 
perspectival relationship as an imaginatively constructed element of the pictorial representation: 
 
The geometrical element of the definition is the identification 
of a picture as a surface intersecting the visual pyramid at 
some distance with a fixed centre. The visual pyramid is a 
representation of the visual field in which it is imagined that a 
pyramid extends from the eye to enclose the visible world. 
Beholders of Albertian pictures are assumed to take up the 
position of the eye at the apex of the visual pyramid of which 
the picture is a section.
200
  
 
For Alberti, beauty and creative endeavour lay also in its rhetorical invention. The notion that the 
artist must strive to make a painting that speaks of her intentions is compounded by the 
interpretation of perspective as an element of the picture that is representative of the artist’s 
thought or intent. The visual pyramid for example constructs an apparently natural relationship 
between the viewer and the perspective contained within the painting. Whereas in truth, the 
viewer is always separated from the depiction by the very fact that he must engage with a fictive 
or interpretive perspective – as the integrative theorist recognises: ‘The eye of the beholder of the 
Albertian picture is therefore always outside and to the front of the picture surface looking into 
the world depicted.’201 
 
This leads us to the second aspect of Alberti’s theoretical treatise on painting. So far a 
description of Alberti’s thesis has concerned the notion of perspective as the interpretation of the 
spatial relationship between an imagined viewer and the subject. Yet, central to the aesthetic 
potential of the pictorial representation relates not only to the accuracy of perspectival depiction 
but also the subtleties of composition.  
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The composition for Alberti is the aspect of pictorial representation that contains the narrative of 
the work. The primary function of the narrative is to engage the viewer’s interest not only in the 
appearance but also the rhetoric of the composition which Alberti refers to as the istoria. The 
istoria is the aspect of a picture that as Michael Ann Holly recognises unifies the structure of 
representational meaning that we relate to the depiction: ‘…the composition was a structure 
articulated to a higher end: to make manifest the narrative power of the istoria, the telling of the 
story by appropriate emotions expressed through harmonious action.’202  
 
To create an istoria Alberti argues that the painter should be learned in the rhetorical arts. The 
rhetorical quality of the pictorial is for Alberti akin to the narrational qualities employed by poets 
and storytellers: ‘artists should associate with poets and orators who have many embellishments 
in common with painters and who have a broad knowledge of many things. These could be very 
useful in beautifully composing the istoria.’203 
 
5.6: Keplerian representation 
 
The Albertian model, for the integrative theorist, relies on an understanding of the composition 
as a space within which perspective is appreciated for its fictive construction. Friday claims, that 
if we are to think about the photograph as a contemplative and meaningful picture, we must 
rethink our conception of the pictorial construction. The counter-example that he offers 
reconsiders an aesthetic interpretation of the composition based on a Keplerian model of the 
pictorial representation. 
 
Johannes Kepler’s treatise Optics204 is not concerned with our aesthetic contemplation of the 
pictorial. His illuminating work on optical mechanics describes the manner by which light is 
focussed onto the retina to form as a picture. As Tiger Holtsmark points out: ‘The Keplerian 
‘picture’ is a purely geometrical proposition, which states that when two or more rays of light 
from the same point having passed through some optical device meet again in another point, this 
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second point is a ‘picture’ of the first.’205 The integrative theorist’s interest regarding Kepler’s 
optical revelations concerns a reassessment of the perspectival in pictorial representation. Friday 
uses a Keplerian view to illustrate an understanding of perspective that does not require a 
synthesis of a real with an imagined view; therefore, it allows for the exploration of an aesthetic 
attitude that is not reliant on an appreciation of the perspective as an element of pictorial that is 
fictively constructed.  
 
In the Albertian model, we understand perspective as an aspect of the picture that is fictively 
created, whereas in the Keplerian schema the picture surface is determined by a real relation 
between the beholder and the object perceived; perspective does not relate to a synthesis between 
a real and imagined view but  through a mechanically derived causal process. Standing before a 
painting the viewer may believe the painter has depicted a scene from a perspective that in one 
sense may be called real; perhaps it seems as though the artist has painted from memory. There 
is still in this recognition, an understanding of the painting as expressive of an intention to see 
the subject in a certain way; the viewer also acknowledges that it is the artist’s belief and/or 
mental state that guide – to a certain degree – the memory.  
 
The real relation that I refer to concerns not necessarily a human intention – although it may also 
be involved – but as in the Keplerian model, interpreted by Friday. The picture that we take an 
interest towards, does not involve a perspective that causally related to the artist’s intentions but 
a perspective that is the conclusion of a mechanically derived causal process: That is to say the 
picture is caused by the refraction/reflection of light, exposed onto a photographically sensitive 
surface. It is the object before the lens that holds our interest. Describing the photographic 
perspectival as representative of a real relation does not necessarily indicate a belief in the 
viewer that he is in the presence of the object photographed.  
 
The notion of a real relation is descriptive of the causal relation between the image and the 
object photographed. Nonetheless, the causal relation, as we have discussed previously in this 
thesis, does not indicate likeness; causal relation involves not merely the object photographed but 
that object situated in the photographic event. It is not necessary to conclude therefore, that the 
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appearance of the object in a photograph shares a likeness with its appearance as we see it 
ordinarily. This, I contend, enables us to consider the possibility that our interest towards the 
photograph does not merely concern an interest in the way something appears when it is 
photographed – or at least when we talk about appearance in a photographic sense its meaning 
has a special usage. For the integrative theorist, whilst appearance – generated in the photograph 
– is causally related to the object photographed our interest is not necessarily caused merely by 
the object; it is also related to our seeing that object from the photographer’s perspective. 
 
To ferment this view Friday integrates the Albertian visual pyramid with an interpretation of the 
Keplerian notion of perspective. For Alberti, as we have discussed, the apex of the pyramid 
stands for the perspective of the beholder, albeit, a fictively synthesised perspective. In its 
Keplerian formulation the apex of the pyramid contains a perspective that we determine by 
referring to the light rays and the subsequent image that takes place on the retina of the beholder; 
therefore, the perspectival, because of the mechanically derived causal process is expressive of a 
real rather than imagined beholder.  
 
Perspective in the Keplerian conception is not intentionally crafted but the consequence of 
mechanically derived process. In this sense, the distance between the object depicted and the 
beholder is different; the beholder relates not to perspective as an interpretation but a real 
relation between the photograph and its subject matter: ‘If an Albertian picture resides at some 
distance from the apex of the pyramid, the Keplerian picture represents the world from the apex. 
At the apex of the visual pyramid is the eye and visual experience.’206  For the integrative 
theorist, our interest towards the photograph involves perceptual access to that part of the world 
recorded by the camera. I claim, however that we need not be concerned with perceptual access 
in this way since the photograph is a photograph of what is before of the lens for the duration of 
the exposure. 
 
The integrative theorist’s interpretation of Kepler presents us with a conception of the visual 
pyramid that challenges an Albertian conception of perspective; in terms of reconsidering our 
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aesthetic understanding of the photographic. For Alberti, we might say, the aesthetic 
complexities are due in part to our understanding of perspective as being a fictive construction.  
 
For Friday, however, it is possible to think about the pictorial differently, to challenge the notion 
that our aesthetic understanding of perspective as solely determined by the artist’s arrangement. I 
am inclined to agree with this position; that we may contemplate the place of perspective within 
a work for its mutability and temporality. However, the question that I have been considering 
throughout this thesis – albeit in a different configuration – remains unresolved; if a photograph 
is unable to synthesise perspective how can it hold our aesthetic interest as representational art?  
 
5.7: Crafting the visual 
 
The Keplerian interpretation offers the potential to explore an aesthetic understanding of the 
photographic frame as a space in which the viewer finds that her interest is directed towards the 
real rather than imagined representation of the perspectival. However, if we are unable to say 
that the photograph is an expression of the artist’s thought about her subject then how should we 
go about discussing its potential to hold our interest as an aesthetic representation? In other 
words, how can a perspective which is representationally real rather than imagined provoke an 
interest that is aesthetically interesting? An example that might prove illuminating, I contend, is 
found in the work of photographer, James Casebere.  
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14. James Casebere, Neovision Underground #1, 2001 
 
In Casebere’s Neovision Underground #1 (2001), the viewer looks out across a hallway that 
appears to be of ancient Mediterranean or perhaps colonial architectural design. The scene is 
emptied of people. A subtle light pours in through the archway to the right of the picture. It is, 
however, because the hallway is flooded with water that our attention is held most fixedly. The 
stout pillars seem to turn to jelly when reflected in the still water giving the scene a disconcerting 
stillness. 
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A sense of the surreal unfolds in the scene depicted; we see through the picture to the scene 
depicted, in which our groping for a narrative structure to our visual experience is constantly re-
affirmed; nothing within the frame gives us a reason for the flooding. The building represents a 
historical presence that is palpable, yet the emptiness of the scene only evades any revelation of 
its time period. The photograph shows us a scene that would appear to contain a very interesting 
story, yet we are unable to see its narrative. And then we learn that the scene is entirely 
constructed by Casebere himself. The building is in fact a table-top construction, made to look 
like an old colonial building on a West Indian plantation.  
 
The cause of our aesthetic interest, I contend, cannot be countenanced without celebrating the 
photographicity of his works – both technical and intentional. Not only do we appreciate the skill 
with which the construction is put together but also the care taken over the lighting of each 
scene. The choice of lens, depth of field, all these are elements of Casebere’s constructions that 
contribute to a sense of fictive realism that his photographs provoke. He takes care to make sure 
that his images look as though they are photographs of life-size buildings. 
 
Yet Casebere has employed these techniques not just to fool or deceive the viewer but in order to 
provoke contemplative interest. For Casebere photography is aesthetically interesting because it 
has the potential to create images that enable the viewer to take a contemplative interest towards 
appearance as a representative of the event; event, in this context refers to the duration of the 
exposure that is a part of the photographic recording process. As we discussed in the previous 
chapter, photographs do not only bridge the gap between viewer and image – in terms of the 
spatial and temporal – but also have the potential to become aesthetically interesting because of 
the absence of those objects photographed; the viewer acknowledges himself as distanced from 
the photographic event. In creating realistic, trompe l’oeil sets, the absence of the viewer 
emerges as a mechanism that creates contemplative interest.  
 
Absence of the traditional notion of intentionality, interpretive control and a fictive perspective 
are characteristics that for Scruton and the negative proponents of the transparency thesis make 
photographs untenable as aesthetic representations. In Casebere’s work, however, these are 
qualities that potentially enable the artist to engage contemplatively with her subject. For 
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Casebere, the photographic composition is able to hold our aesthetic interest because of its 
potential to challenge the relationship between subject and viewer. It is the real rather than 
imagined relation between viewer and subject that interests Casebere as he creates an image 
which provokes the viewer to rethink the meaning structure of the object of her visual 
experience. The meanings that we relate to the objects we see may change or emerge differently 
when we see them through the photograph. 
 
For Casebere this approach towards his work allows him to challenge beliefs and ideas about our 
relationship to the world and its objects. The viewer is not passive in the Albertian sense of the 
perspectival relationship but is – due to photographic transparency – realised to have an active 
role in the meaning construction of the image. This does not mean, however, that the 
representational meaning of the work is incomplete without the presence of a viewer. It 
acknowledges that because the image is causally related to a photographic event, the meaning 
will be found – to a certain extent – as relating to the object photographed. Since the picture is 
not considered to be an imagined view, our interest towards the image does not engender the 
artist’s intention –as it does in the painting – but the narrative structure of meaning emerges 
something akin to a possibility. 
 
Photographers often use their medium to explore the complex relationship between objects and 
their meanings: and in doing so, they are often interested by the way which we relate to our 
experience of the world and its complex of meaningful structures. Rather than as a passive 
receiver of a constructed perspective, the viewer engages actively in the discourse of the image, 
exploring the tension that is set up by the photographer’s suggestive use of composition. Roni 
Horn is one such photographer whose work explores the distancing effect of photography; her 
androgynous subject in You are the Weather (1994-95) being one such example. Like Casebere, 
Horn uses photography because it has the potential to create a sense of ambiguity; the spatial and 
temporal distance between the viewer and the subject enables her to create images that express a 
sense of awkwardness about experience. Representational meanings emerge as a possibility 
rather than unified by an intention: 
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There is always the experience that what you cannot see 
deeply affects what you can see… Presence occurs when a 
thing is what it appears to be… So I have a certain way of 
working that is concerned — not with the invisible, but with 
the nonvisible; meaning it's there and you can sense it. The 
nonvisible is confluent with the visible, it's the bigger part of 
the sensible.
207
 
 
 
 
5.8: Losing the interpretive 
 
The integrative theorist makes a clear distinction between our aesthetic understanding of the 
perspectival in photography and painting: In photography the perspectival is representative of a 
real relation between the image and the subject, whereas in painting perspective involves a 
fictively constructed relationship. In making this distinction Friday works towards reforming the 
Keplerian notion of perspective around the Albertian istoria. Friday contends that photographs 
allow the viewer to take an interest in the perspectival as relating to the photographer’s intention; 
insofar as – for example – the viewer recognises that the photographer intended to show the 
subject looking a certain way at a certain time:  
 
The possibility of very different ways of picturing vision 
provides a clue to the source of a Keplerian picture’s 
intentional meaning.  Indeed, in this possibility we find the 
Keplerian picture’s unique counterpart to the Albertian 
historia [istoria]. A Keplerian picture does not merely 
represent vision, it does so together with a manner of seeing – 
a way in which the world is represented as being seen.
208
 
 
Whilst Friday’s interpretation of Kepler allows that the viewer may take an aesthetic interest 
towards our ordinary visual experience, it must be as an interpretation of a visual experience – 
the photographer’s. The sceptic might ask of this conclusion; what assurances do we have that 
our interest towards the ideal photograph is determined by the photographer’s intention? Or, 
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simply reiterate; that since the photograph is causally related to the photographic event not those 
objects as the photographer intends us to see them we are unable to take an interest in the 
photograph as a representation of the authors intention. At least in the same way we do a painted 
picture.  
 
In his interpretation of the Keplerian picture, Friday presents our interest in the photograph as an 
interest in the intentions of the photographer to look at the object photographed; insofar as our 
interest in the object photographed recognises that our visual experience is being directed by the 
photographer’s composition. However, the photograph, he argues, is a representation unlike the 
painting. Rather than our taking an interest in the representation as an intentionally dependent – 
as we might when appreciating a painting – we take an interest in the photograph as the 
representation of a visual experience: ‘As spectators of such pictures [Keplerian], what we see is 
a representation of the real world as it appears in ordinary perception.’209  Photographs, argues 
the integrative theorist, give us the experience of ‘actually seeing the world’210 and therefore, we 
are able to think about how seeing the world from the photographer’s perspective is aesthetically 
interesting.  
 
Yet, as Robert Silverman observes, Kepler interpreted the eye as non-interventional instrument. 
It is involved in the transferral of information but does not tell us how to look at or interpret. 
Therefore, when a viewer takes up perspective of a camera, perspective does not relate to a 
human interpretation but the Bazinian non-living agent: 
 
19
th
 Century photochemistry produced an ironic corollary to 
Kepler’s 1604 discovery that the eye behaves like a lifeless 
mechanical instrument – a camera obscura. By replacing the 
retina with a sensitive plate, the camera had become an 
eye.
211
  
 
In this sense, therefore, the Keplerian model is problematic insofar as its aesthetic amalgamation 
with the Albertian istoria is concerned. The Keplerian model of the eye precludes the kind of 
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synthesis with the Albertian conception of the istoria that the integrative theorist is arguing for: 
When we think of the Keplerian notion of the pictorial, the perspectival does not relate to a 
synthesis between a real and imagined perspective but illustrates the mechanical nature of the 
relationship between the depiction and the objects depicted.  
 
To employ the Albertian notion of pictorial perspective, therefore, seems to contradict or defeat 
the aims of the Keplerian interpretation. I agree with Friday, that the Keplerian model is useful 
insofar as it makes distinct the viewer’s relationship to the perspectival. However, I also think 
that employing the Albertian istoria to describe the photographer’s intention is problematic; it 
requires the viewer to synthesise the mechanical view with the photographer’s thought or intent – 
which as Scruton points out brushes against our understanding of the ideal photograph. 
 
5.9: Conclusion 
 
The role of perspective in our understanding of the aesthetic representation has prior to this 
chapter been discussed as an element that is fictive in its construction. In this sense, we 
understand an aesthetic experience to be cultivated, if and only if, the viewer is to engage with 
perspective as an aspect of a picture that is synthetically created by the artist. The ordinary 
perspective of the viewer – standing outside the picture – is a passive element insofar as it is 
synthesised by the imagined perspective; created by the artist. The integrative view, however, 
underlines the possibility that photographs are pictures that require the viewer to think about the 
creative aspect of perspective in a different manner.  
 
The photographic representation of perspective, argues the integrative theorist, does not relate to 
a thought or intention about the object depicted – in the same way that a painting might. We see 
the objects depicted from a perspective that we may take to be the photographers, a perspective 
that is neither fictive nor imaginatively synthesised. Therefore, we are able to explore a different 
way of thinking about perspective in relation to the creative practice of picture making.  
 
The Perspective of the viewer, in terms of its Albertian conception is rendered passively; it is 
subsumed by the imaginative perspective imagined or interpreted by the artist. The Keplerian 
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notion of perspective, on the other hand, retains the representation of a real relationship between 
the perspective and the image: This is because the causal relationship between image and the 
subject before the lens is determined by a mechanical process. Since the photographer recognises 
that photographs entail a causal relation between image and object before the lens – situated 
within the photographic event – the viewer engages not merely with the image but also that 
which a photograph depicts. The viewer, for the photographer, therefore, is in one sense an 
active element of her creative intent. But in what way are we to think of the perspective of the 
viewer as being an active element of the pictorial representation and more importantly its 
aesthetic character? 
 
In answering this question I intend to offer a different direction for this discussion. A direction 
from which I think a better understanding of what is unique to the creative practice of 
photography may be more likely to emerge. The example that I want to consider as a starting 
point, concerns the metaphorical notion of perspective; in particular the viewer’s interest towards 
the perspectival element of the pictorial representation.  
 
In Daniel Collins’ discussion about anamorphic art and perspective he considers the role of the 
viewer in relation to the pictorial construction of perspective. In picture making, he contends, for 
the most part the perspective of viewer is a passive entity; something which is to be eliminated 
by the artist. However, in the case of anamorphic art, we are able to think about the perspective 
of the viewer as having an active role. Leonardo da Vinci made, possibly the earliest use of 
anamorphic technique of depiction. However, perhaps the most renowned use of Anamorphsis is 
to be found in Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533).  
 
In Holbein’s depiction we see two regal looking ambassadors posed amongst an array of fine 
trinkets. At the bottom of the painting an odd and seemingly overly stretched out shape divides 
the ambassadors. Viewing this portion of the painting from the same linear perspective used to 
render the two ambassadors, the viewer is unable to make sense of the shape. However to move 
to one side painting, the strange shape begins to come into view. As the viewer moves to one 
side, the surreal looking shape no longer looks unfamiliar and the shape of a skull emerges.  
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15. Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533 
 
In order to see what is on the picture surface, the beholder of an anamorphic picture must 
become self-aware of her positioning before the canvas. The relinquishing of an ordinary or 
Albertian perspective is not merely a passive act but requires the viewer to think about where 
they must stand in order to see properly that which is depicted. Collin’s interpretation of 
Anamorphosis suggests a different conception of perspective: It offers an interpretation of the 
viewer as not only aware of her position, physically, but also provokes the viewer to reflect on 
the real perspectival relation: that is to say a perspective that is not imagined or fictive but 
causally related to the object depicted in the photograph. The viewer, in this sense is aware of the 
act of submitting to the perspective; rather than accepting that his perspective is sublimated by a 
synthetically imagined perspective.   
 
Returning to the Casebere example may be useful here: his photographs of table-top 
constructions suggest an imagined perspective – insofar as his pictures may fool the viewer into 
believing that he is looking at a habitable building. Yet it is not an imagined or a fictive 
perspective that engages the viewer. It cannot become – wholly – imaginative because once the 
viewer becomes aware of the subject as a table top construction he becomes conscious of the real 
relation between the image and the object photographed. Casebere creates an image that does not 
provoke a contemplative interest towards an intention as an expression of a thought but a 
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possibility; in which we relate the structure of representational meaning not to the intention of 
the artist but the way the object looks in the photograph.  
 
For Casebere this allows him to create images that enable the viewer to contemplate the structure 
of meaning as it relates to an experience of the world through appearances: Because the viewer 
relates the perspectival to a real rather than imaginatively constructed perspective, meaning 
relates to the way something looks rather than the intentions of the artist. His visual trickery, 
therefore, has a decisive purpose; to enable the viewer to contemplate her involvement in the 
conference of meaning. The perspective that engages the viewer is not understood to be 
representative of a fictive construction but a real relation between image and object; because of 
this as Collins argues, there is a sense of perspectival awareness towards the picture in which the 
presence of the viewer is understood to have an active rather than a passive role: 
 
…at the moment that the artwork or object of vision takes 
over as the primary center, the viewer is no longer the center 
of the world. An observer ‘oblivious of his own outer 
existence’ is neither an observer at the center nor an observer 
who is a participant in the construction of meaning. My use 
of the term ‘eccentric observer’ suggests a viewing subject 
who not only acknowledges the oblique and contingent 
nature of her point of view, but who also realizes that the full 
appreciation of the aesthetic objects stems not from 
‘oblivion’ (that is, literally, a ‘forgetting’) but from playing 
an active role in the creation of the aesthetic object.
212
 
 
Collins introduces a notion of perspective that is not fastened to a traditional notion of intention. 
Intention does not emerge wholly in relation to the designs of the creator but involves a sense of 
participation. This, I claim is due to the kind of access that the photographer is able to gain to 
her subject matter; the mechanically derived causal process produces a picture that is not wholly 
tied to an imaginative perspective. Therefore, the viewer finds perspective to be a feature of the 
pictorial depiction that relates to the object before the lens.  
 
In Collin’s discussion of the viewer as recognising themselves before the picture as an eccentric 
observer we find an interesting road ahead. In the next chapter I will discuss further what it 
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means to say that the viewer is an active rather than a passive element of the structure of 
meaning in the photographic representation. Central to this will be a discussion of the creation 
and expression of meaning in the photographic representation. 
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Chapter 6: Fascination through the lens  
 
6.1: Introduction 
 
‘...the perceptual experience of the world depicted in a photograph and perceptual experience of 
the world itself must be closely related.’213 
 
Those who claim that we are unable to take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph as a 
representation are troubled by the idea that we may appreciate the photograph as a product of the 
artist’s intention. This view is held by some proponents of the transparency thesis. A reaction to 
the negative interpretation of photographer’s creative potential, therefore, often seeks to 
undermine the transparency theorist’s claim that photographs are pictures that we see through.  
 
Yet I claim that working with the transparency theorist – towards an exploration of the creative 
potential of photography – is not necessarily restrictive. In discussing Walton’s argument that we 
see through photographs, the notion that photographs may provoke aesthetic interest in a special 
way – different from paintings – has begun to gather some speed. In particular, discussing the 
distinction between face-to-face seeing and seeing through; insofar as we see the object through 
the photograph in an environ that we are separate from – the photographic event.  
 
Friday’s exploration of the perspectival drew out a further quality of the medium relating to its 
representational value; our interest towards the photographs involves that we acknowledge a kind 
of real relation between the viewer and the object photographed. This is different in kind from an 
interest towards the painting, a relationship wherein the perspectival is understood to be 
representative of a vantage point that is imagined or fictively constructed. This distinction, I 
agree, underlines a qualitative difference between paintings and photographs.  
 
A discussion that seeks to re-evaluate the creative potential of photography must also, it would 
seem, reconsider the relationship between viewer and the pictorial. Friday’s integrative argument 
combines the causal with the intentional; whilst he recognises that photographs enable us to take 
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a contemplative attitude towards the object photographed he also argues that photographs may be 
appreciated as intentionally produced images. The photographer’s decision to frame the subject 
before the lens in a certain way, he claims, is expressive of an intention to illustrate a certain 
thought or idea about the object photographed: ‘The visual perspective of a picture in the 
Keplerian mode is always the product of the artist’s conception of how vision ought to be 
represented.’214 Integrating the Keplerian view which offers a different understanding of the 
perspectival relationship with the Albertian istoria Friday contends that we are able to appreciate 
photographs as intentional creations.  
 
Yet, since I began this discussion, I have been mindful of Scruton’s criticism of this view. The 
claim that due to the mechanically derived causal process the photographer is unable to use the 
camera to express a thought about the object in front of the lens, I claim remains unchallenged; at 
least no challenge, in my view, has successfully undermined this position. Friday’s argument that 
intention is recognised in the framing of a photograph is problematic; if, for example, we are take 
into account the work of photographers like Walker Evans and Robert Frank: Two photographers 
who pioneered the shooting from the hip technique – which involves taking a photograph 
without bringing the viewfinder to the eye. In this sense, composition does not necessarily form 
as central to the photographer’s intentions. The camera was used as a tool freed up from the 
photographer’s – a human – perspective. It allowed the photographer to respond to her 
environment without creating an image that was embedded within a thought; the thought is still 
present, yet it does not circumscribe what could be said about the appearance of the objects in the 
photograph.   
 
For Frank the meaning relationships that can form between objects and their appearance create a 
sense of familiarity that can be misleading. Frank used the camera as a way of penetrating the 
familiarity that punctuates our visual experience of the world:  ‘…in my photographs what I 
wanted to photograph was not really what was in front of my eyes but what was inside. That was 
what made me want to pick up a camera. The nature that I became familiar with inspired me and 
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I used it as a background.’215 If it is Frank’s eye that we attribute to the composition, his use of it 
often seems non-natural and we become aware of its being used in a way that is akin to Walton’s 
prosthesis.  For example, in Frank’s iconic work, The Americans (1958) he would often shoot 
with a camera poking out of his jacket or from the waist, in order that he could get – unnoticed – 
into the middle of the scene he wanted to photograph. Frank is not interested in the way things 
look but how appearances form in the ebb and flow of the moment. In taking up the camera, the 
photographer relinquishes the ability to present his work as an expression of a thought about its 
subject. Yet in doing so, a different relationship between the artist and intention emerge. In this 
chapter I will explore what this difference means for expressivity and ask the question; how do 
we relate the meaning we find in a photograph to a thought about the subject? 
 
6.2: Expressing the real 
 
Unlike in painting, photography enables the viewer to reflect on the real relationship between the 
object and the image: paintings enable the viewer to take an interest in a representation that is 
constructed by the artist according to her intentions. In photography, the representation is 
causally related to the object photographed and largely independent from the photographer’s 
intentions. I have argued that the experience of a painting differs from a photograph insofar as 
the viewer’s relationship to the picture is concerned. I have described the difference between the 
two as demarcated by the passive and the active. In painting, I have argued that the viewer is a 
passive viewer insofar as her vantage point is neutralised by the fictively constructed perspective 
of the painting. The viewer of a photograph is, by contrast an active viewer, since transparent 
status represents a real relationship between object photographed and the picture.  
 
I claim that the real relationship involves not only a different kind of relationship between the 
viewer and the picture but also between the viewer and the photographer – insofar as the viewer 
takes an interest towards the picture as representative of an intention. In this chapter, therefore, 
the challenge is to explore this relationship further and consider how it has impacted on the 
creative practice of pictorial representation. I will start from the integrative theorist’s claim that 
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when we appreciate a photograph it is because we gain perceptual access to the object 
photographed. In particular I want to focus on the notion that our interest towards the photograph 
is determined by the object photographed. For Friday’s integrative theory this has a certain 
consequence: We take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph because the objects 
photographed relate to certain meanings that are caused by seeing the object photographed.  
 
The integrative theorist works towards a description of the meaningful value of a photograph by 
circumscribing it within the Peircian triadic notion of the sign. For the Integrative theorist, this 
system allows us to see how photographs work in terms of their meaning relationships: They are 
pictures that coincidentally point towards the subject photographed. In this sense they are for the 
integrative theorist coincidentally iconic and indexical signs. The corresponding relationship 
between the picturing – iconicity – and pointing – indexicality – illuminates the relationship 
between the viewer and the photograph: A relationship that recognises both the transparent and 
intentional quality of a photograph. Friday makes it clear that his use of the Peircian semiotic 
does not involve a critical dialogue with the current arguments about the concepts of a sign. 
Moreover, his intention is to show how the use of the Peircian categories helps us get to grips 
with the aesthetic character of the medium: ‘I should add that I am not particularly interested 
here in what Peirce has to say about these categories, but in what can be said about them.’216  
 
In discussing the integrative theorist’s conception of the aesthetically meaningful content of a 
photograph I will assess how this effects an exploration of the creative aspect of photography. 
The integrative theorist claims that when we take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph we 
recognise that; ‘... the meaning is possessed by the objects depicted rather than by the picture 
itself, the latter being just the vehicle for manifesting the appearance of an independently 
meaningful world.’217 
 
Whilst I agree that photographs are often meaningful because of the object in front of the lens I 
contend that this view has the potential to undermine an exploration of the representational 
potential of the medium; in particular a discussion of the peculiar manner by which photography 
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affords the artist intentionality. I will put forward the view that meaning does not always relate to 
the object photographed. In particular, I am interested in examining how the photographer’s 
intentions emerge in the photographic event. 
 
As the ideal photograph is causally related to a time based event – duration of the exposure – 
this, I claim, also enables the viewer to consider what is outside the frame as having some on an 
interest towards the object photographed: it is also important to note that because the photograph 
is causally related to an event that is absent from the viewer’s spatiotemporal realm, there is to an 
extent some uncertainty with regards to what may be said about the meaning relationships that 
the viewer is able to appreciate through the photograph. We may also say that a painting draws 
our interest towards an event but we do not ordinarily take the representation on the canvas to 
extend beyond the frame. Photographs, on the other hand, document a part of the world, for a 
duration; our appreciation of a photograph, therefore, must be aware of the fact that there is 
always something happening outside the frame beyond the 1/60
th
 of a second. But what does this 
tell us about the aesthetic character of photography? 
 
Photographs, unlike paintings, in one sense do not give us the full story; we appreciate the 
photograph as a photograph of something at a certain moment, although we do not have access to 
the moment. Yet, it is perhaps this quality that if explored further may reveal to us the aesthetic 
character of the medium. As Meyerowitz notes, photographs are compelling because whilst the 
photographic frame may not reveal the photographer’s intent as a painting does, it allows the 
viewer’s imagination to engage with what is possible. He found that by pointing a camera at the 
world, he could make images that did not simply show what things look like but could reveal a 
whole complex of narrative like meanings. For Meyerowitz, artistic photographs are not simply 
documents, but are representative of possibilities. Locating the intentions of the photographer in 
this complex is a task that I contend relates closely to an exploration of the possibility. 
 
Nonetheless, before I present this view I will first explore the integrative theorists claim that 
photographs are meaningful because the object photographed is possessive of a certain meaning. 
In the last chapter I explored the integrative theorists claim that due to causal dependency we 
engage with the perspective as entailing a real rather than imagined vantage point. In this chapter 
151 
 
 
 
I will explore the consequences this has for a discussion of aesthetic and creative value. As I 
have mentioned, the Peircian view – as it will be taken up in this chapter – refers to the meaning 
relationship, between subject matter and depiction. 
 
6.3: Signposting  
 
The three major categories of the sign into which Peirce places our abstract understanding of 
experience involve the icon, index and symbol. There are many subdivisions of these categories. 
However, I will not go into further detail regarding their rigorously contested definitions here; 
my aim is to consider if the Peircian sign system can help us to circumscribe the meaning 
relationship between object photographed and its representation in the photograph.
218
 Friday 
illustrates, very neatly a simplified illustration of the function of each of the three signs: 
 
Peirce gave these categories of sign (and representational 
character) the now familiar names ‘symbol’, ‘index’ and 
‘icon’. Symbols signify solely in virtue of conventional 
practices... A flag flown at half-mast, for example... Indices, 
by contrast, are signs that signify in terms of contiguous with 
what it signifies. A pointing finger is an index because it is 
contiguous with what it signifies... however, (indices) are 
sometimes called ‘natural signs’ – objects or states of affairs 
that signify by pointing to their causes or effects... the notion 
of an ‘icon’ is roughly equivalent to that of a ‘picture’.219 
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For Friday the indexical quality of a photograph stands for its transparency. The photograph is 
causally related to the object photographed – for Friday – in the same way as ‘[t]he number of 
rings to be found in the cross-section of a tree trunk is an index of the age of a tree...’220 The 
indexical sign is representative of the causal relationship that photographs have to the object in 
front of the lens; photographs, he argues direct our attention towards the object photographed 
and therefore our interest is held by the photograph insofar as it points toward that object. For 
Friday, the photograph’s indexical/transparent status as we have just mentioned is coincidental 
with its iconicity. So how is the transparent/indexical quality of a photograph dependent or 
coincidental on its iconicity?  
 
Friday identifies two qualities of the icon. Both qualities, he argues, are unified by the icon’s 
pictorial function; that is, an icon resembles pictorially and conventionally the object it 
represents – like the green man at a pelican crossing resembles a person walking. The first of the 
two qualities of an icon that the integrative theorist identifies concerns the figurative or literal 
resemblance that the icon shares with the object it represents. This might be compared to the 
likeness shared between a portrait painting and a sitter or as Peirce points out the photograph and 
the object photographed.
221
 The second instance whereupon a sign resembles the object it 
represents concerns the non-figurative.  
 
The non-figurative icon resembles or pictures its object by way of abstraction: Pictorial 
abstraction in this sense refers to convention; maps for example allow us to see the gradient of 
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the hill that we are determined to climb. The abstract icon refers to pictures that allow us to see 
certain objects yet do not visually resemble them. Following on from this we may also take an 
icon to be a sign that is not attached to a particular object insofar as it does not necessarily infer 
likeness by way of resemblance: ‘A final, but crucial, feature of Peirce’s account of iconic 
representation is his claim that icons may represent fictional objects and states of affairs.’222 
 
So, to return to our earlier question; how is the indexical/transparent aspect of a photograph 
coincidental with an iconic/representational quality? For Friday, the answer relates to both the 
object photographed and the act of composition: a photograph is a picture – albeit in the 
Keplerian mode – in the sense that it resembles iconically those objects it pictures. However, it 
does not resemble or picture in the ordinary sense, since iconic quality for Friday is dependent on 
indexicality. A photograph, for the integrative theorist, therefore, pictures by pointing towards 
something:  
 
When we reflect on what it is for the iconic and the indexical 
to be coincident, we begin to discern something of 
importance for understanding photographic representation. 
To point to the world by picturing it, a photograph must 
picture the world in a manner that points back at it... if a 
photograph points back at the world by giving us, in some 
sense, the appearance of the world, then perceptual 
experience of the world depicted in a photograph and 
perceptual experience of the world itself must be closely 
related.
223
 
 
The integrative theorist’s aim here is twofold. In the first instance he offers a counter to the 
photographic sceptic’s claim that we are unable to take an aesthetic interest towards the 
photograph because of transparency. Secondly, it is an attempt to describe how we engage with 
the aesthetic content of a photograph: If photographs are aesthetically interesting it is because we 
are able to see certain aesthetic qualities by looking at the subject matter and importantly by 
acknowledging the way the subject photographed is framed. Primarily because we recognise that 
the subject has been photographed for a reason; that it occurred to the photographer that the 
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object looked aesthetically interesting. In this sense we see that it is the photographer’s intention 
to share with the viewer an aesthetically pleasing scene. Photographs, argue Friday enable the 
viewer to engage contemplatively with an aspect of, or certain meaning related to the subject.
224
  
 
In one sense I agree that we are able to take an interest towards the photograph because the 
object photographed looks aesthetically interesting. We recognise the picture to be contiguous 
with the object before the lens, rather than an intention to see the object in a certain way. I also 
agree that photographs offer the artist a different way of approaching her subject matter and 
therefore, we need to take some time to consider what is unique about the medium in relation to 
its creative practice. Yet I do not agree with the assumption that our interest towards the 
photograph is necessarily determined by an interest in what the photographer has photographed. 
Photographs do not, I claim merely intentionally point towards the object photographed.  
 
6.4: Disrupting the signifier 
 
The sign-object relationship, for the integrative theorist, describes how objects are possessive of 
meanings. Because we think of a photograph as a picture of the world that is causally related to 
the object photographed. However, I find the integrative theorist’s interpretation of the pictorial 
in relation to photography to be problematic. In particular, regarding the perspectival real 
relation that supposedly explains the indexical quality of a photograph.  
 
In developing a critique of this view I am inclined to agree with Joel Snyder, who argues in a 
round table discussion with Friday that photographs do not necessarily point towards their 
subject matter, if indeed we are able to say that the photograph has a subject. For Snyder, a 
photograph does not necessarily contain nor indicate any information about the subject, such as a 
particular meaning or expression: ‘If you are saying that the picture [photograph of a glass] 
allows us to attend to the glass, who would want to argue with that? But the picture isn’t 
ostensive…’225  
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Photographs, argues Snyder may be causally related to the object photographed but this 
relationship does not necessarily extend to the aesthetic content: ‘What you want to say is that 
when you see a photograph of this [the glass], something else is going on. What else is going on? 
Drop the pointing [indexical relationship], because there is nobody pointing.’226 The fact of the 
causal relation does not, for Snyder, extend to the discernment of aesthetically meaningful 
content. 
 
As Snyder argues, photographs enable us to attend to the object before the lens but they do not 
point towards a particular meaning; at least if they do, it is not necessarily a meaning that we can 
say is possessed by the object photographed. Nonetheless, neither can we say that the photograph 
is – in the same sense that we find in painting – expressive of a thought about the subject. 
Authorial anonymity, however, can enable the photographer to create a kind of dialogic 
relationship with meanings.  
 
An understanding of the Peircian sign-object relationship as dialogically related that I find to be 
helpful is expressed by Roberta Kevelson. In Kevelson’s interpretation of Peircian aesthetics she 
treats the role of the sign as dynamic. The meaning that is related to the object, therefore, is not 
to be considered as holistic, but represents a fragment or unique perspective: ‘One cannot 
analyze an impression which is taken or perceived as a whole; one cannot analyze a work of art 
to the extent that it is successful in being interpreted as having holistic integrity and self-
referential coherence.’227 This is frequently the case in Yinka Shonibare’s work. His tableau 
photographs often act as a collision point rather than a hermeneutical synthesis of meanings.  
 
In his series Diary of a Victorian Dandy (1998), Shonibare places himself at the centre of a 
recreation of a Victorian tableau – inspired by Hogarth’s A Rakes’ Progress (1733). From 
Shonibare’s images emerge ideas that relate to cultural and historical notions of racial identity 
drawing on Hogarth’s subversive attitude towards aristocracy and power. Due to a causal rather 
than interpretive relationship to his subject, however, the intentions of the photographer do not 
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circumscribe the aesthetic content of the work; the photographed subjects are not possessive of 
certain meanings, moreover, I claim that we find meaning to be dialogically engaged: That is to 
say that the meaning is not possible holistically, as – due to the causally mechanical process – we 
are unable to relate the image to a unified intention.  
 
Photography allows Shonibare to express his thoughts about ideas concerning identity without 
interpreting, or enabling the viewer to see the work as expressive of a particular intention that is 
pervasive. The possibility for creating an image that expresses a thought about a subject is for 
Shonibare possible, only insofar as that thought is not wholly autonomous; the thought itself is 
mediated by a further presence or conduit that is represented in the work by the mechanically 
derived causal process. In this sense photography enables him to challenge the notion that artistic 
expression is itself merely an autonomous practice.
228
 The aesthetic content of his work is not 
only a quality that emerges through the artist’s expression of a thought but also as a dialogue in 
which he is engaged: ‘What I want to suggest is that there is no such thing as a natural signifier, 
that the signifier is always constructed—in other words, that what you represent things with is a 
form of mythology. Representation itself comes into question.’229 
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16. Yinka Shonibare, Untitled, 1997 
 
Shonibare’s work seeks to underline disruptive rather than affirmative relationship between the 
subject and its meaning. Shonibare accesses photography due to its potential to disallow a 
unified notion of intentional control. Because the viewer is unable to treat the work as solely a 
product of the artist’s intention, Shonibare’s elaborate scenes play with an unresolved meaning; 
the photograph does not point conclusively to any particular meaning – that we may refer to the 
artist’s interpretation – but presents the meaningful and aesthetic content as a suggestive 
interplay between subject and appearance. It is in this sense, I claim, that Snyder argues we are 
unable to consider photographs as pointing towards the subject; since as is illustrated in 
Shonibare’s work, if things are possessive of meaning it is not a straightforward and easily 
discernible relationship:  
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You don’t measure photographs against the world: you 
measure the world against photographs. To enjoy 
photographs, or to study them, or think about them critically, 
requires not a one-to-one translation, but a recognition – and 
this is [Edward] Weston’s thought – that the object matter in 
the world does not determine the subject matter of the 
photograph… What I fear about the causal stuff is that it 
stops you from seeing the photographs as pictures.
230
 
 
 For example, when we look at Hiroshi Sugimoto’s Union City Drive In, Union City (1993) one 
may be inclined to ask; what is being pointed out? We see an exposure of a drive-in cinema that 
has apparently been made over a long period of time – possibly the length of the film. We can 
reasonably deduce this by noticing the plane/star trails and the blanket of white that covers the 
film screen. We know that under normal circumstances when we look at the screen of a Drive In 
or a sky at dusk we do not see a blanket of white or elongated white lines that curve across the 
sky: Possibly because we are unable to gain perceptual access to the world at multiple points in 
time at the same time. But by acknowledging that what we see is not usually the case – in 
relation to our ordinary visual experience – we seem to be ignoring what it is that we are actually 
looking at: A blanket of white covering the film screen and white curved lines drawn across the 
sky. By describing this photograph as a picture that points towards the screen of a Drive In, it 
seems that in one sense we are no longer talking about the photograph.  
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17. Hiroshi Sugimoto, Union City Drive In, Union City,  
1993 
 
Furthermore, is our interest towards the photograph necessarily contingent on what the 
photographer wants to show us? It would be difficult for anyone to believe that Union City is a 
representation of Sugimoto’s visual experience – although the picture may represent what he 
wants the viewer to see.
231
 But we do not necessarily attribute the composition of a photograph 
to what the photographer was looking at or wants the viewer to look at; insofar as the viewer 
recognises that the photographer is unable to construct, wholly, meaning relationships between 
the object photographed and its appearance in the photograph.  
 
The aesthetically meaningful forms not only in relation to those objects depicted but a 
consideration of perspective that is not attributable to a unified relationship between the 
depiction and the depicted. If Sugimoto is showing us how things appear, it is not the world as 
we are able to see it ordinarily. Yet neither is it the world as he witnessed it. As in Shonibare’s 
work, I claim that Sugimoto is interested in presenting us with a perspective that allows us to 
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take a contemplative attitude towards the object photographed and its complex of meaningful 
relationships; as they form in the photographic event. 
 
6.5: Determining intent 
 
The integrative theorist claims that it is the compositional characteristic of a photograph that 
allows the viewer to acknowledge the photographer’s intention. That is, the decision to point the 
camera in one direction as opposed to another; to focus on a particular detail as demonstrative of 
a particular thought or intention – about the subject. This act, of framing certain objects, 
according to Friday illustrates the context in which we interrogate the aesthetic content of a 
photograph: ‘Fundamentally, a photograph transparently represents objects and states of affairs 
by virtue of these appearing within the frame of the photograph. Thus photographs represent the 
objects as a result of the intentional framing and composition carried out by the photographer.’232 
 
Friday argues that it is not the photograph itself but the objects photographed that possess 
meaning. This is because, as he maintains, photographs picture by pointing towards the object 
photographed. However, it is also due to the photographer’s act of framing certain objects that 
are meaningful that we are able to take a contemplative attitude towards the photograph. 
Meaningful content, therefore, emerges through our acknowledging the composition as 
dependent on the photographer’s intention. But is this claim convincing?  
 
The integrative theorist acknowledges that meaning is possessed by objects in a multitude of 
ways. We recognise something as meaningful, he argues, because we interpret it in a certain 
way. Interpretation where it relates to photography, continues the integrative theorist is affected 
by the object photographed: ‘If there is such a thing as a ‘pure given’ of perception, then it has 
no content until a person with a particular purpose, history, knowledge, attitudes interest and the 
like individuates its objects by means of a demonstrative thought foregrounding certain 
properties and thereby singling out an object as one of the things that it is... The interpretation is 
in the act of seeing.’233 
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This point would seem to give some significance to Friday’s claim that photographers have some 
intentional control over composition; a photographer might frame a certain object because of its 
resonance within contemporary socio-historical setting or find an event meaningful because of its 
cultural relevance. For the integrative theorist, the photographic frame communicates something 
about the photographer’s intention. The photographer, therefore, does not produce or control 
meaning in the same manner that is available to the painter. The viewer’s aesthetic interest is 
dependent on acknowledging that we see the object photographed:  
 
[A] photograph represents by virtue of communicating a 
demonstrative thought... What this suggests is that 
photographs might also be thought of as representing ‘a 
version of reality’ – a way in which the world can be visually 
construed. Since the representational thought achieving this 
results from the manner in which the subject matter is singled 
out by the frame of the photograph...
234
 
 
Yet, do we always find that the artistically expressive content in a photograph is relatable to the 
photographer’s composition? I have begun to consider the possibility that it is not always 
necessary to acknowledge the photographer’s intentionality – in the same way that we recognise 
the painter’s intentionality. Photography offers the artist the potential to create images in which 
the tools appropriated do not always enable the artist to create a work that is unified by the 
photographer’s agency. Nonetheless, I think that the loss of a unifying intention is a conscious 
choice and allows the artist – in using photography – to think differently about how artworks 
enable the expression of a thought. Because photographs are causally related to a photographic 
event the  approach towards structuring the content of the picture is different from painting.  
 
It may be more fruitful to explore what is peculiar about the relationship between the 
photographer, subject matter and picture; that I claim is based upon a de-centred notion of 
intentionality rather than a composition that is unified by the imagined construction of an 
appearance. I contend that in examining this conception of intentionality we will be in a better 
                                                          
234
 Friday, J. (2002), p.79 
162 
 
 
 
position to discuss the role of the artist in relation to the creative practice of photography as 
representational art.  
 
Characterising the loss of intentional control as a creative impetus is difficult when considering 
Scruton’s claim that underlining the aesthetic representation is the intentional. Yet, for 
photographers the mechanical process is central to the aesthetic character of the photographic 
medium; the aesthetic emerges not merely in the appearance but in the appearance as 
representative of the event: The structure of the representational meaning, therefore, is not 
merely present by attending to the appearance but what the appearance can tell us about the 
event. For Sugimoto it is that photographic event that holds our interest, not merely the way 
something looks when it is photographed: 
 
Dressed up as a tourist, I walked into a cheap cinema in the 
East Village with a large-format camera. As soon as the 
movie started, I fixed the shutter at a wide-open aperture, and 
two hours later when the movie finished, I clicked the shutter 
closed. That evening, I developed the film, and the vision 
exploded behind my eyes.
235
 
 
6.6: Re-establishing the boundaries of intentionality 
 
The need to reassess the creative potential of photography, therefore, is necessary in order to 
contextualise the potential to create representational art within an understanding of the medium. 
Underlining the boundaries of the medium – such as the loss of a centralised notion of 
intentionality – I contend enables us to look more carefully at how creativity relates to 
photographic practice. This is evidenced, I claim, by underlining the provenance of the 
photographic event as the cause of our interest towards meaning relationships in the image. Yet, 
as we discussed in the first two chapters of this investigation, we may not think of the causal 
relationship as inclusive of the photographer; at least not in the same way as we do painting.  
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To think of the meaningful and aesthetic content of a photograph as wholly determined by the 
intentional – be it photographer or subject matter – is, I contend, a mistake. I claim that we might 
instead consider the photograph as expressive of a different relationship between author and 
intent; determining intention as a de-centred rather than as central to the cause of our aesthetic 
interest is an approach that may benefit our understanding of the photographic artform. In 
particular in a discussion of the relationship between the photograph and its structure of 
representational meaning. Umberto Eco describes the complexity of this relationship as ‘… a 
series of successive transcriptions.’236 For Eco, photographs do not only give the viewer access 
to a document of a certain object but also hold the potential for the viewer to reflect on the 
artistic content of the photograph to be expressive of narratives that are not always unified.  
 
Photography, in this sense enables the artist to engage with her authorial presence in an entirely 
different manner. Whereas, the conception of creative picture making in painting is often 
dependent on our recognising authorial intent, for the photographer the authorial does not emerge 
as a thought about the way something looks. Sugimoto’s work demonstrates quite eloquently the 
role of the photographer insofar as intention is concerned: Sugimoto, the camera and the viewer 
all see in relation to the exposure something quite different.  
 
Sugimoto recognises that the camera allows him to create images in which the artist’s presence is 
de-centred; the viewer’s appreciation of the photographer’s thought forms not due to the 
intentional control over appearance but by attending to the event that is represented by the 
appearance of the object photographed. For the photographer, meaning is not possessed by the 
object or its appearance but is found in the photographic event. Much of Sugimoto’s work is 
consumed by the relationship between time and meaning. For Sugimoto the camera does not 
merely document the world but is a tool that allows him to penetrate the surface of appearance. 
His long exposures almost always eradicate the conventional relationship between meaning and 
appearance; enabling the viewer to contemplate the structure of representational meaning as 
forming in the event rather than the object photographed.  
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6.7: The possibility of representational meaning 
 
In chapter 1 we got a glimpse of the idea upon which the notion of artistic photography as 
involving a de-centred notion of intentionality is based: For example, Meyerowitz’s describes the 
photographic frame as a vehicle that draws his interest because it enables him to create images 
that represent what is possible. These possibilities are aesthetically interesting because, as 
Meyerowitz points out, they draw our attention towards the object photographed but do not give 
us access to it. Our interest, therefore, is not merely held by the object but those possibilities that 
we attribute to it. 
 
This, I contend allows us to rethink the relationship between artist and her intention. The 
question of intention has continually underlined our discussion of creative practice. Rather than 
seeking to fit photography into a model of creativity that matches with our understanding of 
intention in painting perhaps an entirely different approach is required. As John Berger 
acknowledges, where aesthetically interesting, photographs are pictures in which we find 
meaning to be complex because of its fragmentary rather than unified quality: 
 
A photograph is a meeting place where the interests of the 
photographer, the photographed, the viewer, and those who 
are using the photographs are often contradictory. These 
contradictions both hide and increase the natural ambiguity of 
the photographic image.
237
 
 
As the viewer is not always present when a photograph is taken, the ability to discern the 
meaning relating to the objects photographed is not always established as an objective fact: A 
viewer may discern several possible actions – by appealing to the way something looks like 
photographed – and contingent meanings when looking at the world through a photograph. 
Acutely aware of this potentiality of the use of the photographic medium, I claim that 
photographers regard their intentions as present yet de-centred. 
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There are two tasks to undertake in relating the representational meaning of a photograph to a de-
centred notion of intention. Firstly, it is necessary to establish the qualities peculiar to a de-
centred notion of intentionality. I will achieve this by underlining a point of divergence from 
what I regard to be a centralised notion of intentionality; which I claim is important in Scruton’s 
characterisation of representational art. This will be the main task in the next chapter. Secondly, I 
will show how the viewer relates the representational meaning to a de-centred intention. This 
involves a lot of descriptive work in two areas; the photographic event and the actual use of the 
medium towards artistic end. The latter, I claim, informs our understanding of the former; insofar 
as it enables the viewer to appreciate the photographer’s intentions. I will discuss the unfolding 
of the de-centred intent in chapter 7 and illustrate its usage towards an artistic end in chapter 8.   
 
In order to situate a de-centred notion of intentionality within its artistic usage I will work 
towards a description of the creative practice of photography as illustrative of this conception. In 
order to characterise the parameters of a de-centred notion of intentionality I will describe the 
structure of representational meaning as performative. Such a description is not as a means to 
forming a normative understanding of the photographic artform. Moreover, I claim it will 
illuminate the relationship between the photographer’s intention and what Joel Meyerowitz 
refers to as the possibilities present in the photographic composition. 
 
In discussing Margaret Iversen’s essay on performative photography Diarmuid Costello and 
James Elkins consider the possibility that we take an aesthetic interest towards photographs as 
we might a performance: ‘[Iversen’s] paper raised the question of a performative photography, a 
photography that does not function to document some event or entity in the world that precedes 
its being recorded, but is itself an agency that brings something into being through its own 
action.’238  
 
The photographer often regards the task of photographing as a performance – sometimes even 
developing their practice through the construction of an elaborate charade. Hans Eijkelboom, for 
example has tailored his overcoat in such a way that a shutter release cable discreetly leading to a 
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pocket may be depressed without his subject knowing that they have been photographed. The 
notion that photographs do not show us things that are meaningful but enable the viewer to 
attend to a subject matter that appears to act out its meanings is an idea that photographer Gary 
Winogrand understands very well. In Central Park Zoo, New York (1967) Winogrand 
photographs a couple who are both carrying Chimpanzee’s. Shot at a time when issues regarding 
race, interracial relationships and equality were responsible for a great tension that split the 
political ideologies of the North and South of the United States Winogrand’s photograph was 
certainly – and I contend still is – provocative.  
 
 
18. Gary Winogrand, Central Park Zoo, New York, 1967 
 
It is not, I contend, the subjects in Gary Winogrand’s photographs that possess the 
meaning/critique that is often ascribed to Winogrand’s photograph. As I discussed in chapter 1, 
photographers recognise that their subject matter cannot speak for it/themselves and in the same 
way neither can the photographer speak for the subject. Because of this, what often draws us 
towards the subject – engages our interest – is not wholly attributable to any particular intention 
but meanings that relates appearance to the photographic event. Attributing a certain meaning to 
the photographed subject, therefore, we take an interest towards the subject as performative of 
that particular meaning.  
 
The notion that photographs are aesthetically interesting because of their performative like 
quality will be explored in the following chapters. I aim to show that due to the inability to treat 
the medium as interpretive, the photographer’s creative expression is dependent on how they 
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engage with their subject matter and setting. The photographer’s intention is not revealed like 
that of the painter’s but must in a sense become actively engaged with the subject, so that it 
emerges through the photographic event rather than merely the way something looks 
photographed.  
  
6.8: Framing intent 
 
Acknowledging that photographs can be aesthetically pleasing in their own right it would seem 
from this inquiry is no simple task. Perhaps the most complex case made in support of this claim 
is made by Jonathan Friday. His integrative argument follows that we take an aesthetic interest in 
the photograph due to the photographer intentionally framing meaningful objects. However, this 
argument is not without its problems.  
 
The claim that intentionality relates to composition, I claim, is not satisfactory. Henri Cartier-
Bresson, renowned for his street photography, worked on the basis that photographs are not 
made by appealing the photographer’s composition alone, but due to a great deal of 
happenstance: ‘I'm not responsible for my photographs. Photography is not documentary, but 
intuition, a poetic experience. It's drowning yourself, dissolving yourself, and then sniff, sniff, 
sniff – being sensitive to coincidence. You can't go looking for it; you can't want it, or you won’t 
get it. First you must lose yourself. Then it happens.’239 
 
In this sense, I claim that to discuss the compositional element as a unifying quality, expressive 
of the artist’s intention is misleading. This point is illustrated by Henry Wright’s Untitled (2003). 
Wright photographed – without using the viewfinder – street scenes in Paris, London and New 
York on black and white super 8mm film. After developing the film, he put onto slide film a 
number of the frames chosen from the super 8mm film. A slide projection of the chosen frames 
was photographed on a copy stand using black and white 35mm film from which final prints 
were made.  
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In Wright’s work it is not so much the intention that is important as is the repetitious: Not only 
the act of photographing and re-photographing, but finding this act as a refrain; the final image 
taken as a single frame, removed from the super 8mm film in normal usage would have passed 
by the viewer without pause. Likewise, for Wright, the photographer is unable to intentionally 
capture or compose that which is before his lens. The act of photographing, I propose is best 
described as performative insofar as the presence of the photographer takes on a dialogical form; 
with camera in hand Wright seeks to interrupt and engage in dialogue with his environment, 
rather than interpret or construct a representation of his surroundings: The performative is an 
element of his practice insofar as it creates the parameters of his engagement with the objects 
photographed.  
 
6.9: Conclusion  
 
This chapter concludes my discussion of the transparency thesis. The claim held by the 
photography sceptic to recall, follows that because a photograph is transparent we are unable to 
find anything interesting to say about photographs; since it is the object photographed that holds 
our attention. The most insightful argument against the sceptic incorporates the transparency 
thesis as a way of illustrating photography as a medium that needs to be made distinct from our 
interest in the painterly conception of pictorial representation. For the integrative theorist the 
photograph is transparent, however, we take an interest in the objects photographed due to the 
photographer’s intention to frame certain objects.  
 
Yet I contend that the integrative theorist’s argument does not go far enough in making the break 
from a painterly conception of the creative practice of picture making. For Friday, to take an 
aesthetic interest in the photograph we must be able to recognise some intentional control – 
framing in the case of the transparent representation. To take an aesthetic interest toward the 
photograph, therefore, we must be able to acknowledge a conception of the intentional that is 
akin to our appreciation of the Albertian picture. This means that the objects within the picture 
frame must be representative of a conscious decision made by the artist. As we have discussed, 
for the integrative theorist, meaningful content, is possessed by the object photographed only if 
we recognise it is because they are framed by a photographer. 
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By rethinking the foundations of the integrative theorist’s bold claims regarding the conception 
of pictorial representation after photography I contend that we may conceive of a more decisive 
break from the traditional painterly conception of the intentional in representational art. In this 
conception of the photograph as a transparent representation the integrative theorist conceives of 
our aesthetic interest towards the photograph as an interest towards the photographer’s 
perspective, which for Friday contains an expressive perspective; ‘Skilfully used, the medium of 
photography is capable of capturing and sustaining aesthetic attention by virtue of the expressive 
perspectives on the world that it is suited to creating.’240 
 
Expressive perspective, Friday argues amounts to the photographer’s intention to frame certain 
objects that are meaningful. The question that the sceptic might well ask at this point, I contend, 
is also central to our understanding of the photographic aesthetic: “Can we see the 
photographer’s intention by appealing to the framing of certain objects?” The photographic 
sceptic, I can perhaps safely presume would answer, no. And on this point I am in agreement. 
The absence of intentional control, I contend is often the very reason that artists choose to 
photograph. 
 
This, I claim must have a striking impact on how we are to think about both the transparent and 
representational quality of a photograph. In this chapter I have looked at how photographs carry 
and express their meaning – in terms of our aesthetic understanding. For the negative proponent 
of the transparency theory, the answer to this problem is clear; since photographs are transparent, 
it is the object photographed and not the photograph that carries and expresses meaning. For the 
integrative theorist, the response is more complex: The photograph relates to the photographer’s 
decision to frame a certain object, which we acknowledge through appealing to the composition. 
Yet, it is the object photographed that is possessive of the meaning that we see in a photograph.  
 
A good deal of our discussion of creative practice up to this point I claim has been dependent on 
the assimilation of qualities that I refer to as painterly. It seems as though the notion of intention 
and the propensity for the artist to use of the camera to interpret is central to a discussion of 
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creative practice. However, in this chapter I have begun to consider the possibility that intention 
and interpretation, as the sceptic contends, are not only absent – in the traditional, painterly 
conception of the intentional – in photography but this absence is illustrative of photography’s 
aesthetic value. Therefore, if we are to distance ourselves from the current arguments criticised 
in this investigation a re-examination of our interest towards the photograph is required. In 
particular, we need to consider what photography offers the artist in relation to its creative 
potential.  
 
Unlike our understanding of the painterly, expression is not fixed to the content of a photograph 
as something that we attribute to the artist’s intention. Instead we might think of the photograph 
as reflective of certain intentions that are attributable to the artist, the objects photographed, 
photographic tropes and concerns that are external to all three. As Douglas Greenlee observes we 
realise that aesthetic content does not necessarily unify meaning or expression, on the contrary it 
has a decidedly more fragmentary quality: 
 
To say that a work of art has meaning may be only to say, for 
example, that some of its parts or elements have meaning. 
And the meaning in question may be that kind of meaning 
which a part in a whole is often said to have when it 
contributes to the aesthetic ‘excellence’ of an organic 
whole.
241
 
 
In the next 2 chapters, I set out to do two things. Firstly I will describe what I mean by saying 
that photography offers the artist a significantly different approach to engaging with her subject 
matter. In order to do this I will draw upon an interpretation of Walter Benjamin to illustrate the 
creative act as a constantly transforming concept.  
 
Benjamin’s critical technique will inform the epistemological conditions of this approach. 
However, this path is not without its own problems. Traditionally a Benjaminian perspective is 
often expected to focus on the de-auratising impact of technological media on art. As discussed 
in chapter 1; this focuses on the way in which technologically advanced media such as 
photography has altered our access to artworks, creative practice and an aesthetic understanding. 
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However, my interpretation of Benjamin offers a quite different service. As this investigation has 
largely centred on the role of intention in developing our understanding of creative practice of 
representational art I will consider how photography has affected the artist’s relationship with 
her subject matter. Firstly, I will revise the current approach taken in this investigation towards 
examining the role of intention in relation to creative practice. Artists who choose to photograph, 
I aim to show, do so fully aware that they are unable to exact complete or unified intentional 
control over her subject matter. Furthermore, I will argue that the lack of intentional control is 
often what compels artists to adopt the photographic medium. In order to describe and illustrate 
this different approach towards creative practice I will first reconsider the epistemological 
foundations upon which we base our understanding of the role of intention in creative practice.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Ansel Adams on the creative practice of photography: ‘The negative is the score, the print is the 
performance.’242 
 
7.1: Introduction 
 
In the last 2 chapters I set out to explore how the expressive and aesthetically meaningful form in 
the photographic artform. I presented and later rejected the integrative view that photographs are 
aesthetically interesting because they represent the photographer’s perspective. The problem that 
I find with this viewpoint is similar to that which the photographic sceptic acknowledges; that 
photographers are unable to express a thought about the object photographed. Whilst I do not 
think that our interest towards the photographic representation is devoid of an appreciation of the 
intentional, it is not central to our aesthetic understanding of a photograph. An aesthetic 
understanding of the photographic medium, I claim, is in need of a conception of the intentional 
that is peculiar to the parameters of its practice.  
 
In this chapter, I will present a de-centred notion of the intentional. In doing so, I will consider 
an approach towards the creative use of photography in which its mechanical limitations are 
appropriate to the aims of the artist. I will endeavour to present an understanding of creative 
photography that like Friday’s integrative thesis incorporates the causal and the expressive. 
Problematic to the integrative thesis, as I understand it, is that the conception of the intentional is 
not altered from an understanding that is characteristic in painting insofar as intentionality is 
considered to be central to the cause of our aesthetic interest. Therefore, a de-centred conception 
of the intentional seeks to describe the intentional as it is manifest in photography.  
 
The initial steps I claim that are required to be taken in order to illustrate the intentional as a 
feature of artistic photography also necessitates an outline of the point at which a conception of 
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the intentional in photography diverges from its place in painting. In describing the point of 
divergence my objective is to characterise the place of intention in photographic art. This would, 
I contend, offer a counter to the position held by the photographic sceptic; that we are unable to 
take an aesthetic interest towards the ideal photograph that is not an interest towards the object 
photographed. At present I have underlined the intentional as present in artistic photography, yet 
as a force that is de-centred by the mechanically derived causal process. In further developing the 
notion of a de-centred intentionality my aim is to underline its value as descriptive of our 
appreciation of the aesthetically representational in photography. 
 
The arguments that are purported to counter the sceptical viewpoint of intentionality, that I have 
examined so far, have not sufficiently taken to task an outlining intentionality peculiar to the 
practice of ideal photography. I claim that this is because these arguments do not seek out an 
approach towards the intentional is explicative of the difference between the centralised place of 
intentionality in painting and its de-centred place in photography. For example, in Friday’s 
integrative theory, the aesthetic in photography is characterised by our interest towards a picture 
of the world from the photographer’s perspective. Dominic Lopes argues for a transparent 
aesthetic of photography, in which he incorporates Walton’s prosthesis conception of 
photography. Aesthetic appreciation of the photograph is possible because they are pictures that 
we see through. Our interest is held by the object photographed, yet because we see through the 
image it is different from our ordinary, day-to-day seeing. Therefore, we are able to appreciate 
the photograph as representative of the photographer’s intentions. 
 
In considering these arguments, that seek to undermine the claim held by the photographic 
sceptic – a position that is in this thesis represented by Scruton’s argument in the Photography 
and Representation essay –I have found to be lacking an exploration of an understanding of the 
place of intentionality in photography. I do not think we need to redefine the notion of 
intentionality in art, merely it is the position of intentionality that requires reconsideration; it is 
my claim that a description of a de-centred notion of intentionality constitutes a different kind of 
relationship between the artwork and its structure of representational meaning. Because the 
prevailing epistemological discourse of intentionality within this investigation has posited it as 
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quality central to the expressive potential of an artwork, I find the need to adopt a different 
theoretical perspective.  
 
Walter Benjamin’s critical theory will offer a characteristically alternate approach. Benjamin did 
not develop a theory of artistic photography but was concerned with – amongst other things – the 
impact of the medium on creativity. A great deal of Benjamin’s writing on photography and the 
mechanical arts is concerned with a conception of the artwork as a tool for political change. As 
in Friday’s discussion of Peirce’s semiology, I am not interested in engaging in an evaluative 
discourse on Benjamin’s discussion of the function of art, but what may be discerned from his 
approach towards an aesthetic critique. Benjamin observed that photography challenged the artist 
to rethink her approach towards representation: For the painter, the representation is something 
which is removed from the reality that she depicts, whilst it is the task of the photographer to 
enter into that reality: ‘The painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, the 
cameraman penetrates deeply into its web.’243  
 
Benjamin’s discussion of the photographic medium as an artform that is different in kind from 
painting – in terms of its representational potential – enables us to consider a categorically 
different relationship between the artist and the emergence of the intentional. The comparative 
study of painting and photography as a means to discover the parameters of the aesthetic 
representation was for Benjamin injurious to a study of the photographic artform: 
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The nineteenth-century dispute as to the artistic value of 
painting versus photography today seems devious and 
confused. This does not diminish its importance, however; if 
anything, it underlines it. The dispute was in fact the 
symptom of a historical transformation the universal impact 
of which was not realized by either of the rivals. When the 
age of mechanical reproduction separated art from its basis in 
cult, the semblance of its autonomy disappeared forever.
244
  
 
Important to Benjamin’s discourse on the photographic artform is a difference that is underlined 
by the artist’s appropriation of the mechanical tool. In chapter 1 I considered this observation as 
pertinent to illuminating a conscious choice to de-centre the intentional. In this chapter I will 
describe the point of divergence as a notion as explicative of a notion of intentionality that is not 
central to the cause of an aesthetic interest. In order to illustrate a fragmented view of the 
intentional, it is first necessary to describe the point of divergence that is important Benjamin’s 
discussion of the art of photography.    
 
7.2: The point of divergence 
 
In chapter 1, I discussed Scruton’s conception of the aesthetic representation. I considered his 
argument that the ideal photograph is unable to produce in the viewer an appreciation of that 
image as an aesthetic representation.
245
 Because a photograph is causally related to the object 
before the lens, it is the object photographed rather than the photographer’s intention that holds 
the aesthetic attention of the viewer. Important to his claim about the parameters of the aesthetic 
representation is the notion of intentionality.  
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Paintings, due to the manner of their production, require the viewer to take an interest towards 
the representation as expressive of the artist’s intention: to share a thought about the subject’s 
appearance. In the case of the ideal photograph, the viewer is unable, in his appreciation of the 
image, to share with the photographer, an expression of a thought about the object photographed. 
Insofar as what may be expressed by a photograph is not attributable to the photographer’s 
intention but the appearance of the object photographed. 
 
Scruton examines the representational contents of the painting and the photograph in order to 
describe the conceptual parameters of representational art specific to the media. Because the 
photograph is causally related to the subject, due to the mechanised production of the image, the 
contents of the image that attract an aesthetic interest are caused by the object before the lens: 
effectively, because the process of creating the image is a mechanical one, the artist is unable to 
make a picture – without distorting the causal link of the ideal photograph – that conveys a 
thought about that subject.  
 
The representational content of a painting if we look more closely, he argues, reveals a different 
relationship to the objects they depict. It is a difference that we may see by comparing the 
referential relationship between the representation and the object represented. For example, 
whilst an aesthetic interest towards the photograph may not involve perceptual recognition of the 
object photographed; we acknowledge that an interest towards the photograph  is causally related 
to the object photographed. Because the referential parts of the photograph are all causally 
related to the object before the lens this means, according to Scruton, that an aesthetic interest 
must refer to object and not the photographic depiction: ‘If I ask someone why he is looking at a 
picture, there are several kinds of reply he might give. In one case his reasons will be reasons for 
an interest only in the things depicted… Here the interest in the picture is derivative; it lies in the 
fact that the picture reveals properties of its subject… [and] is being treated as a means of access 
to the subject...’246 Contrarily, in painting the parts that reference the object depicted are not 
causally related to that object, but the painter’s intention to show the object in a certain way. 
Therefore, our aesthetic interest towards the parts that refer to the object depicted are causally 
related to the intention rather than the object depicted: 
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It is clearly true that we understand the representational 
meaning, of, say, a Carpaccio through understanding the 
representational meaning of its parts. But the parts 
themselves are understood in precisely the same way; that is 
they too have parts, each of which is potentially divisible into 
significant components, and so on ad infinitum… As we see 
the meaning of a painting so do we see the meaning of its 
parts. This contrasts sharply with the case of reference in 
language, where we construct the meaning of the sentence 
from the reference of its parts, and where the parts 
themselves have reference in a way that is ultimately 
conventional.
247
  
 
For Scruton, intentionality is central to our aesthetic appreciation of the picture. In order to 
appreciate the picture as an aesthetic representation it must be due to an acknowledgement of the 
depiction as circumscribed, not by the appearance of the object depicted but the intention to 
depict the subject in a certain way. Ultimately, because the parts of the photograph do not 
reference the photographer’s intention – as we find intentionality in painting – we are unable to 
appreciate the photograph as an aesthetic representation. The difference between our aesthetic 
appreciation of the painting and the photograph in Scruton’s argument underlines the importance 
of intentionality in art: 
 
 
 
 
 
…there is the case where the reasons for the interest are 
reasons for an interest in the picture (in the way it looks) 
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even though they make essential reference to the subject and 
can be understood as reasons only by someone who 
understands reference to the subject. For example, the 
observer may refer to a particular gesture of a certain figure, 
and a particular way of painting that gesture, as revelatory of 
the subject’s character.248 
 
This kind of interest is also realised, by Scruton, as dependent on acknowledging the 
intentionality to share a thought about the subject depicted. If an aesthetic interest is not caused 
by the reference to an intention, then the referents that produce in the viewer the aesthetic 
interest are caused by an interest towards the subject photographed and not the picture: ‘Such an 
interest [towards the painting] leads naturally to another, to an interest in the use of the medium – 
in the way the painting presents its subject and therefore in the way in which the subject is seen 
by the painter.’249 This is for Scruton, ‘the core of aesthetic experience of pictorial art…’250 and 
underlines the centrality of intentionality in his conception of the aesthetic representation. 
 
For Benjamin, it is possible to take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph that is caused by 
the photographer’s intentions. The camera does not distil the potentiality for self-expression but 
is a tool that invokes a different mode of expression. Benjamin underlines Camille Recht’s 
description of the difference in expressivity as found in the manner by which the two media 
differ in their shaping of their subject matter:
251
 
 
 
 
Painter and photographer alike have their instruments. For the 
painter, the processes of drawing and colouring correspond to 
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the note-shaping of violin-playing, while the photographer 
and the piano player have the advantage of the mechanical 
dimension, which is subject to restrictive laws that place 
nothing like the same compulsion on the violinist.
252
  
 
Benjamin, in a manner that is not dissimilar to Scruton recognises a categorical difference in the 
parameters of expression between the two media. He argues that both the painter and 
photographer may use their medium to express a thought about their subject. Nonetheless it is 
necessary to demarcate the difference not as a limiting factor – for photography – but as a point 
of divergence. Once again, akin to Scruton, Benjamin also holds that there is a difference in the 
aesthetic appreciation of the picture according to our understanding of the place of intentionality; 
as, for Benjamin, the parts of the photograph that produce an aesthetic interest refer not only to 
the artist’s intention. Whereas, for Scruton, this difference indicates a lacking in photography, for 
Benjamin it illustrates the need to challenge our current understanding of intentionality as central 
to a conception of the aesthetic representation: ‘There is a tremendous difference between the 
pictures that they [painters and photographers] obtain. That of the painter is a total one, that of 
the cameraman [or photographer] consists of multiple fragments which are assembled under a 
new law.’253  
 
After underlining the intentional as a quality that manifests itself as different in kind – in 
photography and painting – I will now assess what can be said about this point of divergence. 
Informed by Benjamin’s description of the aesthetically meaningful as fragmented rather than 
unified by the intentional, I will present a positive thesis of the de-centring of the intentional. The 
framework for this thesis is motivated by Benjamin’s assertion that aesthetic meaningfulness is a 
quality of the artwork that is historically determined.  
 
For Benjamin a critique of the artwork must take into account the historical conditions in which 
it is made; the environment in which the artist is working, the technological developments of the 
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epoch and the political situation are all qualities that for Benjamin punctuate the parameters of an 
aesthetic understanding. The technological advance made in the nineteenth century, therefore, 
impacted on the boundaries of our conception of intentionality and expression. Greame Gilloch 
cites this impact as characteristic of the challenge that Benjamin set himself through his writing; 
to envisage a conceptual framework that is historically forming and therefore remains under 
constant critical challenge: 
 
…central to Benjamin’s work is the insight that texts, objects 
and images have a particular existence, or ‘life’, of their own 
which goes beyond, and cannot be reduced to, the intentions 
and purposes of those who created them. This is not an act of 
fetishisation, the ascription of human capacities and qualities 
to inanimate things. Rather, it is the contention that the 
meaning and significance of a text [or image(s)] are not 
determined by the author at the moment of [creation] but are 
contested and conceptualized anew as it enters subsequent 
contexts… 254 
 
 
7.3: The critical challenge 
 
For Benjamin the work of art serves a purpose that extends beyond appreciation for its own sake. 
Indeed the concept of l’art art pour l’art for Benjamin has the potential to damage the 
authenticity of the artwork: ‘With the advent of the first truly revolutionary means of 
reproduction, photography… art sensed the approaching crisis which has become evident a 
century later. At the time, art reacted with the doctrine of l’art pour l’art, that is, with a theology 
of art.’255 A theory of the artwork that seeks to hide from its aesthetic character the material 
conditions in which the work is produced, argues Benjamin, undermines its exhibition value in 
                                                          
254
 Gilloch, G. (2002), p. 2 
255
 Benjamin, W. (1999), p.218 
181 
 
 
 
favour of cult status. The elevation of the work of art and intentionality of the producer to cult 
status, for Benjamin undermines the authenticity of art. The authentic work, in his writing is 
evaluated for its potential to challenge the ubiquity of cult status; in doing so, the work of art 
becomes vital as a critique of the status of social relations. Only a medium in which the value of 
original is interchangeable with its reproduction can a theory of art that transcends the work 
beyond its subject be properly challenged: 
 
Mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its 
parasitical dependence on ritual… From a photographic 
negative, for example, one can make any number of prints; to 
ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense. But the instant 
criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic 
production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of 
being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another 
practice – politics. 
 
His critique of art and the theory of artistic production, therefore, would seem to form in its 
conceptual amalgamation as having a divisive purpose; as expressive of a dichotomy in which 
the politicisation of the aesthetics is described as the means by which its authenticity may be 
redeemed. There has been much criticism of Benjamin’s appropriation of technological 
reproduction as a means of rethinking the purpose of art. Indeed Benjamin’s friend and 
publisher, Theodore Adorno, criticised the grand illusion that there could be a revolutionary 
appropriation of mechanically produced art as naïve: Adorno argues that the technologically 
reproduced image and moving image could be more readily produced and widely distributed by 
the forces that Benjamin considers could be upturned by the use of mechanically reproduced 
art.
256
 
 
Yet, aside from Adorno’s charge of naïveté made in response to the claim that mechanically 
reproduced art has the potential to transform the function of art, it is encased within a theoretical 
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framework that describes the impact on the attitude towards expression that was caused by the 
de-centring of the intentional: ‘…a different nature… speaks to the camera than speaks to the 
eye; different above all in that, rather than space permeated with human consciousness, here is 
one permeated with unconsciousness.’257 
 
Photography, for Benjamin, penetrated the world in such a way that it enabled artist and viewer 
to take a different kind of interest towards the expression of a thought about our meaningful 
experience of the world. The unconsciousness that Benjamin was interested in is represented in 
the photographic image as the everyday gesture that engages us only by habit and therefore must 
pass us by in an instant. Those moments, frozen in a photograph, he argues, can provoke a 
contemplative attitude that was not possible in the continuum of time, or in works of art in which 
our interest is causally related to the artist’s intention. Yet that detail which refers our interest 
towards the representational meaning is not unified by the artist’s intent; for Benjamin this 
means that what is expressed in the work is not brought to consciousness by the artist. The 
aesthetically meaningful, therefore, forms in fragmentation, expressed as narrative like structures 
that emerge in fragmentation through the details of the work:  
 
 
Yet at the same time, photography reveals in this material 
physiognomic aspects, image worlds, which dwell in the 
smallest things – meaningful yet covert enough to find a 
hiding place in waking dreams, but which, enlarged and 
capable of formulation, make the difference between 
technology and magic visible as a thoroughly historical 
variable.
258
 
 
Central to Benjamin’s writing is a critique of the structure of meaningful experience that 
circumscribes our experience of the world. Art, for Benjamin, is the mode that enables us to 
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reflect on that structure of meanings that we encounter in our experience of the world. Benjamin 
describes two conceptions of the aesthetically meaningful: one that regards the artwork as an 
object that is expressive of a meaningful structure that is unified or symbolised by the intentional 
and a second mode in which the aesthetically meaningful emerges as fragmentary; Benjamin 
describes the second conception of the artwork as allegorically composed because he allows that 
the detail of a work of art may be emblematic of an intent without that intention circumscribing 
the entire meaningful structure of the work. The first mode, for Benjamin, describes the artwork 
as an object in which its expressions transcend their subject matter.  
 
The second mode, for Benjamin, is vital to our understanding of – what was for him – the new 
technical apparatus of the artist: Because it includes the possibility that a structure of 
representational meaning is not determined by a centralising force in the intentional. I will now 
describe the differentiation between the symbolic and allegorical conceptions of the aesthetically 
meaningful as representative of the point of divergence.  
 
7.4: The framework of a new approach 
 
In Benjamin’s early writing he began to form an approach towards a critique of the structure of 
representational meaning that would characterise his entire theoretical oeuvre.
259
 In particular, 
Benjamin was concerned with examining meaningfulness in our everyday experience. Its 
formation as both a social and aesthetic phenomenon characterised the contents of his critical 
studies. For Benjamin, true meaningful experience was heading towards a crisis point; the new 
mechanical modes of mass production held the possibility to damage the authenticity of 
meaningful experience when we come to rely on them as giving us access to the world and a 
conception of meaningfulness:
 260
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Man’s inner concerns do not have their issueless private 
character by nature. They do so only when he is increasingly 
unable to assimilate the data of the world around him by way 
of experience. Newspapers constitute one of many evidences 
of such an inability. If it were the intention of the press to 
have the reader assimilate the information it supplies as part 
of his own experience, it would not achieve its purpose. But 
its intention is just the opposite… to isolate what happens 
from the realm in which it could affect the experience of the 
reader.
261
 
 
The artwork is for Benjamin a tool that unlike the press may engage our interest as a part of the 
individual experience: This is because the work of art enables us to both experience and express 
emotions about the world that we can relate to as a personal experience. Whereas the newspaper, 
for Benjamin, enables a kind access to the world that does not seek to incorporate the experience 
of the reader, the work of art holds the potential to provoke an experience which is unique to the 
person who appreciates that work. Whilst it may be possible to have a meaningful experience 
when watching/reading/ listening to the news, it is an experience that holds our interest as 
information and therefore, as Benjamin notes, it does not engage us meaningfully, as of our own 
experience.  
 
Critical to his theoretical framework, is that meaningful experience is historically forming and 
therefore, an examination of its conceptualisation can be found in not only artworks but the 
objects of the phenomenal world. Benjamin’s ultimate intention was to set up a critical 
framework that could describe the historical character of meaningful experience. Influenced by 
Jewish mysticism, Benjamin saw that this task could be reached by an examination of meaning 
that sought to return meaning to its origin:  
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There takes place in every original phenomenon a 
determination of the form in which an idea will constantly 
confront the historical world, until it is revealed fulfilled, in 
the totality of its history. Origin is not, therefore, discovered 
by the examination of actual findings, but it is related to their 
history and their subsequent development.
262
 
 
Benjamin identified two approaches that constitute our approach towards a useful critical 
examination of the epistemology of meaning: the symbolic and the allegoric. Both mechanisms 
reside, he argues, not in a thesis that seeks to establish an essentialist perspective of meaning but 
are modes of its representation: ‘If philosophy is to remain true to the law of its own form, as the 
representation of truth and not as a guide to the acquisition of knowledge, then the exercise of 
this form – rather than its anticipation in the system – must be accorded due importance.’263 
Because, for Benjamin, a theoretical framework, in one sense underlines the epistemological 
boundaries of the epoch in which it is espoused, he examines our expression of a founding 
epistemology as representational – rather than exacting or normative.  
 
Benjamin’s theoretical framework was an attempt to move away from – or at least critique – a 
symbolic conception of the representational. For Benjamin, the symbolic image of representation 
manifests itself as unified by a centralising force: the meaningful structure of the symbolic image 
of representation is conceived of as complete; insofar as it expresses a unique perspective. 
Representation, in a symbolic interpretation, carries meaning that does not merely refer to object 
represented but is expressive of its own unique meaningful structure. Therefore, the referents that 
symbolise meaningfulness are peculiar to the representation itself: ‘The measure of time for the 
experience of the symbol is the mystical instance in which the symbol assumes the meaning into 
its hidden and, if one might say so, wooded interior.’264 Benjamin’s symbolic interpretation of 
                                                          
262
 Benjamin, W. (1977), p.46 
263
 Benjamin, W. (1977), p.28 
264
 Benjamin, W. (1977), p. 165 
186 
 
 
 
the representational, I claim, is able to show us a conception of the representational that is self-
constitutive in terms of its structure of representational meaning.  
 
As with Scruton’s conception of the aesthetic representation, Benjamin’s conception of the 
symbolic representation regards the meaningful elements as referring to an intention rather than 
merely the object represented. The aesthetic realisation of the symbolic representation, 
establishes the artwork as an object in which its referents express a structure of meaning that are 
intrinsic to that work. As John McCole argues, the symbolic, for Benjamin establishes its own 
meaningful structure: ‘The aesthetic symbol’s affirmative bias lies in its pretense of incarnating a 
“plastic” stabilized totality.’265 Therefore, the representation for Benjamin, in its symbolic 
configuration is expressive of a meaning that transcends the historical moment in which its 
referents are found. 
 
In Scruton’s interpretation of the aesthetic representation he also underlines the loss of time as a 
quality that is central to its conception. In comparing the painted and photographic portrait he 
argues that what holds our interest in a photograph is often an appreciation of the appearance of 
the subject photographed when the picture was taken. In the case of the painted portrait, it is not 
merely the appearance of the subject that holds our interest. Indeed, how the subject appeared 
when the portrait was painted may not concern the viewer at all. For Scruton, the intention to see 
the subject in a certain way – as depicted in the painting – is the central force that guides our 
interest towards the aesthetic representation. As our aesthetic appreciation of the representation 
is not causally related to the subject the relationship between the subject and its depiction may be 
characterised as transcendent of the temporal realm to which the depiction refers: 
 
 
 
One of the most important differences between photography 
and portraiture… lies in the relation of each to time… 
photography… is thought of as revealing something 
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momentary about its subject – how the subject looked at a 
particular moment… Portrait painting, however, aims to 
capture the sense of time and to represent its subject as 
extended in time, even in the process of displaying a 
particular moment of its existence… The aim of painting is to 
give insight, and the creation of an appearance is important 
mainly as the expression of a thought.
266
 
  
Scruton’s conception of the aesthetic representation, I claim, involves a centralised notion of the 
intentional. This can also be said about Benjamin’s notion of the symbolic representation. In his 
conception of the symbolic representation the meaningful structure is centralised, insofar as all 
its referents emerge as unified: ‘The meaning of a symbol is not dispersed across a plethora of 
disparate referents, but is concentrated intensively in a single image.’267 Both theoretical 
frameworks involve a conception of the aesthetic as an experience in which the parameters of 
expression and meaningfulness are synthetically unified. The relationship to the temporal is 
important in terms of how it configures in the aesthetic experience of the representation. For 
Benjamin as, Bainard Cowan argues, the symbolic conception of representation permits a 
description of aesthetic appreciation that is emptied of time: ‘Experience would then become 
something to appreciate entirely in itself. Time seems to stop for this perfect moment, and 
problems of communication are annulled.’268  
 
We find this approach towards a conception of the aesthetic representation present in Scruton’s 
writing on representational art. In Scruton’s conception of representational art, this concerns the 
referential relationship between the subject and the aesthetic content: For Scruton, the aesthetic 
content refers to the artist’s intention to depict the subject in a certain way. An aesthetic interest 
towards the representation, therefore, does not regard its referents as causally related to the 
                                                          
266
 Scruton, R. (1998), p. 129 
267
 Gilloch, G. (2002), p. 80 
268
 Cowan, B. Benjamin’s Theory of Allegory in New German Critique, No. 22, Winter 1981 pp. 109-122 , P. 111 
188 
 
 
 
temporal realm. As Scruton notes in order to understand the meaningful and expressive value of 
the artwork we need not look for its structure outside of that work:  
 
The interest is not in the representation for the sake of its 
subject but in the representation for its own sake. And it is 
such an interest that forms the core of the aesthetic 
experience of pictorial art, and which… would explain not 
only the value of that experience but also the nature and value 
of the art which is its object. We see at once that such an 
interest is not, and cannot be, an interest in the literal truth of 
the picture.
269
 
 
In Benjamin’s interpretation of the symbolic representation, the expressive and the meaningful 
are elements are naturalised in the representation. As Jeremy Tambling points out in his 
interpretation of Benjamin’s symbolic conception of the representation, the aesthetically 
meaningful emerges as made permanent by the representation: ‘…it seems that what the symbol 
describes as ‘natural’, making the danger of symbolism that it concentrates certain values as 
natural, permanent and having an essential and unchanging existence.’270 
 
7.5: The allegorical as a point of divergence 
 
The symbolic image of representation, on its own, he found to be inadequate because it 
constructs a theoretical framework in which the represented becomes insufficient or secondary to 
our understanding or interest. This model disallows our consideration of the represented as a 
referent that is in some way constitutive of the representational content. For Benjamin, the 
relationships formed in the representational meaning are not merely self-referential because, he 
argues that our understanding and appreciation of them form according to certain 
epistemological boundaries; that are for Benjamin historically forming.  
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In Benjamin’s conception, history is not revealed in by attending to the past event but as 
narratives that punctuate our experience of the present: ‘…nothing that has ever happened should 
be regarded as lost for history… For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present 
as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.’271 Benjamin, therefore, also 
posits a different approach towards our conception of the representation. The allegorical model 
is for Benjamin more suited to a conception of the representation that takes into account the 
disagreements and inconsistencies that punctuate its formation, as Howard Caygill notes:  
 
Allegory emerges out of the difficult relationship between 
appearance and essence, and is based on the recognition that 
there is a discrepancy between them. This discrepancy is for 
Benjamin not a falling away from the symbolic, but an 
inevitable consequence of the experience of time and 
finitude
272
 
 
The allegorical, in Benjamin’s writing is presented as a point of divergence from which he 
considers a historically forming conception of the parameters of an aesthetic understanding to 
emerge. The allegorical conception of representation is for Benjamin expressive of an 
understanding of history in which meaning is not symbolised by the event. In the symbolic 
conception of the event, Benjamin argues, we regard history of a series of moments that are 
complete or finite in terms of their meaning relationships.  
 
The consequence of a unified structure of representational meaning, he argues, is that we find 
meaning in our present experience to be complete or ready-made; by this, Benjamin means that 
meaningful experience is regarded as attached to the event rather than individual personal 
experience. To illuminate this idea, Benjamin appropriates Baudelaire’s work on the passer-by. 
In Baudelaire’s conception of the passer-by, he found an experience of the world in which 
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communication or correspondence is lost. The urban setting that is the site of Baudelaire’s 
writing on the passer-by documents the loss of the individual in the crowd. Meaningful 
experience, therefore, is consigned to the event rather than present fully as a unique experience. 
The passer-by, however, represents the possibility of a communication that could engender a 
meaningful experience, yet within an urban setting emerges through an expression that is 
representative of the crowd rather than the individual.  
 
Significantly, Baudelaire injected into his poem the look of 
the eye encumbered by distance as the regard familier. The 
poet who failed to found a family endowed the word familier 
with overtones pervaded by promise and renunciation. He has 
lost himself to the spell of eyes which do not return his 
glance and submits to their sway without illusions.
273
 
 
The danger present in this pessimistic conception of the structure of representational meaning is 
a loss of identity. The allegorical representation, he argues, posits a conception of the aesthetic in 
which representational meaning does not form as unified by the event. For Benjamin, the event 
forms not as a series of meanings that are symbolically unified but are present to our experience: 
Therefore, for Benjamin, history is best viewed by re-tracing the meaningful content in objects 
and artworks rather than an attempt to relive the original event. This makes Benjamin’s 
conception of the allegorical representation of history as a materialist rather historicist 
conception: 
 
 
 
 
A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a 
present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still 
and has come to a stop. For this notion defines the present in 
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which he himself is writing history. Historicism gives the 
‘eternal’ image of the past; historical materialism supplies a 
unique experience of the past.
274
 
 
In this sense, meaning is not centralised by a representation of the event in its unique historical 
setting. The allegorical conception of the representation regards the event as readily accessible 
through contemporary experience; in such objects as artworks, artefacts, everyday objects and 
critical writing. Whilst this position is not entirely opposed to the symbolic conception of the 
representational it does offer a unique approach towards our understanding of our relation to the 
structure of representational meaning. For Benjamin, the allegorical interpretation of the 
representation seeks to describe an approach towards criticism that does not look to a qualitative 
definition that is transcendent of the experiential. Indeed, for Benjamin the experiential is a 
quality that is essential to a critical discourse; if it is not present, no exacting examination of the 
meaningful can be performed. The meaningful structure, of the event, therefore, no longer 
symbolises a moment in time that can be consigned to an unreachable past, but enables a 
conception of history that is a constituent part of understanding of the present experience:  
 
 
Pervading Benjamin’s writing about history is an awareness 
of the all-too-human propensity to forget the past and in 
doing so to look away from the truth to oneself; to be 
fascinated  by the image of a symbolic other that is free from 
all real conflicts, to be fixated by the “beauty” of this 
image… and fail to recognize one’s own face, the face of 
history, with all its marks of suffering and incompleteness.
275
  
 
Benjamin’s allegorical representation of meaning presents us with a quite different image. The 
symbolic representation situates a structure of representational meaning as inherent within the 
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particular representation. The allegoric counterpart, whilst recognising the unitary expression of 
the representation attempts to do the opposite in terms of its structure. Meaning is not formed in 
the detail – of the representation – as equal in value to the meaning of the whole. The allegorical 
formation of representational meaning emerges as a number of possibilities rather than a unified 
construct as it is in the symbolic conception of the representation. This symbolic conception of 
the value of the representation, Benjamin claims is not the only approach available for use in our 
examination of the aesthetic. As Gilloch argues, an attempt to examine the aesthetic value of new 
media such as photography within the traditional discourse will overlook the qualities that 
constitute their aesthetic value: ‘For Benjamin photography and film are qualitatively new media 
which can neither be understood nor evaluated with respect to traditional aesthetic categories and 
criteria.’276 
 
The allegorical structure of the representational, I claim, provides us with an alternative approach 
towards our understanding of the work of art because it rejects an intention centred construction 
of meaning and expression. This presents us with an image of the artwork as an object that does 
not symbolise a structure that is centralised by an intention. Allegory is important to an 
understanding of Benjamin’s aesthetics, because it re-situates a conception of the expressive. 
 
The expressive as we have discussed it so far, emerges through the artwork as illuminative of the 
artist’s intention. The structure of representational meaning expressed in the artwork, in this 
sense, is in accordance with the artist’s intention; insofar as the meaning of its referents – the 
represented object(s) – are causally related to the artist’s intention. Benjamin does not seek to 
reject this possibility in his allegorical conception. Moreover, his allegorical conception of the 
representation enables us to explore a conception of the work of art that is not dependent on a 
centralised notion of the intentional. A de-centred notion of the intentional, therefore, forms the 
expressive content of the work of art. 
 
The de-centred conception of intention is informed by a description of the expressive contents of 
the work as allegorically forming. Central to this image is the notion of a structure of 
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representational meaning that is a fragmented rather than a unified whole; the work of art as an 
object that is expressive of a thought about its subject becomes aesthetically interesting not 
because we perceive that intention as unifying but as fragmented quality of its structure of 
meaning. Appreciation of the aesthetic representation in Benjamin’s allegorical image 
reconstitutes the intentional as a multi-narrative like in structure. Each strand of the narrative 
emerges to have a different resonance within the work that refers to not merely the artist’s 
thought about the subject, but also through the subject. Intentionality, in this sense is viewed as a 
de-centred quality of the work of art; as Eduardo Cadava notes in his understanding of 
Benjamin’s allegory, it offers an understanding of the work of art as an object that due to its de-
centred notion of intentionality is no longer perceives that quality as unifying: ‘…allegory is not 
only the loss of the artwork’s originality or singularity, however, but also of transcendent 
radiance.’277  
 
The new mechanical media appropriated by the artist, I claim, requires an allegorical approach 
towards a consideration of their aesthetic value because the symbolic approach is unable to 
encapsulate the expressive potential of a representation which is not unified by an intention. 
Benjamin offers an analogy which demarcates the point of divergence from which the allegorical 
is removed from its symbolic conception; in which the structure of representational meaning in 
the allegorical conception finds its referents are not necessarily unifying because they are not 
accessible as an expression of a single or unifying thought:  
 
Everything about history that, from the very beginning, has 
been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face 
– or rather in a death’s head. And although such a thing lacks 
all ‘symbolic’ freedom of expression, all classical proportion, 
all humanity – nevertheless, this is the form in which man’s 
subjection to nature is most obvious and it significantly gives 
rise not only to the enigmatic question of nature of human 
existence as such, but also of the biographical historicity of 
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the individual. This is the heart of the allegorical way of 
seeing…278 
 
The death’s head serves as analogy because it encapsulates a point of reference that for him 
demarcates the character of the allegorical representation. Embedded in its image, Benjamin 
argues is an expression that is not free from its referents – that is the object represented. In his 
image of the deaths head, therefore, Benjamin finds an analogy of the allegorical concept of 
representational meaning; insofar as it is an image that involves both convention and expression. 
Central to this notion of the allegorical notion of representational meaning is that the intention 
forms in such a way that is expressive of a lacking or loss: ‘Allegories are, in the realm of 
thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things.’279 
 
7.6: Confounding Origin 
 
Benjamin’s death’s head analogy of the allegorical conception returns us to his broader project 
of a discourse on the origin of meaning. As I noted at the outset of this chapter, his discussion of 
an origin of meaning does not involve a description of origin as a fixed point in space and time; 
for Benjamin, origin of meaning is not something that is expressible in-itself but can be grasped 
as a representation. There are two approaches that I have outlined as descriptive of Benjamin’s 
approach towards a representation of the origin of meaning: The symbolic conception of 
representation presents us with its own unique structure of representational meaning; in which 
the referents are themselves constitutive of their meaningful value. The aesthetic value of the 
symbolic representation, therefore, is descriptive of the representational artwork as holding our 
attention according to an inner logic that the work seems to possess. We may refer to primary or 
centralising force of that inner logic, I contend, as the intentional aspect.  
 
The allegorical conception of the representation presents us with an image that does not have a 
unified structure of representational meaning; insofar as Benjamin identifies the relationship 
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between an expression and its structure of representational meaning as a multi-narrative 
composition. This allegorical conception is tied up with Benjamin’s historical materialism that 
regards our understanding of meaning as bound to the objects that we use to order our everyday 
experience. For Benjamin, the objects of our everyday experience form ideas and meaningful 
relationships with the world that we are not always conscious of.  
 
Artworks often permit us to contemplate those aspects of our experience that we are not able to 
think about ordinarily: Representational meaning, in this sense, for Benjamin is also to a certain 
degree a part of experience that is unconscious. Benjamin argues that we are not always able to 
say that the work of art is unified by the notion that it is expressive of a thought about its subject. 
New media such as photography and film enable the artist to explore this unconscious 
relationship in a way that understands and incorporates the unconscious. The allegorical notion 
of representation circumscribes a conception of the aesthetic that is not unified but fragmented in 
terms of outlining the structure of representational meaning.  
 
The notion of an Origin of meaning in this sense, as Carol Armstrong notes, is pessimistic 
insofar as it includes the possibility that whilst it maybe expressed in the artwork it is also, 
potentially, ungraspable. However, pessimistic this may seem it is not wholly negative, for it 
makes it possible for us to consider the artwork as an object that engages our interest as 
expressive of both a conscious and unconscious thought about its subject.  
 
…instead of offering us a straight line between "origin," act, 
and object, it [connection between the depiction and the 
depicted] catches us up in a circle of responses. So, like 
photography, it also confounds the very concept of the 
"origin" and of the act of origination (not to mention the 
necessary, almost causal relationship between the act of 
origination and the accomplishment of possession…)280  
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In one sense, Benjamin’s writing on the allegorical is esoteric and difficult to describe as a 
critique of aesthetic judgement; because in his writing descriptive terms are passed over in 
favour of analogy and imagistic representation. The allegorical conception of representation, for 
example, outlines a notion of the origin of meaning as ungraspable yet present in our 
unconscious – and therefore, expressible through the work of art, or a historically materialist 
critique. However, his allegorical account does, enables us to consider an approach towards 
describing the aesthetic representation that is not dependent on an intention centred conception 
of the artwork. Benjamin’s allegorical conception of representation encompasses an image of the 
artwork that recognises that its parameters of expression are closely linked to medium. As 
Caygill notes, Benjamin’s conception of the artwork considers medium as defining the 
parameters of intentionality: 
 
Benjamin follows Schlegel in identifying the ‘construction’ 
of the work of art with its form. Yet it is not form in the 
classical sense of a shaping principle imposed upon matter, 
but form understood as the configuration of a medium of 
expression… for is both medium of expression and that 
which is expressed.
281
 
  
7.7: Photography as an allegorical artform 
 
Photography presents us with a problem when examining its aesthetic merits: The photographic 
image, we may appreciate as aesthetically pleasing, yet discerning the cause of this kind of 
interest has provoked much debate. I have hitherto examined the arguments for and against the 
notion that our aesthetic interest is caused by the photographer’s intention. Establishing this as a 
fact is a difficult task, because the evidence that we look for in other pictorial media – notably 
painting – is not present, at least in the manner that we usually expect it to be at hand: The 
pictorial depiction in a painting, for example, shows the appearance of its subject that is causally 
related to the artist’s intention. When we look at a photograph, on the other hand, the 
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photographer’s thoughts about the way the object photographed looks is not evident in the way 
that object appears in the depiction – at least in the same way that we appreciate in the painting. 
Although, as I considered in chapter 1, it is not necessary to say that the photograph depicts the 
way the object photographed looks. Because the photograph is causally related to the event we 
are, therefore, unable to attribute the appearance to the photographer’s thought about the object 
before the lens. 
 
In this chapter I have considered Benjamin’s approach towards this debate as a way of resetting 
the parameters of the discourse. I described his dual conception of the representation as 
explicative of the point at which our discussion of the aesthetic character of photography 
diverges from the traditional conception of representational art. The symbolic conception of the 
representational, I have claimed resonates with Scruton’s conception of representational art: In 
Benjamin’s symbolic conception an aesthetic understanding of the representation forms as a 
synthetic construction of its structure of representational meaning. The work of art contains 
referents, the parts of which are equal in their value to the whole. 
 
The allegorical conception of the representation is a departure from an understanding of the work 
of art as an expressive whole. The structure of representational meaning in the allegorical 
conception does not consider the work of art to be unified according to a centralised intention. 
There is, effectively, in the allegorical conception a de-centred notion of the intentional and 
consequently we do not identify the work of art as merely expressive of a thought about its 
subject. For Benjamin, photography brought into view, not only the photographer’s intention to 
show the viewer the way something looks but also the unconscious as descriptive of those details 
that hold our attention yet are not attributable to the intention. When we take an interest towards 
the photograph, contends Benjamin, we do not only see the object photographed but notice 
things about that object that we would not under ordinary circumstances. The camera, therefore, 
presents the artist with an opportunity to explore what Benjamin refers to as the ‘optical 
unconscious.’282 
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The notion of the optical unconscious, for Benjamin, is descriptive of the allegorical character of 
a photographic aesthetic: Photographs, he contends, open our contemplative interest to an 
experience of the world that is not available to us ordinarily – because we see the world through 
the photograph. Photographers, therefore, do not seek to present us with an image that is 
circumscribed by an intention – to show us how they think something looks. Moreover, the 
photographer is interested in presenting a representation in which the expressive forms as 
fragmented rather than unified: 
 
The fact is, it is a different nature that speaks to the camera 
than speaks to the eye; different above all in that rather than a 
space permeated with human consciousness, here is one 
permeated with unconsciousness. While it is quite normal for 
a person to have some idea… of how people walk, for 
instance, that person will certainly know nothing… about 
their posture in the split second of their stepping out.
283
 
 
The allegorical conception engenders an approach towards an aesthetic understanding of 
photography that describes the fragmented character of the aesthetic representation – within the 
photographic medium. In the symbolic conception of the representation the structure of the work 
of art is unified by the intentional. In photography, because this centralised conception of the 
intentional is not possible, that which emerges through the photograph as expressive is not 
necessarily related to an intention – recognisable as the artist’s. The photographic work of art, 
therefore, holds our aesthetic interest, not necessarily because it shows us the way something 
looks but because it enables us to contemplate detail as expressive in such a way that is 
ordinarily inaccessible to human consciousness. The Victorian writer Elizabeth Eastlake roundly 
criticised the potential to appreciate the photographic representation in the same way that we 
may the painted representation. However, she also acknowledges that photographs enable us to 
take a contemplative interest towards the world that is not available to our ordinary conscious 
perceptual experience: 
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Though the faces of our children may not be modelled and 
rounded with that truth and beauty which art attains, yet 
minor things – the very shoes of one, the inseparable toy of 
the other – are given strength of identity which art does not 
even seek.
284
 
 
For Benjamin, the notion of the optical unconscious permeates artistic photography as 
characteristic of its fragmented conception of expression. Because photography deals with, but 
cannot represent the whole meaning of what takes place before the frame it is not possible to say 
that a photograph is able to give us access to what is in front of the lens – insofar as our interest 
in the meaning of the things photographed is concerned. The image produced by the 
photographic process of exposing light through an aperture onto a photo-sensitive surface, 
emerges in a very real sense as a fragment; we see through a photograph – iff the object 
photographed is correctly exposed, focused, etc – a fragmented picture of the world: Even a well 
framed portrait may be betrayed by the ambiguous smile of the sitter or a ruffle in her dress. As 
Scruton points the photograph is unable contain a unified structure of representational meaning 
that is peculiar to that image because we do not appreciate its detail as intentionally dependent.
285
 
 
 
7.8: The fragments of representational meaning 
 
Nevertheless, in Benjamin’s allegorical conception, the aesthetic representation is characterised 
by its fragmentary structure of representational meaning. Because photographs are images in 
which we find that the meaning of the object is not centralised by the intentional, a change in our 
attitude towards an appreciation of the aesthetic representation occurs. The representational 
meaning of detail of the photograph is not – as it is in painting – equal in value to whole of the 
picture. Therefore, the detail that holds are aesthetic interest emerges as a fragment; not 
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necessarily unified by the whole of the picture and so its representational meaning carries with it 
a narrative that is unique to that detail. As Linda Rugg observes, the camera enables 
photographers to frame the world in such a way that allows the viewer to see through the picture 
the object photographed. By the same token a photograph may also disallow the viewer access to 
the object photographed by the use of framing, depth of focus and exposure – amongst other 
techniques. This can enable the photographer to focus on, or intentionally cut out objects. Such a 
possibility, argues Rugg, causes us to appreciate a fragmentary quality in the representational 
meaning of the photograph: 
 
Like allegorical objects, photographs function as “fragments” 
in that they are moments blasted from the continuum of 
time… Their capacity for cutting space into fragments can be 
clearly seen in those photographs that do not center their 
objects in a frame; an odd angle or a chopped-off building or 
body part renders visible what might ordinarily be 
overlooked.
286
 
 
Whilst a photographer is not always able to introduce the detail that holds our attention as 
expressive of a unified representational meaning – this does not mean that we appreciate the 
photograph as devoid of intention. Benjamin’s description of the camera underlines its potential 
to open our contemplative interest to an optical unconscious; that we are unable to appreciate 
ordinarily. The camera, in this sense I claim, resituates the artist’s conception of her role in the 
production of the artwork – as expressive of her thought about the subject/object photographed. 
Rather than considering the production of representational meaning as circumscribed by the 
intentional, instead it is realised as a quality that it is perceived – in the photographic medium – 
to be unified by its performative character. The allegorical conception of representational 
meaning, as Rugg describes emerges not as a number of parts that are equal to the whole but 
assesses the value of each part as fragments that potentially have their own different 
representational meanings. 
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The fragments, I claim, do not act to constitute a unified representational meaning but are 
themselves expressive only as possible narratives. Furthermore, because the image is causally 
related to a photographic event the image is expressive of a meaning that we are unable to 
describe as inherent in the object photographed, photographer’s intention or viewer’s 
understanding. Because we do attribute the meaning relationships to the object photographed it is 
suitable, I claim to describe the structure of representational meaning as performatively realised 
in the photograph; primarily because whilst we relate the meaning to object photographed it is 
causally related to the event in which we see the object rather than the object itself.  An aesthetic 
interest towards the photographic representation, therefore, regards its representational meaning 
as a related to its referents performatively: 
 
[There] would seem at first glance to be a difference between 
allegory and photograph – this denotative reference to the 
world itself outside the text for allegories are not meant to 
represent actual objects in the world, and it seems that 
photographs cannot help doing so. But it is not that allegories 
do not refer to objects from nature or experience for they 
always seem to refer to persons and/or objects from nature or 
experience; it is that those objects have their meaning only in 
performance in the allegorical code.
287
 
 
As we discussed in the opening chapter, the structure of representational meaning in the 
photographic composition often emerges as expressive of a tension; that is characterised by the 
ambiguity of meanings that we relate to the objects photographed: As we recognise a real 
relation between the depiction and the object depicted – due to the mechanically derived causal 
process – so we note that the meaning relationships relate to the object photographed sits within 
the photographic event. This enables the photographer to not only document but challenge 
meaning relationships that form in and between objects that we see through the photograph.  
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In Eugene Meatyard’s Lucybelle Crater & fatherly friend, Lucybelle Crater (1970-72) for 
example the intentional does not concretise the structure of representational meaning but 
emerges as fragmentary in character; it is in tension with a structure of representational meaning 
because it is not resolved within the other detail of the objects photographed. The mask, which 
we may – or may not – take to be the object which indicates Meatyard’s intention has a dual 
purpose: it both represents and at the same time denies access to meaning which we relate to the 
object photographed. The mechanical process of photography enables Meatyard to create images 
that create a fragmentary structure of representational meaning rather than one which is 
symbolically unified by his intention. 
 
 
19. Eugene Meatyard Lucybelle Crater & fatherly friend, Lucybelle Crater, 1970-72 
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In chapter 1 I considered the notion of tension as an embodiment of an ambiguity that 
characterises the structure of representational meaning in a photograph; the notion of tension 
underlines the complex relationship between the object photographed and the meaning that we 
relate to it - according to the appearance of that object we see through the photograph. I 
considered Duane Michals’s and Charlie White’s work as illustrative of this conception of 
representational meaning. In Both artists work, the representational meaning, I contend, takes on 
an allegorical structure. We appreciate the representational meaning as fragmentary rather than 
symbolically unified by the intentional.  
 
Yet in denying a centralised notion of the intentional it has not been my aim to deny the presence 
of the photographer’s intention. Rather, by re-considering the place of the intentional as de-
centred, I have aimed to describe an allegorical conception of the aesthetic representation as 
more suited to an understanding of the aesthetic character of photography. In contrast to the 
position that appropriates intentionality as definitive of the structure of representational meaning, 
it emerges through the artwork as a fragment; not necessarily unified or unifying.  
 
In this chapter I have presented a view, informed by Benjamin’s notion of the allegorical that 
seeks to offer an alternative conception of the structure of representational meaning in pictorial 
art. I have argued that in appreciating the aesthetic representation we need not consider the 
artist’s intention as the centralising quality of its aesthetic characterisation. Benjamin’s notion of 
the allegorical conceives of an interpretation of the representational in which the intentional 
emerges as a fragment of the representational meaning rather than its unifying quality. The 
allegorical conception of the representational, I contend, presents us with an approach towards 
describing the aesthetic representation in which the intentional forms as a narrative like 
fragment. 
 
In presenting a conception of the quality of intention as informed by Benjamin’s notion of the 
allegorical I have not, however, described the character of the de-centred intention as it is 
manifest in the photographic medium. In the next chapter, therefore, I will explore how the 
notion of a de-centred intention relates to an expression of a thought. 
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Chapter 8: The act of photographing 
 
8.1: Introduction 
 
Unlike the work of literature, translation does not find itself 
in the centre of the language forest but on the outside facing 
the wooded ridge; it calls into it without entering, aiming at 
that single spot where the echo is able to give, in its own 
language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one.
288
 
 
The description of artistic photography as expressive of an intention makes for a most 
inconsistent and discontinuous study. However, whilst I may not have successfully outlined a 
clear definition of the aesthetic character of photography, I have presented a comprehensive 
rejection of the negative interpretation of the transparency theory of photography; which follows 
that because photographs are causally related to the subject before the lens we are unable to take 
an aesthetic interest towards the photograph as representational art. At the centre of this 
argument is a question regarding agency. Representational art, argues Scruton, holds our 
attention because it shows a thought or intention communicated by the artist: Due to the 
mechanical causal process, it is argued that the link between representation and the artist is 
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broken. I have argued that Scruton’s conception of the aesthetic representation reveals an 
inconsistency in our understanding of the photographic artform. Whilst his conception of the 
aesthetic representation acknowledges a criterion that describes our aesthetic interest towards a 
painting, by virtue it seems to fall short of doing the same of our understanding of photography.  
 
I have argued that we may begin to better understand what is peculiar to the creative practice of 
photography if we rethink the relationship between the artist, her tool box and subject matter. 
The artistic practice of photography demands from the creator a unique attitude towards the 
expression and understanding of an intention. 
 
Therefore, integral to the aim in this thesis has been the re-assessment of the notion of intention 
as a concept that is at the centre of our understanding of the creative photography. In the last 
chapter I have argued that we need not consider representational meaning as causally related to 
the artist intention. In order to outline this view, I claimed that an alternative framework of the 
aesthetic representation is required; one which conceives of the intentional as de-centred. 
  
 
In this chapter my aim is to describe intentionality that is unique to the photographic medium. 
The intention or expression that engages an aesthetic interest is, I claim, to be regarded as a 
possibility that may be described as a narrative like fragment: Yet, we need not necessarily 
ascribe the fragment conception of representational meaning as a unifying; moreover, it is 
allegorically unifying. The allegorical notion of representation, as we have discussed in the last 
chapter incorporates representational meaning as a quality that forms in the detail yet does not 
regard that detail as equal in value to the whole – of the picture – as we might when appreciating 
the detail of a painting. As in so many of the photographs that I have discussed in this thesis we 
attribute the meaningful to something that is enacted by the subject by relating appearance to the 
photographic event. As Meyerowitz observes, in photographing, intention is not necessarily a 
unifying quality but illuminates possibilities that may hold our contemplative interest when we 
are looking at the photograph. Informed by Meyerowitz’s usage of the possibility of a narrative, 
our interest towards the photograph as – also – an interest towards the object photographed, 
relates meaning to the object photographed as possibilities. Yet, I claim that we can describe 
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representational meaning as a possibility that is intended by the photographer. To show that the 
representational meaning is illustrative of the photographer’s intention I will describe the 
narrative possibilities that hold our aesthetic interest as performative in character. In this sense, I 
claim that we appreciate the representational meaning as peculiar to the photograph rather than 
the object photographed. For Winogrand, representational meaning in photography relates not 
only to the object photographed but also the photographic representation; our interest towards the 
photograph is not separate from an interest towards the object photographed, rather the meanings 
relate to the object photograph in such a way that we might think of those objects as 
performative of their meanings: 
 
There's the sense that they sort of happen, [the photographs] 
rather than they are being made. At the same time, there is 
very much the look of a stage set. I think my work is 
theatrical.
289
  
 
My claim is that when we take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph we appreciate the 
representational content of the photograph as a performative element; the object photographed 
does not cause our aesthetic interest, but the object through the photograph. Therefore, what can 
be said about the meaning of the object photographed relates only to the way it looks through the 
photograph. The representational meaning of a Sugimoto, for example, is not merely caused by 
the objects photographed but as Winogrand argues the way they look photographed. I describe 
the essential quality of a way something looks photographed as performative because its 
representational meaning is in one sense taken on or performed by the object photographed. In a 
very rudimentary sense, I do mean that the objects photographed play the part of the 
representational meaning that embodies a thought expressed by the photographer.  
 
This view of representational art also enables us a better perspective of a de-centred notion of 
intentionality. Describing the object(s) photographed as performative of the representational 
meaning, we also acknowledge that the objects themselves do not necessarily intend the meaning 
that they appear to be expressive of – rather, they are enacting it. Neither do we recognise the 
way the objects appear – in the photograph – to be an embodiment of the photographer’s 
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intention. The photographer’s intention is not found by appealing to the way the object appears – 
as it might for an artist in a painting – but the way it appears in the photograph; a painted 
representation, for example, can show us the way the artist imagines the subject looks. 
Photographic intentionality, I claim, emerges not as the expression of a thought about the subject 
but as a thought about the moment: The photographer’s intention emerges not as a unifying 
thought about the moment but as a narrative about that moment – that is not necessarily unified 
or resolved by the objects photographed: the detail of the object in front of the lens carries not a 
single or unified meaning but, when photographed, a multitude of possible meanings emerge and 
it is in this ambiguity that the photographer’s intention is manifest. Gregory Crewdson’s work 
offers us a good example of this understanding of photographic intentionality; in creating his 
tableaus he is interested not merely what can be said about the way the object photographed 
looks but also what that appearance can tell us about the moment. Crewdson’s compositions 
often engage our interest as representations of a fragment of a narrative. In this sense the 
photographic representation is an image in which its representational meaning emerges as 
performed by the object photographed. 
 
My aim is not to suggest that a photograph or photographing sui generis is appreciable as 
performance: describing the structure of representational meaning as performative enables us to 
consider more concretely the emergence of the photographer’s intention. In photography, I claim 
that we need not think of the representational meaning as wholly determined by the artist’s 
arrangement. Moreover, the intention we relate to the photographer emerges as a possibility that 
we appreciate as performed by the object photographed. In this sense, we may think of the 
photographer as having a role within the composition that is more suggestive than interpretive. 
Photographs hold our aesthetic interest not merely because we see the subject but also because of 
the possibilities that are caused by seeing the subject through the photograph. The photograph 
does not give the viewer access to what is happening but can provoke a contemplative interest 
towards what we can see in the photograph rather than the subject. For Winogrand, photography 
enables the artist to express a thought, not about what is happening but as a performance of what 
is happening: ‘The Picture [photograph] plays with… the question of what actually is 
happening.’290  
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In this sense what the photographer wants us to take an interest towards emerges as a narrative 
like element of the composition. For Winogrand the narrative element unfolds as the happening 
that he captures with his camera: ‘I generally deal with something happening… What’s out there 
is a narrative.’291 The aesthetic content, in this sense, is not necessarily caused by seeing the 
object in the photograph but a representational meaning that we appreciate in such a way that 
leads us to think of the object in the photograph as performative of that meaning. Photographers, 
I contend often treat the photographic frame as a performative space; in which the object appears 
to be expressive of meanings that the viewer may or may not be able to attribute to that object: 
 
…maybe somebody's doing a certain kind of gesture and you 
wait for that to happen again because you saw it while you 
were paying attention to some-thing else. It can be very 
interesting.... I'll say it this way. I don't see photographs until 
I see photographs.
292
 
 
In this chapter I will discuss what Winogrand means when he says that he doesn’t see a 
photograph until it appears and what this can tell us about the role of the photographer in the 
creation of representational art. I will explore the notion that by responding to or arranging that 
which is in her frame, we may find that the photographer’s artistic intention emerges as de-
centred. 
 
In discussing the influence of Walker Evans on his own approach towards photographing, 
Winogrand describes the representational meaning of a photograph to emerge in the 
photographic event. The representational meaning for Winogrand, therefore, has a physical 
presence, insofar as we appreciate the meaning to relate to the object photographed: Photographs 
enable the artist to explore how meanings are revealed in the people and things he photographs. 
For Winogrand, photography enables him to express a thought about the familiar appearance or 
gesture. Yet, at the same time, these instances of familiarity are not – unquestionably – present in 
or possessed by the subject in any other sense than our appreciation of a gesture as a 
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performative act. Winogrand found photography to be aesthetically interesting because it allows 
him to create images that did not just document the subject but dramatized the gesture: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…I think in the end it's photography's own intelligence. It 
was the first time I became aware of the physicality of the 
photographic idea. I really became aware of it in a very 
muscular way. I had seen it before in the work of Henri 
Cartier-Bresson and stuff like that, but I guess Bresson’s 
work was too close to what I'd been seeing in Life magazine, 
so that it didn't dramatize itself in the way Evans's work did. 
Evans's work was outside the pale of that world of 
publication…293  
 
In this chapter, as I have mentioned I will describe how the photographer is able to express her 
aim; to explore how the de-centred intentional opens up a different approach towards our 
understanding of creative practice in photography.  
 
8.2: The photographic eye 
 
As Benjamin acknowledges in The Work of Art, essay photography allows the artist to think of 
the eye as a creative tool – whereas before it may have been in service to the hand. The camera 
has given the artist a tool with which she is able to take a contemplative attitude towards the 
visual experience of the everyday:   
 
For the first time in the process of pictorial reproduction, 
photography freed the hand of the most important artistic 
functions which henceforth developed only upon the eye 
looking into a lens. Since the eye perceives more swiftly than 
the hand can draw, the process of pictorial reproduction was 
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accelerated so enormously that it could keep pace with 
speech.
294
 
  
To understand how the camera has allowed the artist to rethink the eye as a creative tool is to 
first find its artistic appropriation in its proper historical context. In the first two chapters I 
considered the impact of photography on pictorial representation; in particular, Manet’s close 
attention to photographic technique in his depiction of the sitter. Photography entered a world 
that was changing rapidly. Not only in the artistic world, but our relationship to the environment 
was becoming transformed through technological advance. Transport, industry and the financial 
infrastructure, through scientific research and political reform embraced a new world perspective 
that saw our attitude towards the landscape alter irrevocably, as Ross King notes in The 
Judgement of Paris: ‘The railway... like photography, caused a shift in visual perception by 
altering the relationship between the viewer and the physical landscape, across which one could 
travel at speeds in excess of fifty miles per hour.’295 
 
Photography arrived, in a sense as a compliment to this change. It brought to both art and the 
physical world a greater sense of nearness at a time in which cities were growing upwards and 
outwards. Distance, due to improvement in transport was also becoming greatly reduced. Yet at 
the same time, the mechanical reproduction of our visual experience introduced a different kind 
of abstract perspective; insofar as the camera removed the human perspective. Photographic art, 
as I discussed in the last chapter has opened our visual experience to an appreciation of the 
optical unconsciousness: a re-presentation of our visual experience as an experience of the world 
that we do not always notice. What draws our attention towards the photograph was not 
necessarily the once before inaccessible, but the mundane and the everyday. The photographer 
found it essential to familiarise themselves within their chosen landscape. As Winogrand claims, 
the photographer is drawn towards the familiar gesture; for him it emerges through the 
photographic as a dramatic element – as though the object photographed were performative of 
that gesture.  
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Photographs have often been used to illustrate ideas about the world that may at first appear 
abstract or unfamiliar. When Eadweard Muybridge settled Leland Stanford’s bet in 1874, 
photography was still very much viewed as the hand maiden to both the arts and sciences. The 
Governor of California hired Muybridge to prove his claim that whilst in gallop all four of a 
horses’ hooves left the ground simultaneously – a popular argument of the day which may or 
may not have included a financial wager. However, Muybridge’s discovery illustrates not only 
the objective authority of the photographic eye but also acknowledges the photographic as a 
challenge to our perceptual cognisance of the familiar.  
 
Photography as illustrated by Muybridge allows us to contemplate the familiar and the 
conventional on a level that the painting naturally excludes; the potential to see and reflect upon 
an object and or situation as it occurs, yet the meaning relationships that we appreciate in the 
photograph, I claim, we are not always able to attribute to the photographic event; inasmuch as it 
is a machine that enables a different way of thinking about our perceptual access to the world. 
The camera, has given us new way in which we are able think about the eye in creative practice. 
In this sense, I contend is not simply an extension of our ordinary visual experience; the camera 
as an eye is a removed observer; the image produced by the camera does not necessarily give us 
a full view of what is recorded but with regards to our interest towards the object photographed 
reveals meaning relationships as fragmentary like. To attempt to endow the artistic photographer 
with the same intentionality as is available to the painter, I claim, misaligns our understanding of 
the artistic expression that we appreciate in the photograph. Artistic expression in photography 
which I will now consider cannot, I contend, be understood without some consideration of the 
use of the tools of the medium; an exploration of the photographer’s use her camera to a creative 
end will, I contend, give us a better sense of the parameters of intentionality. 
 
8.3: Creativity and the invisible 
 
To treat the camera as an eye, that enables us to see the world in a way that was not possible 
before photography is certainly a common-sense understanding of the photographic. Yet, I claim 
it often leads to our overlooking the creative potential of the medium. As the Muybridge example 
illustrates, photography does not just have the potential to extend our comprehension of visual 
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experience but illuminates the notion that we do not necessarily cognise what we see merely 
because it is before our eyes. As photographer Dorothea Lange claims, photography often 
provokes artistic inspiration because of its capacity to show us what the eye misses: ‘While there 
is perhaps a province in which the photograph can tell us nothing more than what we see with 
our own eyes, there is another in which it proves to us how little our eyes permit us to see.’296 
 
I contend that we may gain a closer understanding of the creative practice of photography by 
describing the photographer’s eye not as a unifying element but as purposefully disinterested 
towards the entirety of the detail before the lens. Since the viewer is unable to say that the 
photographic composition is wholly intended by the photographer, a more dynamic and often 
dissonant relationship is born between artist and her intentions. Intentionality, that we recognise 
as central to comprehending the artist’s expression is, I claim, de-centred in photography. 
Representational meaning, therefore, becomes fragmentary and takes on a performative like 
character in the detail of the work. We attribute meaningful relationships to the objects 
photographed, yet since we do not have access to those objects – but only their photographic 
representation – we may say only that the meanings appear to be enacted photographically; 
insofar as it allows us to see those objects through the photograph as representative of a certain 
meaning that we relate to the photographic event. 
  
 
The aesthetically meaningful content of a photograph, I claim, engages our interest as a re-
enactment; insofar as we react not merely to the way the object appears but what that appearance 
can tell us about the photographic event; since the viewer is unable to engage with the subject 
but a reproduction or record of the subject. In turning the camera on the familiar – or unfamiliar 
– the photographer creates an image in which the event that is captured in the exposure is 
dislocated from the moment that is often exposed onto the film or digital screen. The meaning 
relationships, therefore, do not form merely due to an appearance but relate to the photographic 
event. The meaning that we relate to an appearance, in one sense we appreciate to be 
performative, insofar as it directs our interest towards the photographic event.  
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The photographer, as both Winogrand and Benjamin acknowledge do not by photographing 
capture the Bressonian decisive moment but make something more akin to an incisive moment. 
The object before the lens becomes subsumed within the structure of the image in a way that is 
similar to the stone or block of wood out of which a figure is crafted. The representational 
meanings relate not merely to an appearance but the texture out of which the appearance is 
carved. As Siskind observes, the photograph may be appreciated as an act that is both engaging 
and engaged within the frame:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The object has entered the picture, in a sense; it has been 
photographed directly. But it is often unrecognizable; for it 
has been removed from its usual context, disassociated from 
its customary neighbours and forced into new 
relationships.
297
 
 
The act of depressing the shutter release observes Siskind subsumes and to a certain extent 
removes the subject before the lens from the context in which it is photographed and we engage 
with the representational meaning as performative. Yet it is not drawn whole into the 
photographer’s arrangement; as Benjamin acknowledges the presence of the object before the 
lens as somehow interrupted: 
 
...a different kind of nature opens itself to the camera than 
opens to the naked eye – if only because an unconsciously 
penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously 
explored by man. Even if one has a general knowledge of the 
way people walk, one knows little of a person’s posture 
during the fractional second of a stride. The act of reaching 
for a lighter or a spoon is familiar routine, yet we hardly 
know what really goes on between the hand and the metal, 
not to mention how this fluctuates with our moods.
298
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The photographer in this sense is engaged in withdrawing from the familiar the mechanism or 
narratives of its routine. These narratives, I claim, are aesthetically interesting because their 
intentions form as theatrically resonant in the object through the photograph. Whilst the viewer is 
able to connect with an aspect of the photograph that appears familiar, it is not necessarily the 
subject that appears familiar to the viewer but closer to a performance of familiarity. This is 
because the act that is perceived through the photograph may only be present as a possibility. 
Hence, an interest towards something that is familiar is closer to the re-enactment of that familiar 
aspect which is present to the viewer as a possibility. It should also be noted that it is not 
necessary that what is found to be familiar in a photograph sets the context for an aesthetic 
interest. 
 
The photographic document as expressive of a series of performed yet unfulfilled or non-
unifying narratives emerges through the work of many photographers. In Life is Perfect (2004) 
Paul + A – Paul Jeff and Sarah Dowling – enacted 50 myths and legends involving the murder of 
a lover, recording the performance on 5x4 Polaroid film. In this work the photographic document 
has two functions: to both preserve and explore the discontinuity of the narrative function of the 
photographic event. In this sense, the act of photographing concretises the event as performance. 
The record, therefore, becomes indistinguishable from the performance and only the presence of 
the shutter release cable in each image interrupts the validity of the acts of murder – performed 
before the lens as Paul + A note:  
 
As Performed Photography the photographs are not merely a 
record of the live art action, but the performative act and the 
record are collapsed into a single utterance and are 
indistinguishable as separate parts of the work. The 
photograph should not be seen as a record of an event nor is 
the performative act privileged as an event worthy of 
record.
299
 
 
In life is perfect the photographer as interpreter is not so much restored through the presence of 
the shutter release cable but is subsumed by the photographic capture: The act of photographing 
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permits a record of the event, yet at the same time it is an event that the viewer is unable to 
access. Therefore, the photographer becomes like the Isherwoodian observer, a passive 
interpreter yet actively engaged with her subject: ‘I am a camera with its shutter open, quite 
passive, recording, not thinking.’300 Through the loss of the centralised conception of the 
intentional, photography also enables the artist to distance herself from the subject in terms of 
developing the representation as a meaning unified by the intention.  
 
Rather than appreciating the intention as a unifying quality of representational art it emerges as 
fragmentary in the photographic event. For example in Jemima Stehli’s The Strip (1999) the 
intention emerges through the artist’s engagement with her subject. The representational 
meaning emerges not merely through engaging with the way the object appears in the 
photograph but the event within which that appearance is held. In Stehli’s Strip we see the 
photographer standing – with her back to the camera – performing a striptease for a man who sits 
in front her with a shutter release cable in his hand. We recognise Stehli’s intention not as a 
unifying aspect of the work but as allegorically composed; the structure of the representational 
meaning does not engage our interest as solely determined by the photographer’s intent but also 
forms in relation to the response of the subject holding the shutter release cable.  
 
8.4: Enacting intent 
 
The photographer often finds herself to be physically present in the photographic composition; 
be it in front or behind the camera. The structure of representational meaning, therefore, often 
emerges within parameters that are determined by the photographer’s relationships within the 
environment she is working. The photographer’s toolkit does not enable her to interpret the 
object photographed; as one might imagine the painter’s toolkit does. Moreover, it is illustrative 
of the way that photographers intend to engage with their subject matter – and so, I claim, we 
must think of style and signature in a different manner, from its place in painting. From Elliot 
Erwitt barking like a dog, to Diane Arbus’ necklace of cameras, photographers often enter into 
the image making process as complicit in the performance that I claim describes the 
representational content of photographic art. Not only in her use of the camera, but the manner 
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by which the photographer participates or engages with the environment in which she is 
working, demarcates the parameters of intentionality.  
 
There are at least three uses of the camera that we might notice when appreciating an ideal 
photograph; the photographer who uses the camera as a way of responding to the environment in 
which he is working; most notable in the work of Henri Cartier-Bresson. Bresson is noted for his 
description of the photograph as a decisive moment; in which the photograph is an expression of 
a fleeting harmony. Bresson would often dance along the street chasing his subject; partly in the 
belief that people would think him mad and therefore he was less likely to court confrontation. 
The photographer who uses the camera to create a response is often present in the work of 
Crewdson and White; photographer’s who are noted for their elaborate set constructions. 
However, we also find this approach in Sugimoto’s work whose work is elaborately constructive 
but does not involve the use of a studio. In the third instance the photographer seeks to remove 
recognition of the camera, the presence of the photographer or both. In this approach we are able 
to see how the structure of representational meaning emerges as performative: Photographer’s 
often treat the environment in which they are working as akin to a stage upon which the use of 
the camera becomes part of the performance. To this end photographers often use their toolkit as 
a means of working without being seen. Bruce Gilden and Philip-Lorca diCorcia’s use of the 
flash gun offers us a good example of this. Whilst both photographers use the flash gun as a 
provocative tool, to gain a reaction from their subject matter, it has a more base function: To 
distract the subject from the presence of the photographer. 
 
Gilden, like diCorcia often uses the street as his subject matter. He photographs the unsuspecting 
passerby by stepping into their path and thrusting both camera and flash gun in their face. Yet in 
doing so, it is not always the camera that provokes a response. Gilden’s intrusive style of making 
his pictures – and explosive use of slow flash sync – purposefully disallows the subject the time 
to respond to the camera. Indeed in the documentary, Street Shots Bruce Gilden (2005), Gilden 
claims that his subjects often respond as though he is photographing what is directly behind 
them.
301
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Gilden seeks to obliterate from the consciousness of his subject the camera. Although, more 
pointedly perhaps, the presence of the camera.
302
 Dealing with, or setting out the parameters of 
the presence of the camera is often central to our identifying the intentions of the photographer; 
in understanding the parameters of the response to the presence of the camera, the viewer also 
begins to understand the parameters of the idea that the photographer wants to express. In 
diCorcia’s series Heads (1999) like Gilden the street becomes for the photographer a 
performative space. As in Gilden’s work, diCorcia uses flash to illuminate his subject. But rather 
than use his presence to provoke a response, he photographs his unknowing subject using a 
telephoto lens – allowing him to photograph from a distance which gives him anonymity. The 
flash guns are attached to scaffolding away from the camera but synchronised to fire off when 
the shutter release is depressed. In this series diCorcia aims to challenge the role of photographer 
as documentarian by creating images that dislocate the relationship between photographer and 
the photographed: ‘Everybody’s used to seeing photographs that look like you’re part of the 
room. I and the camera and the point of view are outside this scene. I try to eliminate any sense 
that the viewer – and the photographer by inference – is participating in what is going on.’303  
 
Gilden and di Corcia’s approach, I contend, underlines the approach towards creative practice 
that is characteristically photographic: The development of the eye as both creative and critically 
reflective tool emerges through a performative engagement with her subject matter; both 
photographers seek out not simply the subject but a certain type of engagement with their 
subject. In doing so, the narratives that permeate their images seem to be a consequence of some 
kind of dialogue that is taking place either between the subject and the photographer or the 
subject and the event. In different ways, these photographers go about examining the meaning of 
the gestures – and their detail – that punctuates our daily existence; either by using the camera to 
respond to the gesture or provoking a response, it is a tool that the artist uses in order 
circumscribe the parameters of her intentions. Yet the intention itself is not pervasive in the 
creation of representational meaning; which emerges not as possessed by the object 
photographed but allegorically resonant in those objects as they appear in the photographic 
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event. Therefore, it seems fitting to describe the intentions as performed because our aesthetic 
interest towards the photograph is caused by the gesture that is enacted by the subject. 
 
This is evident in Shikuza Yokomizo’s Stranger (1998-2000) series insofar as the work is 
dependent on the participation of her subject. Yokomizo wrote an anonymous letter to a number 
of selected addresses. In the letter she writes that at a specific time in the evening she will be 
poised with camera in front of a window at that address. If the intended subject did not want to 
participate they would demonstrate their refusal by closing the curtains. If the subject was 
willing they are invited to stand in the room with the lights on. Yokomizo would make a portrait 
of the subject and leave without any further communication. 
 
The presence of the photographer, in the act of photographing, therefore, is not removed – yet 
neither does it elicit a traditional centralised notion of intentional control. Moreover, the 
photographer becomes a part of or engages in dialogue with the environment or situation within 
which she works. The subject is not passive aspect of dialogue but is actively engaged. The role 
of the photographer – as illustrated in Yokomizo’s Stranger series – is to set the parameters of 
this dialogue. Central to the development of a dialogue by which the photographer is able to 
conduct her creative practice, therefore, is often an ethical code; which underlines not only the 
photographer’s approach towards her subject but the parameters of expression; within which the 
photographer will explore. 
 
8.5: The creative ethic in photographic practice 
 
By examining the photographer’s attitude towards her subject matter, I contend we are able 
explore what is peculiar to photography in terms of its creative potential. So far in this discussion 
I have examined the photographer’s attitude or creative ethic in terms of the intentional. 
Particular to the creative practice of photography, I have argued is a loss of the intentional – at 
least a notion of intention central to the cause of the viewer’s aesthetic interest. Considering, 
therefore, what is central to the creative practice of photography has been a discussion of the 
changing relationship between artist and intent. 
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I have underlined the presence of the camera as axiomatic insofar as it determines the manner by 
which a photographer engages with her subject matter. Acknowledging the photographer’s use of 
the camera – in terms of its presence in relation to the subject – indicates the intention of the 
photographer; insofar as it shows us how the photographer seeks to engage with her subject, by 
setting the parameters of a response and the ideas that she wants to explore. Gilden through his 
use of flash aims to erase the presence of the camera whereas di Lorca seeks conversely, to 
obliterate the presence of the photographer – through his use of a long lens. Yokomizo’s work 
rests somewhere in between these two photographers: preferring instead to contemplate the 
complexity of consensual human relationships. The photographer, for Yokomize is both familiar 
with and at once estranged from the subject of her images. 
 
In the work of these photographers, the act of photographing plays an important role: The setting 
up of a shot, approach towards their subject matter and use of toolkit create an outline of their 
creative practice. Yet it is not an all encompassing structure. Neither photographer attempts to 
determine the outcome completely: the photographer’s intentions unfold within the parameters of 
engagement or set of rules that are necessary to establish in order to create a cohesive structure 
of representational meaning.  
 
The act of photographing, therefore, involves the adherence to an ethics that demarcates the 
conduct of the photographer which in turn establishes the parameters of engagement with the 
environment in which she is working.  The technical and stylistic tropes of a photographer’s 
creative practice may be – to a certain extent – scripted. However, the act of photographing, due 
to the causal derivation also emerges through the subject’s engagement with the photographer’s 
presence. We appreciate as central to the photographer’s intention an ethical code of practice that 
underpins the structure of representational meaning. The attitude towards not only her subject but 
also the tools of the medium often craft a body of work that is expressive of a narrative – in 
which both photographer and subject are engaged.  
 
The photographer’s ethic often forms in relation to the landscape in which she works. However, 
as the photographer Dorothea Lange notes, the structure of this ethic is not intended to become 
subsumed within her working environment. Instead, it is to be considered as disruptive; insofar 
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as she seeks bring to the surface of the photograph the abstract and idiosyncratic qualities of the 
familiar and the conventional: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this unwillingness to accept a familiar world photography 
puts invention to a destructive work. That the familiar world 
is often unsatisfactory cannot be denied, but it is not, for all 
that, one we need abandon... in its distrust of the familiar, 
photography appears to be in flight... even though we live in 
worlds familiar to each other, there is in the photography of 
how they are familiar a very special difficulty. If not by 
nature, then at least by tradition the artist is individual... His 
gift is not that which brings together but which sets apart. But 
in working with a world of the familiar this is not so much so. 
Then the photographer must himself become a familiarity... 
This does not mean the photographer need make a sacrifice of 
his right to express himself. On the contrary, he expresses 
himself – perhaps more fully – in a different way. Among the 
familiar, his behaviour is that of the intimate rather than of 
the stranger.’304 
 
For Lange, the familiar presents the creative photographer with a different problem – to that of 
the painter. For Lange that problem is in part bound up in an ethical responsibility; the 
photographer’s task is for her to adopt an approach towards her practice which will enable her to 
represent what she thinks about meaningful relationships in the environment in which she is 
working. The familiar or conventional for Lange is sufficiently striking without the aid of a 
fictional narrative. Her iconic image of the Migrant Mother (1936) perhaps illustrates most 
neatly this attitude towards photographing. If the photographer is to produce creative work, she 
must become a familiar entity within the situation she is photographing. The aim, therefore, is 
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not to wrest meaning from the situation/object photographed but allow it to emerge allegorically 
in the subject. 
 
Indeed Lange saw that the photographer in order to create expressive and meaningful pictures 
should develop a strong ethical code. Part of this process, for her was saturated in the 
photographer’s ability to familiarise themselves with her subject matter.305 In doing so the 
photographer is able to create images that do not impose authorial presence; for her this enables 
the artist to capture without distorting the nature of her subject matter. Yet she also 
acknowledges that it is not simply the photographer who is present at the time of photographing. 
The camera, she recognises, is a presence that both subject and photographer cannot avoid. It is a 
presence which not only has an impact on the photographers work but the practice of image 
making. An impact that we will now consider in terms of its effect on our conception of the 
pictorial representation:  
 
For better or worse, the destiny of the photographer is bound 
up with the destinies of a machine. In this alliance is 
presented a very special problem. Ours is a time of the 
machine, and ours is a need to know that the machine can be 
put to creative human effort... Though not a poet, nor a 
painter, nor a composer, he is yet an artist, and as an artist 
undertakes not only risks but responsibility.
306
 
 
Yet even for Lange, the camera presents a destiny that is often at odds with the photographer. 
Unhappy with the original composition of the Migrant Mother, Lange partially removed the 
thumb of her main subject from the negative.
307
 Certainly and perhaps contrary to the sceptics 
view, photography has not limited the artist’s creative control. Indeed, digitisation has enabled 
the photographer to work with an even greater sense of immediacy; digital photography, 
transforms the artist’s editing process. Not only does the digital back-screen enable the 
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photographer to have immediate access to the image but enables the photographer to think about 
the creative process differently.  
 
The negative requires the photographer to think about the depressing of the shutter release as a 
decisive and final act. With the advent of the digital camera, however, the act of photographing 
becomes a template; using a digital camera, the photographer can edit whilst she shoots. For this 
reason perhaps, the digital image in photography often comes under scrutiny for its apparent 
lacking in documentary value. Yet, I contend that contrary to ongoing debates regarding the 
photographic legitimacy of the digital camera one only need be reminded by the work of the 
Pictorialists. In particular, Oscar Rejlander’s Two Ways of Life (1857), a combination print 
utilising no less than thirty-two negatives. The potential for editing in photography, I contend, 
has not been transformed, but perhaps the creative process within photography has and will 
undergo a continual transformation. Innovation to photograph tools will potentially change the 
way in which the photographer has access to the image and its structure. 
 
 
8.6: The relationship between: subject, camera, photographer 
 
The artist’s relationship to her subject matter is of course in many circumstances determined by 
the materials of her toolkit. The tools available to photographers allow not only for the removal 
of a thumb but a wholesale transformation of the image structure. Nonetheless, I do not claim 
that the aesthetic character of photography is dependent on stylistic choices. Lange’s point 
regarding the familiar is perhaps more illuminating: artists often choose to photograph because it 
is a medium that allows them to engage with their subject matter without the necessity for 
interpretation.  
 
As discussed in the last chapter, the aesthetic value of an artwork in its allegorical configuration 
is expressive of a fragmentary rather than unified relationship – between the artist and her 
intention. Intention does not emerge as decisive or central to the cause of an aesthetic interest but 
as a narrative that is resonant in the photographic event. In order to isolate the qualities of the de-
centred notion of intentionality, I have described it as having a character that is akin to the 
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performative. Whilst the photographer is not able to produce an image in which all detail relates 
to her intentions there are certain characteristics of the photographic representation that may 
represent her thoughts. By familiarising herself within a chosen environment, she begins to 
notice certain gestures/objects that are peculiar to it. In the viewer’s appreciation of the 
photograph the recurrence of certain gestures/objects can tell us about the photographer’s 
intention. As Winogrand underlines, the photographer is drawn to her subject matter by noticing 
peculiar details or habits; idiosyncrasies that define a subject due to their repetition. As the 
photographer often uses the camera to explore her environment, repetitions and idiosyncrasies 
begin to crystallize into a narrative like structure. Yet because of causal provenance these 
narratives crystallize as suggestive rather than unifying fragments. The subject appears to 
embody certain meanings – due to an appearance that is situated in the photographic event – as 
an actor takes on a role.  
 
Photographing, therefore, becomes a strange process of elimination. As the photographer begins 
to build her body of work, certain observations begin to take a hold of the work – the series of 
images: These observations appear as repetitious details, characteristics that the photographer is 
drawn towards. Through the serial capture of these particular observations, both the work and 
subject matter begin to unfold certain narratives; yet it is a narrative(s) that we need not 
appreciate as unified by the photographer’s intentions. A helpful example of this may be found in 
Hans Eijkelboom’s photography.  
 
Eijkelboom’s creative practice involves a strict routine in which the act of photographing is often 
guided by tasks the artist sets himself. In New York by Numbers (2010), Eijkelboom, over a three 
week period photographed people who were wore numbers on their clothing. Shooting from the 
hip, he removes from his compositions the intention to frame his subject in a certain way but 
moreover emphasises the desire to use the camera to respond to his surroundings. Eijkelboom’s 
work develops its aesthetic value as a series: he is interested in using the camera to explore 
patterns and repetitions in our environment and consider how they often punctuate our 
meaningful experience of the world as narratives; yet they are distanced or dislocated from one 
another. 
 
224 
 
 
 
 
20. Hans Eijkelboom, New York By Numbers 2008 
 
In underlining the principles of Alfred Stieglitz’s working practice Jay Bochner also notices that 
the artistic practice of photography emerges through a self-explorative study of the 
photographer’s environment. The presence of the photographer is felt through the narrative(s) 
that emerge in her work. However, this representation of the artist can be strangifying as it seems 
to reject both interpretation and the centralised presence of the intentional. The creative practice 
of photography, therefore, does not simply document but reflects the place of the photographer in 
the environment in which they are working. As Bochner notes in his reading of Stieglitz’s 
Equivalents (1925-34) the photographer engages not directly with her subject but with the 
relationship or understanding that is shared: 
 
Stieglitz can never get close, [he] has in fact wilfully chosen a 
subject he cannot approach at all… All this defamiliarization 
tends to make abstractions of the Equivalents… while real, 
they seem not to have the usefulness of the real, and are this 
always opening up to the use of our imagination.
308
 
 
Indeed the presence of the photographer is palpable in the war torn landscapes that punctuate 
Don McCullin’s body of work. His intimate portraits often fuse the horrors of war with glimpses 
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of humanity; his eye, when trained on the intimate, has produced some of the most expressive 
and emotionally sensitive images that depict the limits of human strength and suffering. These 
themes that weave in and out of his often distressing images construct a rich and abstracting 
narrative. For example, in Dead North Vietnamese Soldier (1968) we see strewn beside a lifeless 
body a bag of bullets and an open wallet containing what we might take to be a photograph of his 
sweetheart. It is perhaps because of McCullin’s search for the humane in war that his images 
often reflect so much terror and ugliness.  
 
It is perhaps tempting to suggest that underlining qualities as characteristic of the photographic 
arts is difficult because of the mechanically derived causal process that determines the outcome 
of the image. For example it would seem difficult to suggest that due to the diversity of their 
subject matter and indeed approach towards composition that Witkin and McCullin share the 
same ideas about photography. Witkin uses photography to depict the surreal, whereas McCullin 
uses his lens to focus on a very dark realism; aspects of humanity such as war, famine and 
torture. Witkin’s images are fastidious arrangements, whereas McCullin’s narratives unfold 
before the camera – although it would be remiss to call them spontaneous.  
 
Nonetheless, in the work of both photographers, I claim, there is a shared vision of the 
photographic. Both claim that a photographer must not attempt to distort the documentary value 
of a photograph; photographing requires a sense of sincerity, not towards the picture making but 
the subject. It is tempting to say that this sincerity stems from a humanist perspective – and in 
McCullin’s case this element is certainly present. However, in this discussion I am concerned 
with examining an objective perspective of the creative practice of photography. If the 
photographer is interested in photographing a particular subject, the sincerity is often directed not 
only towards the subject or its surroundings but the narrative and/or dialogue that is affected 
through the convergence of these two elements; the causal and the performative.  
 
For a photographer the connection between the artist and her subject matter does not unfold 
between an interpreter and the interpreted. Rather it might be described as the unfolding of a 
intention in which the structure of representational meaning emerges as akin to a performance. 
The task of the photographer is not to interpret the event in which they are photographing, but to 
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become subsumed within it, without interrupting: As McCullin notes, the photographer must 
become aware of, or better still, a part of the atmosphere of that landscape in which they are 
photographing: ‘Photography for me is not looking, it's feeling. If you can't feel what you're 
looking at, then you're never going to get others to feel anything when they look at your 
pictures.’309 Likewise Witkin acknowledges that in order to express a thought about her subject 
the photographer must somehow become a part of her surroundings: ‘When I photograph a 
person, I basically become that person, if only for a short period of time. And before I 
photograph them I have to get their agreement, make them understand what I'm doing, convince 
them of my sincerity - even if they consider my sincerity to be crazy.’310  
 
Both Witkin and McCullin often take an intense interest towards a particular detail: A facial 
expression or gesture provoke the depression of the shutter release. Photographers, who make 
expressive works of art, are able to immerse themselves in their surroundings. They do not frame 
the subject but become familiar to its movements, allowing its details to form a sense of pictorial 
unity. Yet this is not a unity that we can attribute to the photographers intention, neither the 
picture surface: It is found in the image, yet only as representational because of the viewr’s 
inability to access the photographic event to which that image is causally related.  
 
Minor White’s protégé, Paul Caponigro saw photography as way in which the artist could 
directly engage with their subject matter; it enabled him as an artist to explore the subtle and 
suggestive quality of subject matter. For Caponigro the camera allows the artist to find in the 
detail of the our familiar surroundings, narratives that allow us to take a contemplative attitude 
towards the conventional: ‘Photography’s potential as a great image-maker and communicator is 
really no different from the same potential in the best poetry where familiar, everyday words, 
placed within a special context, can soar above the intellect and touch subtle reality in a unique 
way.’311 The conventional, for the photographer is an aspect of her craft which must resonate 
without perversion. Rather than use the hand to craft out the parameters of expression, the 
photographer trains the eye to gather information and familiarise themselves with her subject.  
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As I have discussed throughout this investigation, relating the photograph to a human intention is 
a difficult an onerous task: I have sought out to define the parameters of the intentional by 
claiming that in the case of artistic photography it becomes de-centred. This has led me to 
reconsider the notion of intentionality in representational art which I have described as 
allegorically forming in photography: this configuration of representational art, I contend, 
enables us to consider the intentional as a narrative like fragment of the artwork, rather than a 
unifying element. In resituating an aesthetic discourse on photography from a position informed 
by Benjamin’s conception of the allegorical, my aim has been to describe, like Scruton, a logical 
ideal of the photographic artform. Before concluding this discussion, I will not recap the process 
that has led me to claim that the photograph may hold our interest as representational art. 
 
 
8.7: The parameters of creativity 
 
In the first two chapters, I discussed Scruton’s description of aesthetic representation. For 
Scruton, our aesthetic interest towards the aesthetic representation is determined by 
acknowledging the artist’s intent.312 Scruton’s claim is that the viewer is unable to take an 
interest towards the photograph as representative of the photographer’s intention – to interpret 
the subject. That is not to say that the viewer is unable to find the photograph aesthetically 
pleasing; only that the aesthetic interest is caused by the subject rather than the photographer’s 
intentional control of the image. 
 
My response to this claim was to show the positive influence of photography on the creative 
practice of picture making; as a way of reconsidering how ideas about image making that were 
peculiar to photography informed the practice of artists who were working in the mid to late 
nineteenth century. Intentionality, contends Scruton, is central to our understanding and 
appreciation of creative practice. However, I have argued that in exploring the creative potential 
of photography, the absence of the intentional – at least a de-centred that is illustrative of the 
need to form a different approach towards representational art.  
                                                          
312
 Scruton, R. (1998), p.14 
228 
 
 
 
 
In discussing Walton’s transparency thesis, I considered the possibility that we might appreciate 
the aesthetic character of photography due to its transparency; since photographs are pictures that 
we are able to see through. Walton’s approach offers an alternative to Scruton’s interpretation of 
causal dependency insofar as he does not measure creative potential against the propensity to 
intend the image to express a thought about the subject. 
 
Finally, in my criticism of the transparency theory, I have considered the integrative theorists 
position who supports the claim that it is possible to take an aesthetic interest in a photograph as 
a transparent representation; we are able to take an aesthetic interest in the photograph, whilst at 
the same time acknowledge that a photograph is causally related to the object photographed. 
Central to this proposition is the claim that in order to take an aesthetic interest in the pictorial 
representation we must appreciate the picture as the artist’s perspective of the subject matter. To 
take an aesthetic interest in the photograph as a transparent representation we recognise two 
opposing characteristics simultaneously; firstly that a photograph is transparent to the object 
depicted and, therefore, our interest in the picture is an interest in the object depicted. Secondly, 
our interest in the object depicted is an interest towards the picture as expressive of the 
photographer’s visual experience.  
 
According to the integrative theorist we may take an aesthetic interest towards the photograph 
because we acknowledge that the photographer has consciously composed the photograph: Our 
aesthetic interest towards the photograph, therefore, is dependent on our acknowledging the 
photographers intention to point something out to us. However, as the photographer Luc 
Delahaye observes, the camera enables the artist to detach himself from the scene before the 
lens. Rather than emerge as interpreter, the photographer is distanced by virtue of the mechanical 
tool with which they use to make their picture: The photographer’s intention, contends Delahaye 
is to be drawn into the scene in which they are photographing:  
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I consider the act of taking pictures as artistic performance in 
itself: a sum of movements, which have no other finality than 
their own perfection. I am the only viewer of this part. The 
consequence is “being there,” fully and simply, without 
affects or emotions.
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In the first chapter I found, in Scruton’s argument, a position that could tell us what photography 
is not – in terms of its potential to be appreciated as an aesthetic representation – but on the other 
hand not a great deal of this discussion involved an understanding of creative merit; not that 
Scruton’s argument denies the value in the artistic potential nascent in photography, only that we 
are unable to appreciate the ideal photograph as an aesthetic representation. From this discussion 
I gleaned that the underlying problem that characterises a discussion of the photographic artform 
involves the demarcation of intentionality: When considering the potential to appreciate the 
photograph as an aesthetic representation we have often in our discussion been directed to as; 
“Can we appreciate the photograph as an expression of a thought about the object 
photographed?”  
 
Answering – or attempting to offer a solution to – this question has either led us to a negative 
resolution; due to mechanical nature of the causal process, or, a positive solution that equates 
composition with intentionality. Yet, like the photographic sceptic, I remain unconvinced that 
composition equates to intentionality. Mechanical causality, I agree, really does seem to disallow 
the creation of an ideal photograph that is unified by the artist’s intention. Dissatisfied with the 
positive prognosis I offered an alternative perspective of representational art, informed by 
Benjamin’s conception of the allegorical representation. In this notion of representation, the 
content that we appreciate as the representation of a thought is not recognised as the unifying 
element. Moreover, we appreciate it as an ambiguous or fragmentary like in character and so it 
emerges as one narrative within the work rather than its defining narrative. 
 
Representational art, I have argued, does not necessarily present us with an image that holds our 
aesthetic interest because we see it as somehow unified by the artist’s intention. Intentionality, in 
its allegorical configuration is de-centred and therefore, we do not necessarily acknowledge it to 
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be a unifying quality of the aesthetic representation. The notion that intention is not necessarily a 
unifying element of the aesthetic representation, I contend, presents us with a point of divergence 
from a notion of intention that is regarded as the cause of an aesthetic interest. The notion of 
intentionality – as de-centred – that I have discussed over the course of this thesis, I claim, sits 
alongside the view of the intentional, propounded in Scruton’s argument. Therefore, rather than 
being explicative of a claim that seeks to transform our conception of intentionality in 
representational art, my aim is to consider the creative character of the photographic artform, I 
claim that an approach informed by Benjamin’s allegorical conception of representation enables 
just that. The notion of intentionality in Scruton’s conception of the aesthetic representation 
facilitates a discussion of what is lacking in photographic art, rather than the possibilities that are 
nascent in its configuration of intentionality that are peculiar to the photographic medium. 
 
8.8: Photographic 
 
I have argued that the intentional input of the photographer must emerge in a different way. The 
painterly comparison within this investigation has operated as it does for the photographic 
sceptic: To illustrate that the practice of picture making for the photographer is removed from the 
kind of access that the painter has to her subject. I have described the photographer’s intention as 
a fragment of the representational meaning rather than its unifying element. To illustrate how 
this emerges through the work, I have drawn upon the image of the performance; to show that 
we attribute the representational meaning to the object through the photograph rather than the 
object itself.   
 
In Lee Friedlander’s street work, the people and objects he photographs often emerge as part of a 
chaotic narrative. By including his shadow or reflection, Friedlander often creates images that 
seem detached or curiously dispassionate towards their subject matter. His images are often 
packed with information; a close up head and shoulders shot of a woman in the street – from 
behind. A shadow casts the figure of Friedlander’s head on her back. To the right of the woman a 
hustle of cars litter the frame. Ahead of her, another pedestrian appears just visible and the New 
York architecture encloses everything, presenting the viewer with a fragmented and disjointed 
sense of narrative.  
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But this is Friedlander’s aim, to show everything functioning at once, all together, yet at the 
same time as unique and detached from one another. Photographing allows the artist to focus on 
the detail, to frame it, yet it also captures the unexpected. The familiar, in his images, often 
emerges as strange – allowing for disinterested contemplation – insofar as the detail emerges to 
strike up ambiguous relationships with objects to which that are otherwise unfamiliar; in terms of 
our appreciating an intended meaning. For Friedlander, a zest for the unexpected and unintended 
is crucial to the creative practice of photography:  
 
 
 
 
I only wanted Uncle Vern standing by his new car (a Hudson) 
on a clear day. I got him and the car. I also got a bit of Aunt 
Mary’s laundry, and Beau Jack, the dog, peeing on a fence, 
and a row of potted tuberous begonias on the porch and 78 
trees and a million pebbles in the driveway and more. It’s a 
generous medium, photography.
314
 
 
 
21. Lee Friedlander, New York, 1966.  
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In Friedlander’s work his intention emerges as a fragmentary quality of the work, neither unified 
nor unifying. The details of his images that perforate our imagination do so not as unified by an 
intention but in such a way that I conclude we may describe as performative: insofar as we relate 
our aesthetic interest towards a gesture or meaning that we attribute to the object as 
photographed in the composition – rather than merely the object photographed or the 
photographer’s intention. 
 
Perhaps there is no other image by another photographer that so succinctly demonstrates this 
point than Henri Cartier-Bresson’s Behind the Gare (1932). The photographic frame in Cartier-
Bresson’s picture gives the appearance of a unified intention: A unity that we are tempted to 
attribute to a narrative that is defined by the composition. However, this is a temptation that I 
claim, we must resist; as the photographic sceptic reminds us and I think we should adhere to, a 
photograph is dependent on a mechanically derived causal process. 
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22. Henri Cartier-Bresson, Behind the Gare St. Lazare, 1932 
 
Cartier-Bresson sought out something very particular through his work. Influenced by Eugene 
Herrigel’s Zen in the Art of Archery Cartier-Bresson saw that photography enabled the artist to 
dispense with the traditional parameters of the intentional.
315
 Cartier-Bresson took from Herrigel 
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an attitude towards creative practice that was unconcerned with intention. Instead the artist 
should submerge themselves in the perfection of technique, indifferent of their own intentions 
towards creative practice: The camera forces the artist to develop her practice through engaging 
with the world rather than a thought about it. Photography for Cartier-Bresson conveyed a sense 
of unity that certainly appears on the picture surface, yet it is not a unity that can be 
wholeheartedly attributed to the composition or the photographer.  
 
For Bresson photography both allows and betrays a sense of harmony; enabling the artist to find 
in the environment in which he is working an approach towards expression that does not require 
the imposition of interpretation. But then all the different objects in Behind the Gare St. Lazare 
do, somehow, look unified by design. And certainly we are able to interpret in many of Cartier-
Bresson’s photographs a fascination and playful attitude towards geometry. So what can we learn 
by claiming that what is peculiarly photographic about this image is its fragmentation? And 
doesn’t this seem counterintuitive when we think about photographs such as Behind the Gare St. 
Lazare?  
 
To think about how we appreciate the photograph as a photograph we must keep in mind certain 
qualities that are peculiar to the photographic image. As discussed extensively in this thesis, a 
photograph is causally related to the photographic event. In this sense, to take an interest in the 
photograph is to take an interest towards an image that unlike the painting presents its subject 
matter without the same kind of authorial presence. The photographer is unable, even by 
arranging the objects within the frame to present those objects as causally related to her 
intention.  
 
Therefore, in this sense, to interpret each object in Behind the Gare as symbolically unified is to 
evade what is photographically expressive about the image. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
synthesis in the photographic composition is fragmentary; we acknowledge synthesis as 
emerging through a narrative that is performative rather than finite: the objects seem to act out 
the meaning – and it is in this sense that we appreciate their meaning as representational in the 
photograph. The aesthetic character of a photograph, therefore, emerges as a narrative like 
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quality of the pictorial surface. This relationship can perhaps be best understood through 
descriptive analogy. I will break this down into steps.  
 
Firstly, if we regard the meaning relation of each object photographed to the image we 
acknowledge that their values are independent from one another and not equal in relation to the 
whole expression of the picture. However, we may also appreciate the picture appears to be 
expressive of a sense of unity. In doing so we, potentially, begin to notice that a certain pattern 
emerges; objects seem to connect with one another as we see them as nuances of a whole. The 
third and final stage is the acknowledgement that the photographed objects are certainly not – in 
their own right – nuances of a whole; in the same way that we might think of detail in a painting. 
Rather, each detail/object appears as both a separate and unifying element within the 
photographic frame.  
 
It is tempting to interpret the photograph as constructed in the same manner as a painting; 
inasmuch as all its parts either add to or contain the meaning of the image as a whole. Yet in 
doing so, I would agree with the sceptic, that we misinterpret the aesthetic character of 
photography. The aesthetic and creative potential of photography, I contend, lies, not within the 
interpretive or intentional but the performative character of its detail: insofar as the photograph 
does not sublimate the object photographed into a synthetically constructed meaning.  
 
8.9: Conclusion 
 
The view, presented to us by the sceptic follows that because the photographer is unable to 
interpret her subject matter in the same way as is available to the painter we are unable to take an 
aesthetic interest towards the photograph. Central to the sceptic’s claim is that the artist’s 
intention is the main or sole cause of an aesthetic interest towards the pictorial representation. 
The intention of the photographer – in terms of her making an ideal photograph – is not relevant 
in our aesthetic interest; since what the photographer thought about or wants the viewer to notice 
is not necessarily present in our interest towards the subject. In my criticism of this position, I 
have not attempted to contradict these basic principles; that the ideal photograph is understood as 
a causal relation between image and the object photographed.  
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Central to my re-assessment of creative practice of picture making has been the notion of 
intention. I have sought out to re-situate the concept of intention within the creative practice of 
photography; taking into consideration the different kind of relationship that is available to the 
artist vis-à-vis the potential to present her work as an interpretation of its subject matter. 
 
In this chapter I have considered certain characteristics that underline the creative practice of 
photography. I contend that it is counterintuitive to say that by simply pointing a camera at an 
object, the photographer is able to make an aesthetically pleasing image. Perhaps, the camera 
operator might get lucky and create one or two impressive images but doubtful an entire body of 
work. In this chapter I have discussed the photographer’s approach to her subject matter as 
defined by an ethics or approach towards her subject.  
 
In describing the creative process of photography, artists often discuss the camera as a tool that 
enables them to re-examine the way that they think about looking. For Edward Weston, the 
camera can be used as a creative medium if it used as a response to rather than as an 
interpretation of subject matter: 
 
…the photographer’s most important and likewise most 
difficult task is not learning to manage his camera, or to 
develop, or to print. It is learning to see photographically – 
that is learning to see his subject matter in terms of the 
capacities of his tools and processes, so that he can 
instantaneously translate the elements and values in a scene 
before him into the photograph he wants to make.
316
  
 
For Weston, the aesthetically pleasing is not merely found in or possessed by nature but is there 
to be teased out by the artist who is able to see photographically. In many of his nudes, the 
meticulous attention to the play of light acknowledges a form that reveals an aesthetic 
understanding of the photographic: His images are not abstractions, the forms that are created by 
the interplay between shadow and the human body do not distance the viewer from Weston’s 
subject.  
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23. Edward Weston, Nude, 1934 
 
It is the photographer’s attention to detail in this sense that brings us to the second category 
discussed in this chapter. The camera not only as eye but as a medium which has allowed the 
artist to revaluate the eye as a creative medium. As we have examined, the sceptic’s 
interpretation of intentionality often misrepresents the photographer’s intention in making 
creative artworks.  
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The photographer’s intention as I have presented in this chapter is not to transform the subject 
into a figment of their imagination; or to show in a way that enables the viewer to see the work 
as an expression of a thought about that subject. Creative photography reveals the photographer’s 
intention in a manner unique to the medium. The camera presents the artist with a creative tool 
which allows her not to interpret but rather engage – in a dialogic or reciprocal relationship – 
with their subject matter. As we discussed in the last chapter, aesthetic content need not be 
considered as, solely, an intrinsic quality of the artwork. I acknowledged that it is possible to 
interpret its character as fragmented; the representational meaning of the photograph emerges as 
fragmentary in quality. 
 
To describe the character of the creative practice of photography as performative, I claim, is to 
underline two notions that are peculiar to the medium. The first relating to the causal process and 
the de-centred notion of intentional control: Causal dependency not only describes the way by 
which we recognise the relationship between the image and the subject but also the change in 
character of the artist’s approach towards representing the subject.  
 
In effecting a loss of the traditional notion of intentional control the camera requires the artist to 
treat the subject as a participant rather than a passive aspect of her creative practice; insofar as 
the subject will not appear in the image in a way that is illustrative of the artist’s intention. In 
taking this approach towards her practice the artist provokes the viewer to appreciate the 
resultant image not as an interpretative representation but as a performative of the 
representational meaning. The notion of the performative relates not merely to the causal 
relationship but also meanings that are related to the subject as photographed. These meanings 
are not necessarily possessed by the subject but emerge as suggestive and therefore provoke a 
contemplative interest that is engaged not with the moment itself but its performance. 
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